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Inter-organisational networks of businesses such as Formula 1, information management 
systems, pharmaceutical industries, and aerospace manufacturers face challenges in for 
technological development, competition, and logistics. In such businesses firms form alliances 
with their competitors to tackle specific projects, expand their resource base, and overcome 
regulatory changes. Researchers have identified these conditions as ideal for fostering explicit 
and tacit knowledge transfer and the network as a source of competitive advantage. 
 
This study finds that it is networked individuals with high tacit knowledge content that are 
source of competitive advantage in such inter-organisational networks. These networked 
individuals impact organisational performance and alter the competitive balance within the 
network.  
 
The research is situated within the context of Formula 1. The business model of Formula 1 
involves trading and selling both technology and human resource with the competitors and 
reflects the important role played by tacit knowledge in this process. Formula 1 is an ideal 
context for this research as the grand prix industry is a fast clockspeed and small world 
ecosystem with organisations producing the same product i.e. the grand prix car. Formula 1 
teams innovate and respond to external challenges such as regulation changes via movement 
of networked individuals. These individuals introduce novel knowledge within the 
organisation, and play different managerial and technical roles.   
 
This research establishes other contextual factors that affect tacit knowledge transfer in 
Formula 1. The role of an individual in an organisation is salient when considering the effect 
of that individual on team performance. Individuals in technical and managerial roles affect 
performance to a greater degree than drivers. Regulation changes are key drivers of 
technological discontinuities in Formula 1, and the movement of networked individuals plays 
an important role in teams’ ability to respond to these regulation changes.  
 
The research findings are particularly relevant for industries that share Formula 1’s 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
A rise in interdependencies between firms and technological progress of recent decades has 
brought knowledge transfer in inter-organisational networks to the centre stage (Ahammad et 
al., 2016; Smith et al., 2007). Interconnectivity and rapid change has meant that people must 
share their knowledge pool with others, and learn from them (Szulanski et al., 2016; Stauffer, 
1999). Knowledge transfer is essentially an innovation process (Fores, 2016; Robbins and 
Milliken, 1978) and the ability to innovate is a core capability in businesses (Iyer et al., 2017; 
McEvily et al., 2004).  
 
Knowledge-intensive businesses, such as pharmaceutical, aerospace, and the automotive 
industry show superior innovation competence compared to other businesses. Innovation in 
these businesses is driven by various types of knowledge interaction and is result of ‘knowledge 
dissemination and application’ leading to improvement in firm performance (Fores, 2016; 
Palacios-Marques et al., 2013; Lazzeretti and Capone; 2017).  
 
Knowledge transfer can also be thought of as a process by which one firm is affected by the 
experience of another (Argote et al., 2000).  It has been made more difficult by rapid and radical 
technological changes and competitive pressure (Griffin, 1997). This process is incentivized 
by lower costs involved in replicating knowledge than the original costs of creation (Winter, 
1995). These factors act as driving forces for formation of strategic alliances (Parkhe, 1991; 
Szulanski, 1996; Szulanski et al., 2016; Lyles and Gudergan, 2006; Gomes-Casseres et al., 
2006; Dyer and Singh, 1998). An organisation’s structural position in an inter-organisational 
network of strategic alliances influences its opportunities and constraints (Borgatti et al., 2009; 
Burt, 1992). 
 
Businesses and organisations have invested in various initiatives to help the process of 
knowledge transfer in inter-organisational network of strategic alliances. While this has proven 
to be modestly effective in disseminating codified and explicit knowledge; it does not deal 
effectively with unstructured and non-codified tacit knowledge (Smith et al., 2007; Dalkir and 
Beaulieu, 2017).  Polanyi (1964, 1967) distinguished between tacit and explicit knowledge, 
and argued that ‘explicit’ knowledge can be articulated, codified and written down/stored in a 
media, and hence it can be; relatively easily transferred, ‘tacit knowledge’ can neither be easily 
articulated nor codified, even by an expert practitioner.  
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In fact, critical organisation knowledge often resides in tacit form (Boisot, 1998, Nonaka and 
Takechi, 1995). It is therefore important to understand tacit knowledge from an individual’s 
point of view to be able to effectively design and implement knowledge management practices 
in an organisation (Dalkir and Beaulieu, 2017; Bock et al., 2005; Kelloway and Barling, 2000).  
 
Movement of tacit knowledge is inherently connected to movement (and interaction among) of 
individuals within a network space (Deeds, 2003; Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000; Pfeffer and 
Sutton, 2000; Smith et al., 2007; Squire et al., 2009; Iyer et al., 2017). This interdependency 
between movement of individuals and knowledge transfer is highlighted by Smith et al. (2007) 
study in which they quote a participating manager, “wherever the term ‘knowledge’ is used, 
you should substitute people.” This implies that key to understanding tacit knowledge transfer, 
and its impact on organisational performance is to understand movement of individuals.  
 
Existing consensus in the literature is focused on the importance of the inter-organisational 
network and valuable, inimitable resources as a source of competitive advantage (Peteraf, 
1993; Dyer and Singh, 1998; Lavie and Drori, 2012). However there is no clear criteria for 
what makes a resource valuable or imitable. There is also a dearth of studies in the literature 
exploring the role of individuals and impact of linkages between them in the context of tacit 
knowledge transfer in networks. This study fills that gap and contributes to knowledge by 
visualising the importance of linkages of individuals on an organisation’s performance. At 
personal level, this research is motivated by author’s academic background in engineering and 
knowledge management research and wider interest in fast clockspeed industries.  
 
The framework for visualisation is developed using the social network analysis. It is a research 
methodology which has its roots in sociology. Over the years, social network analysis has 
evolved into an interdisciplinary methodology with the incorporation of mathematics and 
statistics. It can be best understood as a tool to map and analyse the social structure of nodes 
and their relationships (Freeman, 2004; Huber 2009; Leon et al., 2017; Moody, 2001; 
Wassermann and Faust, 1994). Recent years have seen a rise in number of social network 
studies (Monge and Contractor, 2003; Barabasi, 2003; Christakis and Fowler, 2009; Leon et 
al., 2017). Development of powerful computations tools for social network analysis (Agarwal 
et al., 2008; Lazer et al., 2009) have aided the application of social network analysis in different 




This study uses network of teams participating in Formula 1 as the case study for developing 
the said framework. The framework produces a network graph which shows movement of 
individuals, their linkages, and the tacit knowledge within the inter-organisational network over 
the period, 1992 – 2010. This network graph is used to identify and analyse tacit knowledge 
transfer and its effect on organisational performance.  
 
The proposed model also allows for self-validation using a dataset (Formula 1 data) and 
demonstrates that movement of highly networked individuals; those with high metric values in 
the Formula 1 network; is associated with superior team performance. This is a novel method 
of tacking tacit knowledge transfer and has implications for knowledge management and 
organisational performance.  These conclusions challenge the consensus in literature which is 
centred on the utility of the network as a source of competitive advantage and focuses at 
organisational level (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Lavie and Drori, 2012; Haas and Stuebiger; 2017; 
Leischnig; 2014; Lazzeretti and Capone; 2017).  
 
1.1.The Focus of the Investigation 
This thesis explores impact of individuals, their linkages, and the tacit knowledge flowing 
through the linkages on organisational performance in inter-organisational networks. 
Specifically, the research is guided by the following question, 
 
Research Question: How can we demonstrate the effect of networked individuals with high 
tacit knowledge on organisational performance in inter-organisational networks? 
 
This study is focused on understanding tacit knowledge transfer taking place within inter-
organisational networks and its impact on organisational performance. Tacit knowledge resides 
within individuals and to understand tacit knowledge transfer, it is necessary to establish the 
quality and characteristics of this relationship between the tacit knowledge transfer and 
movement of individuals. This study characterises individuals as conduits of tacit knowledge 
flows (see Chapter 5). This characterisation has allowed the study to identify, track, and 
understand the impact of the movement of individuals, and accompanying knowledge, on 




The findings from this study identify the individuals with high network-metric values have a 
positive effect on a team’s performance. Different category of individuals, such as engineers, 
designers, and drivers, affect team performance to different extent. This supports the hypothesis 
that networked individuals affect tacit knowledge transfer and organisation performance, and 
social network analysis can be used to map tacit knowledge transfer in inter-organisational 
network. This study highlights tacit knowledge as an important component of organisational 
performance.  
 
1.2. Background to the Research 
This research is focused on the inter-organisational network of Formula 1 constructors and 
automotive manufacturers. Formula 1 provides an appropriate setting to apply social network 
analysis and other methodological tools to understand movement of individuals and its effect 
on tacit knowledge transfer.  
 
Formula 1 is being increasingly used for management research (Castellucci and Ertug, 2010; 
Jenkins, 2010; Marino et al., 2015; Pinch et al., 2003). Formula 1 is an industry with yearly 
revenue of $16.2 billion (Sylt, 2015), employing over 50, 000 people in more than 30 countries 
(Jenkins et al., 2005).  Formula 1 racing calendar has 20 races each season with each Formula 
1 firm (called ‘F1 team’ or ‘F1 Constructor’) racing two drivers in almost identical cars.  Each 
driver and their team is awarded points depending on the driver’s finishing position. FIA, the 
governing body for Formula 1, requires all teams to construct their chassis internally (hence 
the name ‘constructor championship’ for the team championships). Teams can source engines 
and other components externally though a few teams chose to build their own chassis and 
engines (e.g. Ferrari, Mercedes, and Renault).  
 
Formula 1 offers at least four distinct advantages as a contextual setting for this study. 
• Formula 1 is composed of a global network of constructors, suppliers, and automotive 
manufacturers which are comparable in organisational size, technological knowhow, 
and are all focused on producing one specific product that is the race car. These teams 
are simultaneously collaborating to adopt to the technological challenges and regulatory 
direction involved in building a Formula 1 car and competing at the Grands Prix. This 
offers a remarkable ‘natural control’ and strengthens the validity of empirical analysis 
(Aversa et al., 2015; Castellucci and Ertug, 2010; Marino et al., 2015).  
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• Formula 1 teams’ performance can be quantified, measured, and compared. This offers 
a rare opportunity where availability of performance metric, that is grand prix results, 
helps in understanding effects of movement of individuals within the network and how 
that movement affect the tacit knowledge transfer process.  
• There is a wide availability of data on performance metric, movement of individuals, 
and technological capabilities of Formula 1 teams stretching from 1950s to the present 
day. 
• Formula 1 as an industry operates at a fast clockspeed and is reliant on innovation for 
competitive advantage.  
 
The top teams in Formula 1, such as Ferrari, Mercedes, McLaren, and Red Bull have yearly 
budgets, including sponsorship, partners, and Formula 1 prize money payments, more than 
$500 million (Hall, 2016). Lower ranked teams such as Force India, Williams, and Sauber have 
yearly budgets anywhere between $100 million to $200 million. Despite stringent regulatory 
measures and similar budgetary, technical, and human resources constraints, teams perform 
differently. This implies that the differences in team performance cannot be explained by 
vertical integration or corporate budget alone. This study explores how teams with similar 
resources derive competitive advantage. 
 
1.3.The Contribution to the Research: Gatekeepers and Small World Networks 
This research establishes that movement of key individuals (gatekeepers) facilitates tacit 
knowledge transfer. In this context, there is a correlation between movement of individuals and 
the performance of the organisation. Specifically, those individuals who perform higher on 
certain social network analysis metrics have a positive effect on the performance of the 
organisation. The research finding challenges the relation based and organisational ecology 
views of inter-organisational networks and argue that budgetary, structural factors, and 
organisational level cooperation cannot explain performance differentials, and it further shows 
that individuals, the gatekeepers, who are critical for knowledge transfer success and 
organisational performance.  
 
Study accomplishes this by mapping movement of networked individuals and the 
accompanying tacit knowledge flows in the inter-organisational network of Formula 1. By 
identifying a framework to track movement of tacit knowledge transfer within inter-
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organisational networks, this study also allows for a closer examination of tacit knowledge 
transfer process and has implications for wider knowledge management practices in inter-
organisational networks.  
 
Figure 1 Research contribution 
 
Research findings identify the non-traditional nature of Formula 1 as an industry and its ability 
to consistently innovate and adopt technologically in response to external factors such as 
regulatory changes and improvement in competitors’ performances within a limited time 
frame. Formula 1 accomplishes this via movement of individuals, which introduces novel 
knowledge within the organisation, and play different managerial and technical roles. The 
process by which Formula 1 adopts and responds to these external factors offers lessons for 
other industries such as video game developers and semiconductor chip makers which share 
Formula 1’s fast-clockspeed (Fine, 2010). 
 
Research findings challenge the relation based and 
organisational ecology views of inter-organisational networks 
and highlights  individuals, the gatekeepers, rather than 
organisations and the network as critical for knowledge 
transfer success and organisational performance. 
These individuals and their relationships can be tracked and 
visualised via social network analysis. 
Social network analysis metrics identify the gatekeepers who 
control information flows within the network and 
disproportionally impact organisational performance in inter-
organisiational networks.
Certain individuals are gatekeepers in the network and are 
critical for success of knowledge transfer and impact 
organisational performance. 




The inter-organisational network of Formula 1 is a small world structure which facilitates 
knowledge transfer and innovation. This is relevant for industries which share Formula 1’s 
characteristics of technological complexity, evolution, and competitive-cooperative alliances 
such as aerospace, pharmaceutical, semiconductor chip makers, and video game developers. 
Research finds that regulation changes are key drivers of technological discontinuities in 
Formula 1, and this study shows how the movement of networked individuals plays an 
important role in teams’ ability to respond to these regulation changes with innovation and 
technology improvement.  
 
1.4. The Structure of the Thesis  
 
Chapter 1. Introduction. This chapter has introduced the background to the research and the 
research questions that guided the investigation. This section presents an outline of the structure 
of the document. 
 
Chapter 2. Literature Review: Knowledge Transfer and Social Networks. This chapter begins 
by a survey of literature on knowledge transfer, tacit knowledge transfer and role of individuals 
in that process in inter-organisational networks. The next sections discuss two primary research 
strategies for studying inter-organisational relationships, and identify social network analysis 
(and small world phenomena) as the suitable framework for this study. The chapter ends with 
discussion of research questions and choice of the context for this study.    
  
Chapter 3. Research Philosophy and Methodology. This chapter begins with the section 
describing philosophical underpinning for methodologies and their triangulation. The next 
sections and subsections discuss interviews, case studies, and social network analysis. 
  
Chapter 4.  Context: Formula 1 – A Small World. This chapter begins with a brief technological 
overview of Formula 1 and description of key technological discontinuities.  This chapter 
identifies and categorises interviewees’ responses under labels used for analysis. The chapter 
ends with a section identifying key themes of the interview analysis.  
 
Chapter 5. Interviews and Case Studies: Qualitative Analysis: This chapter identifies and 
categorises interviewees’ responses under labels used for analysis. The chapter ends with a 
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section identifying key themes of the interview analysis. The next sections discuss three cases, 
Renault RS01 (first Formula 1 car to use turbocharges), Ford DFV (the most successful grand 
prix engine in Formula 1 history), and the Ross Brawn’s time at Ferrari and his competitors. 
The chapter ends with identifying key themes that have emerged from the analysis and 
compares them against interview findings.  
 
Chapter 6. Social Network Analysis: Quantitative Analysis. This chapter begins with the 
network graph and metric table for Formula 1 network (1992 – 2010). This is followed by 
discussion of team performance and small world nature of Formula 1. Next sections identify 
the top and bottom performing nodes. This is followed by description of how top placed nodes 
have positive effect on team’s performance and how nodes in certain roles affect team 
performance to a greater degree than others.  
 
Chapter 7. Research Findings and Discussion. This chapter discusses the key research findings 
categorised under the themes of movement of individuals and tacit knowledge, nature of 
Formula 1, small world behaviour of the Formula 1 network, way of doing things, and 
regulations and geographical proximity. 
 
Chapter 8. Conclusion. This chapter concludes by highlighting the key contributions to 



















Figure 2 Thesis outline
Chapter 1: Introduction
•Background and overview of the research. 
•Research question.
•Outline of the thesis.
Chapter 2: Literature Review: Tacit 
Knowledge Transfer and Social Networks 
•Overview of literature on tacit knowledge trasnfer 
and why it is important in inter-organisaitonal 
networks. 
•Challenges to tacit knowledge transfer.
•Framework for  tacit knowledge trasnfer
•Theories for studying tacit knowledge trasnfer in 
interor-ganisaitonal networks. 
•Social networks as a framework for studying 
knowledge transfer 
Chapter 3: Research Philosophy and 
Methodology
•Post-positivist research 
•Method Triangulation of interviews, case studies, 
and social network analysis. 
•Qualitative analysis focuses on literature review 
findings, interviews, and case studies. 
•Visualisation and quantitative anlysis using social 
network analysis and small world coefficient.
Chapter 4 : Formula 1 and Small World 
•Technological overview of Formula 1
•Formula 1 as context for the research
•Small World networks and Formula 1
Chapter 5: Interviews and Case Studies
•Pilot study involving interviews
•Validating tacit knowledge framework and its utility 
for the Formula 1 via interviews.
•Formula 1 case analysis to verify findings of the pilot 
study 
•Key interview and case study findings 
Chapter 6: Social Network Analysis: 
Visualisation
•Visualising the Formula 1 network 
•Small world Coefficient and Formula 1 network
•Quantitative analysis of the network to reinforce 
interview and case study findings
Chapter 7: Discussion of Research 
Findings
•Why movment of networked individuals results in 
improved organisational performance?
•How network visualisation supports the argument
•Comparison of research findings with exisitng 
consensus in the literature
Chapter 8: Conclusion
•Reflections
•Implication for researach, teaching, and industry 
policy.
•Limitations and future work
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Chapter 2: Literature Review: Knowledge Transfer and Social 
Network Analysis  
Knowledge transfer is essentially an innovation process (Robbins and Milliken, 1978, Fores, 
2016, Iyer et al., 2017) and it has been made more difficult by rapid and radical technological 
changes and competitive pressure (Griffin, 1997). Knowledge transfer is incentivised by lower 
costs involved in replicating knowledge than the original costs of creation (Winter, 1995). 
Knowledge Transfer is also a process by which one firm is affected by the experience of another 
(Argote et al, 2003). In the context of organisations, knowledge transfer is defined as the 
process through which organisational nodes- teams, units, and organisations exchange, receive, 
and are influenced by the experience and knowledge of others (Argote, 2012) 
 
Studies have considered other definitions of knowledge transfer, for instance Hansen (1999) 
and Tsai (2002) define knowledge transfer as knowledge sharing, Gupta and Govindarajan 
(2000) and Schulz et al. (2014) describe knowledge transfer as knowledge flow and Darr et al. 
(1995) and Lyles and Salk (1996) focus on knowledge acquisition. Literature also highlights 
the boundaries for the knowledge transfer Inkpen and Tsang (2005) and how inter-firm 
knowledge transfer is more challenging than intra-firm knowledge transfer. 
  
Firms’ are increasingly using alliances and mergers and acquisition to acquire external 
knowledge and it has become a central plank for firm’s success (Bresman et al. 1999, Lane et 
al., 2001, Iyer et al., 2017).  Intra-organisational knowledge transfer is another aspect of 
knowledge transfer playing a central role in a firm’s success (Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000; 
Schulze, 2001, Szulanski et al., 2016). These two aspects, strategic alliances and knowledge 
transfer within and across a firm have become focus of strategy and organisation research.  
 
Knowledge transfer can be unilateral or bilateral (reciprocal flow) and explicit or implicit. 
Implicit knowledge transfer involves innovations/improvements in one firm diffusing through 
an industry or region whereas in explicit knowledge transfer, members of strategic alliances 
initiate the process of knowledge transfer (Argote and Ingram, 2000). One of the primary mode 
for transfer of knowledge, either tacit or explicit between organisations is via movement of 
individuals (Deeds, 2003). This does not however prevent analysis of knowledge transfer at 




There are three levels of analysis for the study of knowledge transfer (Gupta and Govindarajan, 
2000), nodal (within a firm), dyadic (between two firms), and systematic (within an inter-
organisational network). This study is looking at systematic level and how to analyse the 
process of knowledge transfer within an inter-organisational network.  
 
Rebenitsch and Ferretti (1995) state that there are three important aspects to transfer of a 
technology, first is the technology itself. That is the nature of the technology that is being 
transferred. The second aspect is that of transfer mechanism, as in how and by what means the 
technology is transferred and the third aspect is concerned with the receiving firm, and its 
technological capabilities and ability to absorb knowledge. The last aspect is critical for 
knowledge transfer success. If a recipient is not able to decode and absorb the knowledge, then 
irrespective of the transfer mechanism and knowledge content, the process will not be 
successful.  
 
The context in which the technology has been developed by source firm is paramount to the 
success of knowledge transfer as the recipient firm cannot absorb the knowledge or even 
understand what is being transferred if it is working in a different context (Schulze et al., 2014). 
This is important in the context of inter-organisational networks. For instance, in a large supply 
chain network, a supplier working in minerals and ore mining and the end user in the 
construction industry have different working contexts. Without contextualisation, knowledge 
transfer in such a scenario is difficult.  
 
Szulanski (1996) explores this further and suggests four distinct stages of the knowledge 
transfer process,  
• Initiation (firm looks for required knowledge or offered relevant knowledge) 
• Implementation (focus of this dissertation) 
• Ramp up (recipient begins to use the knowledge) 
• Integration (recipient firm achieves satisfactory results with the transferred knowledge. 
Successful knowledge transfer results in knowledge getting embedded in the 
knowledge stock of the recipient firm and leads to a competitive advantage) 
 
Each stage of this process is affected by variables involved (Szulanski, 1996), that can either 
facilitate the process or create barriers. Some of these variables are,  trust (Chen, 2004; 
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Norman, 2002; Schulze et al., 2014), strength of ties (Cavusgil et al, 2003), tacitness of 
knowledge (Chen, 2004; Norman, 2002; Squire et al., 2009), absorptive capacity (Tsai, 2001; 
Lichtenthaler and Lichtenthaler, 2009), barriers to inter-firm and intra-industry knowledge 
transfer, tacit (Szulanski, 1996; Norman, 2002; Squire et al., 2009), overlap of 
resources/technologies (Song et al., 2003), prior alliances (Lyles, 1998; Lyles and Gundegran, 
2006), and proximity to the core competencies (Quintas et al., 1997, Ahuja, 2000).  
 
Out of these variable, certain key variables are frequently identified in literature as critical 
facilitating dimensions or presenting barriers to knowledge transfer (Szulanski, 1996; Chen, 
2004, Norman, 2002; Lyles and Gundegran, 2006; Ahuja, 2000; Song et al., 2003, Tsai, 2001; 
Schulze et al., 2014);   
Table 1 Dimensions of knowledge critical for knowledge transfer 
Dimensions of knowledge  
Tacitness Knowledge about the transfer process in strategic alliances is 
tacit and difficult to transfer (Szulanski, 1996, Szulanski et al., 
2016) 
Absorptive capacity Absorptive capacity is critical to success of strategic alliances 
(Tsai, 2001) 
Prior alliances Choice of partner for a strategic alliance is affected by the 
experience of prior alliances (Gulati, 1998) 
Proximity to core competencies Quintas et al. (1997) highlight the paradox of encouraging the 
free flow of knowledge while protecting the core competencies. 
Trust Schulze et al. (2014) highlights trust as critical for success of 
knowledge transfer 
 
Researchers have studied knowledge transfer in strategic alliances with a focus on the 
motivation for knowledge transfer. Firms collaborate and get into alliances to access 
knowledge already residing within the alliance partner(s) (Gulati, 1988) or create new 
knowledge and capabilities (Inkpen and Tsang, 2005, 2007). Collaboration has been considered 
an effective and efficient way to acquire knowledge and facilitate innovation. (Adams et al., 
2006). Grant and Baden-Fuller (2004) argue that alliances contribute to efficiency in the 
application of knowledge by, first, improving efficiency with which knowledge is integrated 
into the production of complex goods and services, and second, increasing efficiency with 




Studies have also focused on the relationship between knowledge transfer in alliances and 
innovation; firms that create and use knowledge rapidly and effectively are able to innovate 
faster and successfully (Tamer Cavusgil et al., 2003). In strategic alliances, knowledge is 
located ‘between’ the organisations and not ‘within’ them (Hardy et al., 2003; Quintas et al., 
1997) highlight the boundary paradox where firms have to find a balance between encouraging 
the free flow of knowledge and protecting their core competencies so as to stay competitive in 
the industry whilst dealing with knowledge transfer in alliances.  
 
Knowledge transfer has also been studied in specific industries; Lam (1997) studied a joint 
venture in a high technology industry and highlighted the importance of ‘degree of tacitness’ 
of knowledge. Studies have also focused on how knowledge is actually transferred between 
partners (Appleyard, 1996; Baughn et al., 1997; Choi and Lee 1997; Dodgson 1996; Mowery 
et al., 1996). Garud and Nayyar (1994) examined dimensions of technological knowledge that 
affect knowledge transfer over time and highlighted the role of ‘transformative capacity.’ 
Simonin (1999) studied the role of knowledge ambiguity pertaining to the process of 
knowledge transfer in strategic alliances and found that knowledge ambiguity acts as a 
mediator of tacitness, prior experiences, complexity, cultural distance, and organisational 
distance on knowledge transfer. Lyles and Salk (1996) study shows how knowledge is acquired 
in alliances and joint ventures from parent organisations.  
 
Doz (1996) examined implications of knowledge and learning on the evolution process of the 
collaboration and its outcomes. Cummings and Teng (2003), in their study found that ‘more 
types and numbers of transfer activities contribute to the transfer success”. Their paper also 
suggested that in new product development, reducing the norm distance; the extent to which 
involved parties share similar understanding and ideas about the knowledge transfer project 
between the source and recipient is essential to transfer success. Norman (2002) found in her 
research that in a strategic alliance, firms are more protective when capabilities they contribute 
to the alliance are highly tacit and core and recipient firm has higher learning intent.  
 
Schulze et al. (2014) discuss the impact of disseminative capability on knowledge transfer in 
alliances and collaborations in automotive industry and identified variables affecting 
knowledge transfer success. Pinch et al. (2003) studied how clusters evolve over time and affect 
the learning capacity of firms and facilitating rapid dissemination of knowledge. Inkpen (2008) 
studied knowledge transfer in an alliance between Toyota and General Motors with focus on 
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organisational processes used to transfer knowledge. Jenkins and Tallman (2015) highlight the 
role of geography of knowledge source in internalizing the knowledge from another firm, and 
eventually radically transforming the recipient firm.  
 
Researchers have studied the motivation behind knowledge transfer in strategic alliances 
(Kogut, 1988; Inkpen and Tsang, 2005; Grant and Baden-Fuller, 2004), how ‘knowledge is 
actually transferred’ (Appleyard 1996; Aversa et al., 2015; Baughn et al., 1997; Choi and Lee 
1997; Dodgson 1996; Mowery et al., 1996), and variables affecting knowledge transfer (and 
success) (Garud and Nayyar, 1994; Simonnin, 1999; Cummings and Teng, 2003; Schulze et 
al., 2014). In literature, while some studies, such as Lam (1997), Cummings and Teng (2003), 
Pinch et al. (2003), Lin (2007), and Jenkins (2010) do focus on specific variables (or 
characteristics) of an industry when discussing the knowledge transfer process, but there is a 
dearth of research on the mechanisms for transfer of knowledge.  
 
Recent studies in the literature have also highlighted the critical role of variables, technological 
competence (Ahuja, 2000; Pinch et al., 2003; Aversa et al., 2015), competition (Yoshino and 
Rangan, 1995; Gomes-Casseres, 2006; Pinch et al., 2003), and evolution of knowledge (Rond 
and Marjanovic, 2006; Jenkins and Tallman, 2015) in the implementation of knowledge 
transfer process in strategic alliances. These industry variables (competence, competition, and 
evolution) and knowledge transfer dimensions are constantly interacting within the inter-
organisational network which is also a source of organisational competitive advantage (Dyer 
and Singh, 1998; Van Wijk et al., 2008) and facilitates knowledge transfer (Easterby-Smit et 
al., 2008). 
 
2.1. Tacit Knowledge Transfer  
Codifying knowledge (Chen, 2004), research and development collaborations (Cummings and 
Teng, 2003) and inter-personal networks (Reagans and McEvily, 2003) greatly reduce the 
knowledge transfer time in strategic alliances. Primary variables affecting knowledge transfer 
are, discussion bias (Kim, 1997), firms focusing on the collectively held knowledge, and failing 
to recognize the unique individual knowledge. Trust, communication and supplier flexibility 
also influence knowledge transfer (Zhao and Lavin, 2012).  
 
Argote and Ingram (2000) argue that problem of knowledge transfer in organisations go beyond 
the individual level and instead involves higher levels such as units within the organisation, 
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department or organisation itself. Most of the human knowledge is context bound and highly 
embedded within the individuals in the organisation, and this is further exaggerated if the 
organisation is working in a technologically advanced field, such as automotive industries or 
IT industries (Lam, 97).  Furthermore, Nelson and Winter (1994) argue that knowledge is 
mostly tacit, context bound and firm specific and therefore presents a considerable challenge 
when it comes to transferring one firm’s knowledge to another.  
 
To further understand the knowledge transfer, one must consider the nature of knowledge and 
how it resides in humans. Michael Polanyi (1964, 1967; 4) said,  
 
“I shall reconsider human knowledge by starting from the fact that we can know more than we 
can tell” 
 
Polanyi is referring to ‘tacit’ knowledge with ‘know more than we can tell’ clause. He argues 
that while ‘explicit’ knowledge can be articulated, codified and written down/stored in a media, 
and hence making it relatively easy to transfer it, tacit knowledge can neither be easily 
articulated nor codified, even by an expert practitioner. Manuals are a good example of explicit 
knowledge whereas knowledge of how to design and integrate various mechanical and 
electrical components to build a grand prix race car is an example of tacit knowledge.  
 
In this context of ‘tacitness’, knowledge transfer presents a challenge. Organisations, deposit 
Rebenitsch and Ferretti (1995), are a mash of embodied knowledge that includes technological 
expertise, interpersonal relationships, and organisational hierarchy. Their conclusion suggests 
that knowledge ‘construct’ or ‘architecture’ of each firm is unique and a serious hindrance to 
knowledge transfer. Therefore, the ability of a firm to clearly articulate the embedded 
knowledge becomes crucial for successful knowledge transfer. 
 
 Lam (1997: 994) further elaborates on this in his study of a joint venture between a British and 
Japanese firm, and highlights the importance of ‘degree of embedded knowledge and social 
organisation systems’ of firms to success (or failure) of knowledge transfer. He further argues 
that in the context of ‘high-technology’ collaborations, ‘…difficulties in the transfer of 
knowledge arise not simply from the ’tacit’ nature of knowledge itself, but from differences in 
the degree of tacitness of knowledge and the way in which it is formed, structured and utilized 
 16 
 
between firms in different countries.’ This is relevant to the context of this research as Formula 
1 teams collaborate with, and in some instances are part of the wider automotive industry.  
 
Tacit knowledge is most difficult component of knowledge transfer process. Polanyi (1964) 
has argued that tacit knowledge is not articulated and unspoked. Tacit knowledge has an 
intuitive and personal character and therefore is much more difficult to give structure and 
communicate. Nonaka and Takeuchi (1991) argue that tacit knowledge resides within 
individuals’ minds and their abilities. Transfer of tacit knowledge is dependent on transmission 
capacity (Argote et al., 2003) and learning of individuals (Ferdows, 2006). Tacit knowledge 
has many elements that facilitate business routines and are transferable between individual or 
groups of individuals. It represents the characteristic, corporate structure, and accumulated 
knowledge base of an organisation (Battistella et al., 2016). Tacit knowledge can be 
accumulated through a process of continuous and dynamic development of the knowledge 
already within the organisation. This development and evolution of the knowledge already 
residing within the organisations take place through the process of accumulation of new 
experience, working practices, and operations involving direct contact.  
 
Argote and Ingram (2000) highlight the difficult of replicating tacit knowledge and its potential 
benefit to the competitive advantage of the firm. This implies that organisations have to 
continuously regenerate and adapt their skillset and promote knowledge at every level of the 
firm.  This approach to tacit knowledge is akin to the resource based view of the firm 
(Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 2001a, 2001b; Lado and Wilson, 1994; Penrose, 1959) where firms’ 
derive their competitive advantage from a bundle of resources such as assets, capabilities, 
attributes, (tacit and explicit) knowledge, and internal practices. Tacit knowledge is important 
for a firm’s success in dynamic and inter-connected environments (Lavie and Drori, 2012; 
Gulati et al., 2011; Sirmon et al., 2007). 
 
Framework for Tacit Knowledge Transfer 
The literature survey has highlighted a series of different attributes that affect the knowledge 
transfer process. These attributes can be arranged into a framework to focus the study on the 






Figure 3 Framework for Tacit Knowledge Transfer 
 
The tacit knowledge transfer takes place via individuals moving and interacting within and 
without the organisational boundary in the inter-organisational network. This process is 
affected by many factors, as shown in figure 3. The factors described in figure 3 not only affect 
the tacit knowledge transfer but also interact among themselves. The following table gives a 
summary of how these factors interact and affect tacit knowledge transfer,  
 
Table 2 Factors affecting tacit knowledge transfer 
Degree of tacitness 
A history of prior alliances and absorptive 
capacity can facilitate transfer of highly context 
bound knowledge 
Highly context bound, and tacit knowledge is difficult 
to transfer.  
Absorptive capacity Ability to identify and assimilate relevant knowledge 
in partners is a key factor for the success of knowledge 
transfer.  
Prior alliances 
Trust between network partners grows with a 
history of successful prior alliances. 
A history of prior alliances can encourage knowledge 
transfer between partners.   
Trust High level of trust encourages knowledge flows and 



















Proximity to core competencies 
Trust between organisations can facilitate a 
more cooperative relationship around core 
competencies. 
Organisations are reluctant to share their core 
competencies with their partners.  
Technology Specialised and complex technologies are difficult to 
transfer.  
Competition  
Competition beyond alliance boundaries 
motivates knowledge transfer. 
Competition between alliance partners can be 
detrimental for knowledge transfer process 
Evolution of the industry Industries with fast clockspeeds affect knowledge 




Tacit knowledge transfer has implications for organisational performance and since, tacit 
knowledge resides within individuals, the linkages and relationships among them also have an 
impact on organisational performances.  
 
This discussion has highlighted the role played by individuals and their relationships in tacit 
knowledge transfer in inter-organisational networks. The next section discusses inter-
organisational relationships and methodologies used to study them.  
 
2.2. Inter-organisational Relationships 
Understanding inter-organisational relationships is fundamental to understanding knowledge 
transfer process in networks of organisations. Inter-organisational relationships have received 
growing attention from management scholars. This is in part driven by realisation that 
organisations do not fail or succeed in isolation but as part of an industry network.  
 
Scholars in strategy research and system thinking identify goals (such as sustainability and 
ability to respond to changes) that can only be achieved if organisations operate within a 
network and manage their social interactions (Fiksel, 2006).  Helfat et al. (2009) identify inter-
organisational networking as one of the key strategies for maintaining flexibility and ability to 
respond quickly to challenges. Different theories have been proposed by different scholars to 
study inter-organisational relationships such as transaction cost economics (Ebers and 
Oerlemans, 2016), or resource based view as part of agency theory (Arya and Lin, 2007), and 
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network theories and social network analysis (Bergenholtz and Waldstrom, 2011). The two 
main perspectives for studying inter-organisational relationships are distinguished by how they 
explain inter-organisational relationships (Rossignoli and Ricciardi, 2015). 
  
The first perspective consists of theories which explain inter-organisational relationships in 
terms of coordination and control needs. These theories describe inter-organisational 
relationships as founded on opportunities and bounded rationality (Rossignoli and Ricciardi, 
2015).  Transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1975, 1981, 1989), agency theory 
(Eisenhardt, 1989), and resource dependency theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003) are the main 
theoretical perspectives following this approach. Scholars subscribing to these theories 
maintain that organisations in inter-organisational networks are trying to control the network’s 
critical aspects to pursue their own goals.  
 
Theories following the second perspective explain inter-organisational relationships in terms 
of strategic challenges and posit that these relationships determine an organisation’s strategic 
capabilities of competitiveness and innovations. Organisational ecology (Hannan and Freeman, 
1977), resource based view (Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Barney and Arikan 2001; Peteraf 1993; 
Lado and Wilson 1994; Dyer and Singh, 1998), and social network analysis (Hansen, 1999; 
Burt, 2001, Burt, 2005; Uzzi and Spiro, 2005; Ahuja, 2000; Schilling and Phelps, 2007; Phelps 
et al., 2012) follow the second approach.  
 
Table 3 inter-organisational relationship theories (adopted from Rossignoli and Riccardi, 2015) 
Perspective Theories 
Coordination and Control Needs Transaction Cost Economics, 
Agency Theory,  
Resource Dependency Theory. 
Strategic Challenges Organisational Ecology, 
Resource Based View (and Relational View), 
Network Theories and Social Network Analysis. 
 
 
2.3.1. Coordination and Control Needs 
Transaction Cost Economics 
Transaction Cost Economics theory has its roots in work of Commons (1934) and Coase 
(1937).  Coase (1937) argues that if production is assumed to be regulated by price movements 




Coase’s work attempted to justify the existence of organisations and how they organise 
internally. This work was later expanded by Williamson (1981) who co-opted the 
microeconomic approach, taking a contradictory position to the traditional view of the firm as 
defined in neo-classical theory. The central thesis of transaction cost economics is about the 
role of price as the co-ordinating mechanism and the associated transaction costs. Thus, more 
complex the transactions, higher the costs involved.  
 
Rossignoli and Ricciardi (2015) identify the dynamic between hierarchy and market as central 
to transaction cost theory. This approach put an emphasis on the transaction as the base analysis 
unit. Williamson (1989) argues for the need of organisations by highlighting how certain 
combination of factors can make markets inefficient mechanism for governing transactions, 
and hence making a hierarchy cheaper to use.  Transaction cost economics aims to explain 
unforeseeable costs arising from unpredictable markets such as bounded rationality, 
information asymmetries, and the potential for opportunistic behaviour.  
 
Agency Theory 
Work of scholars such Wilson (1968), Arrow (1986), Ross (1973), and Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) led the foundation of agency theory. Agency theory is concerned with sharing of risk. 
Agency problem occurs when one party or individual; called the principal, delegates work to 
another party or individual; called the agent who performs the work. The agency relationship 
framework is universal and can be applied in any context. For instance, the relationship 
between a project leader and researcher can be analysed with this framework. It can also be 
used to analyse and study inter-organisational relationships, such as supply chain relationships 
which are affected by agency problems.  
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) used the lexicon of ‘contract’ to describe the relationship between 
the agent and the principal. Contract is the primary unit of analysis in agency theory. Agency 
theory aims to determine the most effective contract and other aspect of the agent and the 
principal such as their self-interest, rationality, attitude towards risk. Aspects such as 
organisations and their conflicts and the information as commodity are also explored through 




The agency theory and transaction costs economics arise from two different traditions in 
economics. The former focuses on contracts between two entities or individuals, regardless of 
boundaries whereas later is focused on organisational boundaries.  But agency theory and 
transaction costs economics also share many similarities as observed by Williamson (1975). 
Assumptions of self-interest and (bounded) rationality are foundational for both theories and 
focus is on economic mechanisms for managing conflicts, incentives, and prices. However, 
both perspectives do not take social and political aspects into consideration. Socio-political 
mechanisms of power, negotiations, and personal relationships are not considered.  
 
Resource Dependence Theory  
Scarcity of resources is one of the primary reason for uncertainty in the competitive market. 
Efforts of competitors control critical resources beyond their organisational boundaries and 
unpredictable and sudden changes in market conditions are other contributing factors. This 
motivates firms to form alliances and relationships, especially with the firms with 
complementary competencies and resources.  
 
Pfeffer and Salancik (2003) build their theory of resource dependence around this central 
theme. In resource dependence theory, operating environment and social context of the 
organisation plays an important role. Even the decisions made within the organisational 
boundary is affected by the external environment.  
 
Organisations are interdependent and part of a wider network of social relations. Driving force 
behind this interdependence, which could be reciprocal or partial, is lack of any firm’s ability 
to generate all the resources it needs to operation and be competitive with the external 
environment. Resources are dependent on the external environment and its inherent complexity 
and dynamism (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003.)  
 
2.3.2. Strategic Challenges 
The inter-organisational relationships theories that focus on coordination and control needs do 
not consider the social and political context in which organisations operate and the role of 
individuals within that context. In this regard, theories which treat inter-organisational 




The framework of organisational ecology analyses inter-organisational relationships through 
the lens of evolutionary biology. Organisational ecology first came to the attention of scholars 
in the 1970s (Hannan and Freeman, 1977).  Different organisational theories share one core 
idea that is the organisational type, also known as organisational form. Organisation type is an 
identifier for the class of an organisation. This type is reflection of organisations that share 
relatively same set of external environmental vulnerabilities. Organisations of similar type 
share same set of rules to produce their outputs and compete for same resources.  
 
Organisational type is analogous to what is labelled the business model in present day 
discussions between management scholars. Hannan (2005) identifies two primary factors that 
influence organisations, competition and constraints. Competition influences organisations by 
making resources scarce. These resources can be financial, supplier relationships, or the end 
consumer. Irrespective of an organisation’s relationship with its competitors, it is influenced 
by the competition for resources.   Constraints can be internal and external, and come in form 
economic constraint, consumer opinion and choices, or technological innovation.      
Organisational ecology view is a firm level tool to explore inter-organisational relationships 
and does not explore the relationship dynamics at individual level.  
 
Resource Based and Relational View of the Firm  
Wernerfelt (1984) in his article, A Resource based View of the Firm argued that a firm’s 
resources can be a source of competitive advantage. For these resources (and capabilities) to 
provide competitive advantage and financial success, they must be durable, heterogeneous, 
immobile, and inimitable (Barney and Arikan, 2001; Lado and Wilson, 1994). This leads to the 
question of how some firms can sustain competitive advantage and financial profit, whereas 
others fail. Wernerfelt (1984) argued that firms are more than just a bundle of contracts, they 
are bundle of resources (Penrose, 1959). Resources mean assets, capabilities, attributes, (tacit 
and explicit) knowledge, and internal practices.  
 
A firm controls its resources to drive efficiency, efficacy, and super performance (Barney and 
Arikan, 2001).  Superior performance is a concept that refers to higher than expected value 
generated by resources, resulting in implementation of (value creation) strategies that are 
difficult for competitors to copy. This approach to strategic analysis highlights a firm’s ability 
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to generate more value than its competitors as a source of competitive advantage (Barney and 
Arikan, 2001) This ability is dependent on physical assets such as hardware, technologies, 
production facilities, geographical location, supply chain, and non-physical assets such as 
intellectual capital and tacit knowledge residing within individuals in the organisation.  
 
A resource based view is the dominant paradigm in the field of operations management and 
sub fields (supply chain management, operations strategy, performance management, and 
product and service innovation) and strategy management research (Hitt et al., 2016). Many 
recent developments in the resource based view come from scholars working in the strategic 
management research (see Dyer and Singh, 1998). The field of strategic management is 
concerned with understanding how firms differentiate themselves from their competition to 
achieve a sustained competitive advantage and therefore it is not entirely surprising that 
researchers working in the field translate Penrose (1959) and Wernerfelt’s (1984) ideas for 
understanding how firms gain competitive advantage. 
 
Within the subfields of operations management, the resource based view is particularly relevant 
for operations strategy. Operations strategy deals with how to effectively use inputs and process 
capabilities to produce outputs that help to achieve business and corporate goals (Hitt et al., 
2016; 79). These goals include ability to innovate, product related competencies, quality, and 
profits (Ahmed et al., 1996). Anderson et al. (1989; 133) argue that “proper strategic 
positioning or aligning of operations capabilities can significantly impact competitive strength 
and business performance of an organization.” Since operation strategy treats operations as a 
strategic process of positioning resources and capabilities, the resource based view 
complements operations strategy with a focus on acquiring and bundling the strategic resources 
to create capabilities that are leveraged to achieve a competitive advantage (Tiff et al., 2015; 
80). The resource based view also emphasises synchronisation of the processes involved in 
acquiring, bundling, and leveraging resources, which is a focus for operations strategy research 
(Shah and Ward, 2003; Pilkington and Meredith, 2009). 
 
This study is located at the intersection of operations strategy and strategic management 
research, therefore the resource based view, and other corollaries need to be explored as 




Over the years, scholars have built on the resource based view, and its treatment of resource 
and assets to develop ‘relational view’ (Dyer and Singh, 1998). The relational view is 
concerned with the critical resources of a firm and its ability to extend beyond organisational 
boundaries. Dyer and Sing (1998) identified the theoretical foundation for sources of inter 
organisational competitive advantage, and the inter-organisational relationships as an 
important unit of analysis. Gulati and Westphal (1999) also explored the concept of the network 
of inter-organisational relationships as a source of competitive advantage. Lavie and Drori 
(2012) built up on the concept of the relational view and network as a source of competitive 
advantage to argue that an organisation in a network can derive value from resource that are 
not fully owned or controlled by itself. Stronger inter-organisational links lead to resources with 
idiosyncrasies, making them difficult to imitate. This leads to a sustained competitive 
advantage for the firm. 
  
The relational view builds on the foundation of the resource based view and highlight the 
critical role played by inter-organisational relationships (‘resource network’) in providing a 
sustainable source of competitive advantage.  
 
Some scholars also focus on dynamic capabilities of firms and the importance of agility in an 
inter-organisational network (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Helfat et al., 2009; Shuen and 
Sieber, 2009).  Unlike the resource based view, this approach is more concerned with 
competitive survival than competitive advantage. The main thrust of the dynamic capabilities 
approach is that firms can only survive if they are agile and adaptive, have dynamic capabilities, 
and innovate on their resource base. This aspect of agility is also treated by network theories 
in terms of the individual and organisation’s position in the network.  
 
Despite its dominance in strategy and operations strategy research, resource based view theory 
has been criticised for ambiguity regarding the dependent variable, inimitable resources, and 
its “tautological” treatment of valuable resources (Bromiley and Rau, 2016).  
 
Kraaijenbrink et al.’s (2010; 350) review of resource based literature argues that the resource 
based view aspires to explain the internal sources of a firm’s sustained competitive advantage; 
a view that reflects seminal papers in the field, such as Barney (1991) and Peteraf (1993). But 
an overview of literature demonstrates that few, if any, resource based view papers try to 
explain sustained competitive advantage. Newbert’s (2007) review of 55 empirical articles on 
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resource based view found that only 2% of the studies used sustained competitive advantage 
as the dependent variable and it was actually performance that was the dependent variable in 
93% of the studies. Another review (Armstrong and Shimizu, 2007) of 145 empirical resource 
based view articles found only 4 articles that “even tried” to measure sustained competitive 
advantage. Similarly, in Crook et al.’s (2008) analysis, resource based articles put emphasis on 
performance differences and not on sustained competitive advantage. Bromiley and Rau (2016) 
argues that most resource based view studies do not specify what sustained means in sustained 
competitive advantage.  
 
The second major criticism of resource based view is centred on resources and question of their 
imitability. Resource based view studies have argued that sustained competitive advantage 
comes from resources that are difficult to imitate and the organisations that do seek to imitate 
these resources are faced with some level of causal ambiguity (Barney, 1991, 2001a, 2001b; 
Peteraf, 1993; Lipmann and Rumelt, 1982; Hitt et al., 2016). This leads to the logical 
conclusion that organisations that do have these inimitable resource with some level of causal 
ambiguity do not understand themselves how these resources work. This also means that all 
physical resources such as capital, infrastructure, and supply chains are not sources of 
competitive advantage. This theoretical outlook essentially implies that a firm could not start 
doing business with what is known and develop resources that will provide sustained 
competitive advantage.   
 
Resources based view studies also argue that resource must not only be inimitable but also 
valuable (Barney, 1991). Priem and Butler (2001) have criticised this view as tautological since 
the determination valuable resource within resource based view lies on firm performance. In 
response to these criticisms, resource based view studies have argued that a resource is valuable 
if it is rare, inimitable, and unsubstitutable (Barney, 2001a, 2001b). This valuable resource 
must also be nontradeable and immobile (Peteraf, 1993). This leads to a definitional problem. 
How does one determine if a resource is valuable when it is nontradeable and market cannot 
put a value to it? This discussion demonstrates that the resource based view is lacking when it 
comes to explaining sources of competitive advantage in inter-organisational networks.  
 
2.3. Network Theories  
While resource based and relational based views of firms do provide an inter-organisational 
perspective to analyse sources of competitive advantage and organisational performance, they 
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do not take relationships among individuals within the inter-organisational network into 
account, and the level of analysis remains inter-organisational.  This is where social network 
analysis has advantage over other perspectives for studying inter-organisational relationships. 
Social network analysis has its roots in sociology. Over the years, social network analysis has 
evolved into an interdisciplinary methodology with the incorporation of mathematics and 
statistics. It can be best understood as a tool to map and analyse the social structure of agents 
(or nodes) and their relationships (Freeman, 2004; Huber 2009; Moody, 2001; Wassermann 
and Faust, 1994). Recent years have seen a rise in number of social network studies (Monge 
and Contractor, 2003; Barabasi, 2003; Christakis and Fowler, 2009). Development of powerful 
computations tools for social network analysis (Agarwal et al., 2008; Lazer et al., 2009) have 
aided the application of social network analysis in different contexts to analyse and visualise 
networks.  
Social networks are knowledge networks consisting of nodes (organisations or people). These 
nodes act as knowledge resource and database which can be accessed by other nodes. Nodes 
are linked with each other by social relationships. These relationships provide nodes a medium 
to search for information and knowledge, and a mechanism to diffuse information and 
knowledge through the network (Phelps et al., 2012) 
In a social network, nodes are depicted as point and edges (ties or links) as lines. These 
networks can be analysed and coded using graph theory and social network analysis. Social 
network analysis facilitates a multi-level analysis (individual, intra and inter organisational, 
and network level) of knowledge transfer. Burt (2004) has studied the influence of social 
networks on individual creativity.  
Hansen (1999) focused on intra firm knowledge sharing within a multinational electronics and 
computer company with more than $5 billion in annual sales. Hansen found that the effect on 
project completion times of weak (or strong) ties within the intra-firm network was contingent 
upon the complexity of knowledge which was to be transferred.  
Phelps’ (2010) studied alliance structure of 77 telecommunications equipment manufacturers 
and found that diversity of a firm’ alliance partners increases its exploratory innovation. 
Exploratory innovation is innovation embedding knowledge that is novel to firm’s existing 
knowledge base. Phelps also highlight that in a network where firm’s alliance partners are also 
partners and have access to diverse information, has more exploratory innovation.  
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These social networks and knowledge transfer studies usually attempt to answer research 
questions concerned with networks’ ability to facilitate (maximum) knowledge transfer, 
creations, and adoption. The two primary frameworks used by network scholars are, the ego 
network, and the whole network. Ego networks are focused on understanding role of one central 
node, called ego and how other nodes interact with ego. Whole network focuses on network 
wide behaviour and boundary conditions are defined as per the researcher’s requirement 
(Phelps et al., 2012) 
Studies in literature suggest that knowledge transfer can benefit from ‘embeddedness into 
networks and spatial proximity to network partners’ (Fritsch and Slavtchev, 2007; Fritsch and 
Kauffeld-Monz, 2010). Research has highlighted how network with closely related interests 
can increase chances of successful and relevant knowledge transfer (Cowan et al., 2000; Cowan 
et al., 2007). Networks with embedded relationships encourage rapid and explicit feedback 
which in turn, facilitates generation of new ideas and solutions (Uzzi, 1998; Fritsch and 
Slavtchev, 2010). Frequency of interactions in such relationships have been shown to 
encourage trust, and consequently, increase in the quality of interaction (Daskalakis and 
Kauffeld-Monz, 2007).  
Networks are constructed upon relationships between organisations and individuals and thus 
the knowledge transfer process in such networks is dependent on quality of these relationships 
and the nature of knowledge being transferred. The nature of knowledge, more so than spatial 
distance, determines the process of transfer. Therefore, if knowledge is tacit, and not explicit 
or codified, it requires personal interaction and contact between individuals (Polanyi, 1967; 
Asheim and Isaken, 2002).  
Granovetter (2005) argues that a network (or a cluster within a network) with strong ties is a 
dense network of mutually connected nodes. The high frequency of interaction in such a 
network or cluster results in a considerable share of information flow being redundant, and any 
new information or knowledge is introduced in such a network or cluster through relationships 
which are outside the denser cluster (weak ties).  
Leyden et al. (2014) have drawn parallels between Granovetter’s concept of weak ties (2005) 
and entrepreneurship. The identify search for knowledge as the primary characteristic of an 
entrepreneur and access to social network as key to acquisition of that knowledge. The 
heterogeneous social ties that form the social network facilitate innovation within the network 
(Burt, 2005; Leyden et al., 2014).  
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Researchers (Hoegl and Schulze, 2005; Burt, 2005; Mishra et al. 2017) highlight the role of 
brokers or gatekeepers in context of networks. These brokers or gatekeepers link different 
clusters within the network and provide a channel for flow of non-redundant knowledge. This 
provides for additive rather than overlapping access to knowledge and information (Burt, 
2001). Studies have shown that strong ties within a cluster (Granovetter, 2005) and gatekeeper 
phenomenon (Mishra et al., 2017) are not mutually exclusive and can and do form a productive 
partnership.  
2.4. Studying Inter-Organisational Relationships as Social Networks 
Bergenholtz and Waldstrom (2011) argue for distinguishing between two types of networks in 
the context of inter-organisational relationships, a) networks of social interactions across 
organisational boundaries, and b) descriptive networks dealing with existing social order 
between organisations. Borgatti et al. (2009) highlight role of organisation’s position within a 
network structure in influencing opportunities and constraints.  In this context, scholars have 
argued that (Burt, 1992; Wasserman and Faust, 1994; Wellman and Berkowitz, 1988) that 
social network analysis offers a methodological tool for analysis of networks at different 
structural levels (that is individual, dyadic, triadic, and network level) and studying social 
contexts.  
 
Scholars (Coviello, 2005; Hoang and Antoncic, 2003; Zaheer and Usai, 2004; Tsai, 2002) have 
argued that such an analysis of inter-organisational social network is considerably more 
complex than intra-organisational social networks, especially in context of inter-
organisational entrepreneurial networks. Inter-organisational networks are inherently 
unbounded as observed by scholars in studies on apparel industry (Uzzi, 1997), American 
biotech industry (Higgins and Gulati, 2003), and global biotech industry (Gay and Dousset, 
2005). Lack of natural (and nominal) boundaries in inter-organisational context presents a 
significant challenge to analysis. Laumann et al. (1983) identify two approaches to identifying 
meaningful boundary conditions in such scenarios, a realist approach where individuals (or 
nodes) themselves define the social boundaries and nominal approach where boundaries are 
imposed, conceptually, for the analysis. This study examines the Formula 1 industry as a 
bounded network and boundary specifications of nodes recognise only those nodes that are 
situated within the Grand Prix Constructors-Manufacturers-Suppliers network in Europe with 




Complementing social network studies with institutional aspect of the network such as multi-
level relationships and empirical setting produces a more comprehensive picture of network 
activities ((Dyer and Hatch, 2006; Owen-Smith and Powell, 2004; Paier and  Scherngell, 2011; 
Sorenson and Stuart, 2008).  
 
The last few decades have seen development of social network analysis as a powerful 
methodological tool with innovative metrics and visualization techniques (Borgatti and 
Everett, 2000; Freeman et al., 1991). These new developments have greatly expanded the 
applicability of social network analysis beyond relational studies. Innovative tools within the 
domain of social network analysis, such as exponential random graph models, longitudinal and 
dynamic network modelling, visualization, and directional analysis (Robins et al., 2007; 
Snijders, 2005; Moody et al., 2005; Bonacich and Lloyd, 2001) have led to new set of tests, 
such as assessing if betweenness centrality is linked to innovation (Gilsing et al., 2008), 
structural holes, core-periphery structures (Lazega et al., 2008), and structural network change 
over time (Ahuja, 2000).  
 
2.5. Social Networks and Knowledge Transfer 
Social network studies of knowledge transfer often focus on identifying a network structure 
that maximises knowledge transfer, creation, and adoption. Researchers use two types of 
framework for analysis network structures, the ego network and the whole network. Former is 
concerned with relationships of a single central nodes, called ego and studies of such networks 
explore the interactions of ego with other nodes and the relationship among them. Burt (2001) 
describes the concept of structural holes as a key tool to understand ego networks. A structural 
hole is said to exist between two nodes that are connected to the ego but do not share a tie 
between themselves, putting ego is a favourable position vis-à-vis the two nodes. This 
favourable position is due to the ability of ego to act as an information bridge between these 
nodes. 
  
The second type of network framework is used to analyse the links existing throughout the 
node population. The whole network approach allows a research to set network boundaries 
depending on his/her needs. Phelps et al. (2012) identify knowledge creation, knowledge 
transfer, and knowledge adoption as typical dependent variables in whole network studies. In 
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such studies, researchers aim to provide explanation of how network constructs or metrics 
influence the dependent variables.  
 
These metrics define an array of network features, such as structural and relational. For 
instance, structural network metrics such as density or diameter are independent of the 
relationships and nature of knowledge (either created or flowing through) in the network.  
Metrics that explore influence of position of a node in the network on its knowledge outcomes 
are called centrality metrics. Centrality metrics define, either direct or indirect, contacts that a 
node has.  
 
McEvily and Zaheer (1999) studied structural holes in ego networks and found that these holes 
enhance knowledge sharing and knowledge creation. Schilling and Phelps (2007) argue that it 
is the absence of structural holes or network closures that improve ego’s performance.  Other 
studies have highlighted how these contradictions can be explained, for example the nature of 
link between two nodes can be responsible for how network behaves with holes and closures 
(Ahuja, 2000). It can be argued that presence of diversity and in-depth knowledge within nodes 
in a dense network encourages knowledge sharing and its positive impact.  
 
The clustering coefficient is a metric that measures tendency of nodes to cluster together. These 
clusters have a high density of links. Uzzi and Spiro (2005) argue that clustering is a positive 
for knowledge flows as it promotes social cohesion and facilitates knowledge sharing but an 
excessive clustering can result in too much cohesion, leading to a reduction in availability of 
novel knowledge within the cluster. Clusters that have nodes that are linked with other clusters 
are often most conducive for knowledge flows as they reduce network’s average path length, 
and facilitate access to novel knowledge in other clusters.  
 
There are other factors that affect knowledge management performance of inter-organisational 
networks. Behaviour of links between nodes, characteristics of nodes, the flow of knowledge 
through network links, and absorptive capacity are few such factors. Links between nodes are 
classified as strong ties if the relationships has existed for a long duration, collaborations have 
been frequent and repeated. These types of links encourage trust and reciprocity (Ruef, 2000). 
Strong ties are considered to have a positive influence on knowledge flows and social cohesion, 
though they have been observed to have an inverted U shape effect on innovation (Ruef, 2000; 
Phelps et al., 2012) as strong ties can lead to too much cohesion where nodes are so tightly 
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interlocked that it becomes a hindrance to access different and novel knowledge. Molina-
Morales and Martinez-Fernandez (2009) argue that networks with small number of strong ties 
and many weak ties are most conducive for knowledge sharing among clusters.  
 
Proximity also influences knowledge related performances in inter-organisational networks. 
Geographical, cultural, and sectoral proximities influence how partners access knowledge in 
the network. Scholars highlight (Simonin, 1999; Sampson, 2007) that if partners have too 
similar knowledge resources, it results in little novel knowledge and if partners have too divers 
knowledge resource, it leads to difficulties in understanding partner’s knowledge. Market 
overlap between partners also hinder knowledge sharing as organisations tend to be protective 
of their core knowledge, and not share it with their competitors (Baum et al., 2000).  
 
Absorptive capacity is the ability of an organisation to identify and assimilate knowledge in 
partners (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) It is a cumulative ability, since it depends on prior related 
knowledge and background diversity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; 137). Jane Zhao and Anand 
(2009) argue that absorptive capacity is a strong predictor of knowledge-related performances 
for networked firms. This stems from a firm’s receptiveness towards novel knowledge and 
capabilities.  If a firm is more receptive of knowledge beyond its organisational boundary that 
is residing in the network it would be more than likely to adapt such knowledge for its own 
contextual needs.  
 
Absorptive capacity of an organisation can be enhanced through close cooperation with 
alliance partners. This can take form of exploration of novel ideas and knowledge in existing 
partnerships (Zollo et al., 2002). Though this process is dependent on alliance partner’s 
willingness for knowledge transfer and absorption capacity (Jane Zhao and Anand, 2009). 
 
2.7. Research Question  
Following the discussion in preceding sections, it has become evident that tacit knowledge 
plays a critical role in encouraging innovation and facilitating access to novel knowledge for 
organisations in inter-organisational network. Various theories of inter-organisational 
networks discussed in 2.2 are all focused at an organisational level, and analyse the network in 
terms of organisations’ ability to exploit other organisations for resources (knowledge) within 
the network. For instance, resource dependence theory describes the inter-organisational 
network as a resource and argues in terms of interdependence of firms within this network 
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owing to their inability to access the resources they need. Similarly, organisational ecology 
discusses competition and constraints as two primary aspects of a network influencing 
organisations within. The resource based and relational view of the firm also presents 
competitive advantage as being determined at the organisational level and the network as a 
source of competitive advantage. Any organisation in a network can derive value from resource 
that are not fully owned or controlled by itself.  
 
These theories are focused on an organisation’s ability to exploit resources at an organisational 
level, e.g. through strategic alliances, joint ventures, and commercial partnerships. This ignores 
the role played by individuals in these networks. As discussion of network theory (social 
networks) has shown, social networks can not only act as source of competitive advantage, but 
certain networked individuals in such networks play a critical role in determining the outcome 
of tacit knowledge exchange process. This study will provide a framework to demonstrate the 
effect of these networked individuals. This leads to the following research question: 
 
Research Question: How can we demonstrate the effect of networked individuals with high 
tacit knowledge on organisational performance in inter-organisational networks? 
 
To answer the research question, this dissertation will make use of method triangulation, and 
use interviews, case studies, and social network tools to determine how tacit knowledge transfer 
takes place within inter-organisational networks, and how network composition and movement 
of individuals affects that process. This study will focus on firms involved in grand prix motor 
racing (Formula 1) to explore the research question and objectives. Formula 1 provides an 













Chapter 3. Methodology  
This chapter describes the research philosophy and methodologies and follows Saunders et al. 
(2007) research design approach as shown in the figure 4. These onion layers structure the 
thesis and provide a framework for research progression. Layers are discussed in more details 
in the following paragraphs. 
 
 
Figure 4 Research Onion (adopted from Saunders et al. 2007) 
The first layer is that of post-positivist research paradigm. Collis et al. (2009) define the 
research paradigm as a philosophical construct that is used to conduct scientific research. The 
expansion of knowledge leads to development of new paradigms. Kuhn (1996) defines 
paradigms as universally recognised scientific achievement that for a time provide model 
problems and solutions to a community of practitioners. 
 
The first paradigm to have emerged was positivism (Collis et al., 2009). Positivism has 
remained dominant for centuries and been adequate in providing a construct for scientific 
enquiry based in natural sciences. However, with the progress and development of social 
science research, a new paradigm has emerged, interpretivism.  
 
Positivism is rooted in natural sciences and rests on the assumption that reality is singular and 
objective and is immune to changes through the act of investigation (Collis et al., 2009) 















phenomena. Collis et al. (2009) define interpretivism as arising from the criticism of 
positivism. Interpretivism advocates that reality is subjective and multiple as it resides in 
minds. The act of investigation affects reality. Interpretivist research involves inductive process 
aimed at providing an ‘interpretive understanding’ of the social phenomena within a given 
context (Collis et al., 2009). Creswell (2007) categorised the main philosophical assumptions 
of two paradigms as shown in table 2.  
Table 4 Assumptions of the main paradigms (adopted from Creswell, 2007 and Johns, 2010; 54) 
Philosophical Assumption Positivism  Interpretivism 
Ontological assumption (nature of 
reality) 
Reality is objective and singular, 
separate from the researcher 
Reality is subjective and multiple, as 
seen by the participants 
Epistemological assumption (what 
constitutes valid knowledge?) 
Researcher is independent of that 
being researched 
Researcher interacts with that being 
researched 
Axiological assumption (role of 
values) 
Research is value free and 
unbiased 
Researcher acknowledges that research 
is value ridden and biases are present 
Rhetorical assumption (language 
of research) 
Researcher writes in a formal style 
and uses the passive voice, 
accepted quantitative words, and 
set definitions 
Researcher writes in an informal style 
and uses the personal voice, accepted 
qualitative terms and limited definitions 
Methodological assumption 
(process of research) 
Process is deductive 
 
Study of cause and effect with a 
static design (categories are 
isolated beforehand) 
 
Research is context free 
 
Generalisation lead to prediction, 
explanation, and understanding 
 
Results are accurate and reliable 
through validity and reliability 
Process is inductive 
 
Study of mutual and simultaneous 
shaping of factors with an emerging 
design (categories are identified during 
the process) 
 
Research is context bound 
 
Patterns and/or theories are developed 
for understanding 
 




Both the paradigms discussed together form two extremes of a continuum and between these 
extremes exist many philosophical positions as described in table 3. The researcher’s approach 
to enquiry is shaped by their culture and values. These social aspects prejudice every researcher 
toward the subject of the enquiry. To begin research, a researcher must identify a framework 
 35 
 
or methodology for enquiry. This framework consists of skills, assumptions, and practices that 
the researcher employs as he/she moves from his/her paradigm to the empirical world (Johns, 
2010).  
 
Table 5 Metaphysics of alternative paradigms (adopted from Guba and Lincoln, 1994 and Johns, 2010; 55) 
 Positivism  Post-positivism Critical Theory Constructivism 
Ontology Naïve realism – ‘real’ 
reality but 
apprehendable 
Critical realism – 




Historical realism – 
virtual reality shaped 
by social, political, 
cultural, economic, 
ethnic, and gender 
values: crystallized 
over time 











ity: value mediated 
findings 
Transactional/subjectiv
ist: created findings 


















• Case study 
 
This research falls under a post-positivism paradigm following the multi-methodology 
approach. Ontologically, therefore this research falls under the critical realism category (table 
3). Second layer of the onion highlights the inductive approach of this study and aims to 
generalise based on specific observations. This implies that while research will produce robust 
findings which can be applied to other suitable contexts, research findings will not be 
universally true. This is a realist approach and the findings are not universally true.  
 
3.1. Triangulation of Methods and Research Strategy 
This study adopts a multi-method approach, triangulating interviews, case studies, and social 
network analysis to answer research questions. Denzin (1978) defines triangulation as 
combination of methodologies in the study of the same phenomenon.  Scandura and Williams 
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(2000) have argued that advantage of triangulation lies in that it can compensated for flaws 
present in individual methods and provide corroborating evidence from different methods.  
 
Triangulation of methodologies is appropriate as this research falls within the post-positivist 
paradigm. Researchers in post-positivist paradigm maintained that using multiple methods 
allows the researcher to check of individual analyses (Connidis, 1983). This study uses 
interviews, case studies, and social network analysis to explore research questions. The 
following figure describes the research strategy. 
 
Figure 5 Research strategy diagram 
Research strategy diagram establishes the progression of research problem from formulation 
stage in the literature survey to the research findings providing evidence for role of gatekeepers 
and their influence on organisational performance.  
 
3.2. Interviews 
Arksey and Knight (1999: 3) describe interviews as being concerned with exploring data on 
understandings, opinions, what people remember doing, attitudes, feelings and the like, that 
people have in common. This research used face to face semi-structured interviews with 
academics to explore the primary research objective. Semi structured interviews involve a 
questionnaire and other questions are developed during the interview, if need be. The use of 
interviews allows the study to provide an understanding of Formula 1 and the broader 
Survey of existing research on tacit 
knowledge transfer and 
interorganisational networks 
identifies the gap.
A theoretical framework is devised  
for analysing research quesiton. 
Technological overview of the 
Formula 1 network and interviews 
with the experts to understand the 
context and refine the theoretical 
framework. 
Case studies provide qualitative 
analysis for understanding 
gatekeepers and their impact on 
organisational performance in inter-
organisaitonal networks. 
Social network analysis facilitates 
visualisation and quantitative 
analysis of the interorganisational 
networks and provides 
complementary evidence for role, 
and impact of gatekeepers.
Research findings highlight the role 
of individuals, gatekeepers, who 
influence organisational 
performance irrespective of 
structural position and budgetary 




motorsport industry (Collis and Hussey, 2009). It also allows the exploration of issues which 
may be confidential and commercially sensitive (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012).   
 
The interview questionnaire was designed based on the literature survey and incorporated 
aspects of knowledge transfer process and alliances [appendix 6]. The questionnaire deals with 
motivations behind alliance formation and knowledge transfer. The dimensions of knowledge 
transfer that emerged in literature were also explored in interviews as was the directionality of 
transfer and industry variables and their influence on knowledge transfer process.  
 
Analysing Interviews 
Robson (2011) has highlighted the primary challenge with analysing qualitative data such as 
interviews. In case of qualitative data, there is no universally accepted set of conventions for 
analysis corresponding to those observed with quantitative data. Collis and Hussey (2009) 
argue that qualitative data collection method can be incorporated into analysis.  
 
This study uses labels and pattern identification to analyse the interview data. When using 
general analytical procedure for interviews, researchers give labels (based on literature) to 
phrases, sentences, and ideas as instances of a thing or idea which is relevant to the research. 
These labels inform and evolve with the data collection process and help focus analysis by 
facilitating pattern recognition. Using these patterns, this study has developed a set of 
generalisations which can be formalised in form of labels that are used for analysis.  
 
These themes, based on the literature review, were found more appropriate in analysing the 
interviews and generating findings than nVivo, a qualitative analysis software. nVivo allows 
users to create “nodes” which can be then “coded” with interview texts. This process results 
in interview data being listed under different “nodes” which can be used for identifying 
patterns, classifying data, and modelling. The author carried out an nVivo based analysis, but 
the patterns identified were inherently biased as they were dependent on the classification of 
nodes as done by the author. This is not consistent with a post positivist approach. As a result, 






Interviewees were selected based on their expertise in Formula 1 and other motor sports. All 
three interviewees work at major research universities, and have published extensively on the 
topic of motorsports in reputed international journals and have worked/are working with 
Formula 1 teams on a range of issues. All interviewees have more than ten years of experience 
of working in motorsport research. The interviewees have not been involved in the author’s 
supervision or assessment. 
 
These interviewees help establish the relationship between knowledge transfer and individuals, 
provide context to research questions, and facilitate a robust analysis. The interviewees also 
highlighted the need for new labels in analysis as research progressed. This informed the case 
study and social network analysis and provided a consistent structure to the study.  
 
3.3. Case Studies 
A case study base research strategy provides particular strengths (Bebensat et al., 1987, cited 
by Voss et al., 2002; 197):  
• The phenomenon can be studied in its natural setting and meaningful, relevant theory 
generated from the understanding gained through observing actual practice.  
• The case method allows questions of why, what and how to be answered with relatively 
full understanding of the nature and complexity of the complete phenomenon.  
• The case method lends itself to early, exploratory investigations where the variables are 
still unknown and the phenomenon not at all understood.  
 
Scholars have pointed out that case study methodology needs to be systematic to be able to 
deliver rigorous results (Yin, 2003; Voss et al., 2002; Johns, 2010) as researcher, knowingly or 
unknowing, can introduce bias to results. Yin (2003) argues that researchers can overcome 
these challenges by relying on multiple sources for the data and systematic analysis of cases 
study findings.  
 
Bryman and Bell (2015) and Voss et al. (2002) highlight lack of generalisability of case study 
findings. It is a challenge to extrapolate research findings of a single case study for broader 
applicability. Yin (2003) argues that case studies are in the neighbourhood of theoretical 
positions, rather than populations. Case studies allow for analytical generalisation and cannot 
be taken to represent a sample. Scholars (Eisenhardt, 1989, Voss et al., 2002; Yin, 2003) have 
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argued that case studies are analogous to experiments, and therefore, by adhering to a 
systematic and analytical approach to different stages of case study, design, data collect, and 
analysis, researchers can alleviate most of the concerns associated with the methodology.  
 
Case studies have been criticised as being no more than a rich description of events (Easton, 
2000) and not grounded in firm epistemology. Yin (2003) argues that case study research 
belongs to phenomenological paradigm, but this is contrary to lack of an epistemological base. 
Therefore, for a case study to belong to post-positivist paradigm, it has to be systematic, 
rigorous in its inquiry into the underlying reality (table 3). Following this approach, a case 
study research can provide the researcher with causal explanation, especially of contemporary 
phenomena. Management and social science researchers have used case study research 
extensively (Barnes, 2001) and it meets the methodological standards of this study.  
 
Reliability and validity are important at all stages of the case study research process and 
consequently, these dimensions are considered here before the distinguishable stages of the 
research process are discussed. Four tests have been commonly used to establish the quality of 
empirical social research, including case study research (see the following table). 
 
Table 6 Tests for establishing quality of the case study research (adopted from Yin. 2003; 34) 
Test  Tactic Applicable Phase of Research 
Construct Validity (Is case 
study measuring the concept 
that is focus of the research?) 
• Use multiple sources of 
evidence 
• Establish chain of 
evidence 
• Key informants to 
review draft reports (if 
possible) 
Data Collection 
Internal Validity (how well the 
case study avoids 
confounding?) 
• Pattern matching 
• Explanation building 
• Time-series analysis 
Data analysis 
External Validity (Extent to 
which case study findings can 
be applied to other contexts) 
• Use replication logic in 




Reliability (Is the case study 
accurate, i.e. error free and 
unbiased) 
• Use case study protocol 





This research has used many documentary sources for data collection to ensure construct 
availability. Cases selected for analysis belong to different time in Formula 1 and provide 
balance to case study analysis. Certain key themes and patterns emerge from each case study 
and are documented to ensure validity and reliability of the findings.  
 
3.4. Social Network Analysis  
Social network analysis forms the core of the research onion and provides a quantitative 
foundation for this study. Graph theory and social network analysis facilitate a multi-level 
analysis (individual, intra and inter organisational, and network level).  Research in this field 
is inherently multilevel, focusing on individual, intra-organisational, and inter-organisational 
nodes. Researchers in organisational behaviour have studied the influence of social networks 
on individual creativity (Burt, 2004); Hansen (1999) has investigated how the strength of 
interdivisional ties influence knowledge transfer within firms; strategy researchers have studied 
how inter-organisational network structure affects firm performance (Schilling and Phelps, 
2007).  
 
This study focuses on a systematic level of analysis for understanding the knowledge transfer 
process (Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000) in competitive-cooperative networks. This study had 
to balance the analysis along a) the structural attributes such as individual structural measures 
and whole-network measures, and b) relational attributes such as relational content, relational 
properties, (Burt et al., 1983; Marsden, 2005; Eisenberg and Monge, 1987). This is 
accomplished by using social network analysis metrics to analyse the network based on not 
only the existence of a link or relation between two individuals but also taking the institutional 
setting into account.  This allows the study to explore multi-layered and interlocking 
knowledge transfer process within relationships in the network.  Table 6 is a glossary of 






Table 7 Network Glossary 
Node A node (or a vertex or an actor) is the 
fundamental unit of a network.  
Edge An edge (or a link or a bond) connects two nodes.  
Directed or Undirected An edge can be directed, if it runs only in one 
direction that is from one node to another node. 
An edge is undirected if it runs in both directions. 
A network is directed if all its edges are directed 
(Newman, 2003) 
Geodesic path A geodesic path is the shortest path between a 
pair of two connected nodes (Newman, 2001) 
Component A component is defined as a subset of a network. 
Component to which a node belongs consists of 
nodes that are connected to it through edges of 
the network.   
 
This study is set in the context of Formula 1 and employs a set of mathematical metrics to 
explore relationships and movement of knowledge in the network.  
 
Studies (Fromhold-Eisebith, 2004) have used social network analysis metrics to analyse 
innovative networks. Social network analysis metrics are being used in fields as varied as 
management sciences, organisational studies, economics, sociology, and network studies 
(Knoke and Yang. 2008). They provide an important mathematical tool to study knowledge 
transfer in a geographical dimension, human capital, and entrepreneurships, and inter-regional 
and intra-regional linkages (Fromhold-Eisebith and Werker, 2013; Grabher and Powell, 2005; 
Huber 2007; Kratke and Brandt, 2009; Murray, 2004). Metrics are also a useful tool to study 
how knowledge flows drive innovation in a network (Kratke, 2010). 
 
The following test case demonstrates some core principles of social network analysis. This test 
case involves two teams, Team 1 and Team 2. In year 2000, Team 1 employs A and B and 
Team 2 employs C and D. In Year 2001, B moves to Team 2, and now Team 1 only has A.  
Table 8 Test Case 
Year                 
 
Team 1 Team 2 
2000 A,  B C, D 
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2001 A C, D, B 
 
The resulting network for year 2000 and 2001 is shown in figure 6.  
 
  
Figure 6 Network graph for test case 1 
 
Table 9 contains network level metrics for the network shown in figure 6. 
 
Table 9 Network level metrics for Test Case 1 
Nodes 4 
Edges 4 
Directed or Undirected Undirected Graph 
Component(s) 1   
Average Degree 2 
Diameter 2 
Graph Density 0.667 
Average Clustering Coefficient  0.778 
 
Table 10 shows node level metric values for each node in the network. 
Table 10 Node level metrics for Test Case 1 








A 1 0 0.141 0 0.461 
B 3 2 0.367 0.333 1 
C 2 0 0.246 1 0.854 
D 2 0 0.246 1 0.854 
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Figure 6 shows a longitudinal network for year 2000 and 2001 where edges connect nodes that 
have either worked together in past or are working together in the present. Note that employee 
B is now attached to A, C and D since s/he has worked with them all at some stage during the 
time period under examination (2000-2001). All edges carry equal weight.  
 
Diameter: Any given pair of connected nodes have path length of 1. The diameter of a network 
graph is the longest path length between any two nodes in the network. The average path length 
of the network is average path length between all pairs of connected nodes (Newman, 2003). 
The diameter of the network can give indication of the social nature of discourse (Albert and 
Barabasi, 2002). A large diameter implies a potentially loosely connected community; a small 
diameter may be a very densely connected community, or one in which few connections are 
present (most nodes unconnected or connected to a small number of other nodes). In the test 
case, figure 6, the diameter is 2. This implies that all nodes can be reached by another connected 
node following upto two edges (except for isolated nodes.) For instance, to reach node A from 
node D, there is path length of 2, D to B, and B to A.   
 
Density: Density of a network is the ration between number of actual links in the network and 
number of all possible links. Density is structural property of the network and reflects the 
connectedness of the network (Tichy et al., 1979). 
Average Path Length is defined as average path distance between all connected pair of nodes 
along the shortest paths (Albert and Barabasi, 2002; Newman 2003). In graph theory, average 
path length, clustering coefficient, and degree metrics are considered the most concrete 
measurement of network topology. Shorter average path length and higher clustering 
coefficient values indicated a small world phenomena and as such are of interest to scholars 
and to this study (Newman, 2003).  
 
Degree Centrality: The degree of a node is number of edges that are adjacent to the node. A 
network with directional links has both an in-degree and an out-degree for each node, which 
are the numbers of in-coming and out-going edges respectively (Albert and Barabasi, 2002; 
Newman, 2003). In case of an undirected network, there are no in-coming or out-going edges 
as edges run in both directions. A node with high degree is highly connected within the network 
and potentially highly influential. Low degree of a node indicates that node is on the periphery 
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of the network and potentially does not influence the information flows within the network. 
Degree can also be measured over whole network as the average degree of all nodes, including 
nodes with zero degree.  
 
Nodes that have more links with other nodes may be in more advantageous positions because 
having more links, allow them to have alternative means to access and exploit the network, and 
be less dependent on other nodes. Having this ability to call on the entire network for their 
resource needs, puts them in an advantageous position vis-à-vis other nodes. In real life 
networks, nodes with higher degree are often third parties and gatekeepers (Mishra et al., 2017) 
and can benefit from this brokerage (Hanneman and Riddle, 2005). Degree is a simple but an 
effective measure of a node’s power potential.  
 
In the test case 1, average degree of the network is 0.667 which is considered very high for real 
life networks (Newman, 2003). Nodes with higher degree (may) have more power. Node B has 
a degree of 3 and therefore has more choices compared to other nodes, such as D and A. If 
node B wanted access to certain information, B can acquire that information either from A, C, 
or D whereas in case of D, only c and B are available, and in case of A, only B can provide 
information. Nodes with more links have more opportunities because they have choices 
(Hanneman and Riddle, 2005).   
 
Though degree centrality approach can be misleading as having same degree does not 




Figure 7 Network graph for test case 2  
 
Compared to the test case 1, this network contains more nodes and edges. This affects the 
behaviour of network level as well as node level metrics. The following table lists network 
level metrics,   
 
Table 11 Network level metrics for Test Case 2 
Nodes 7 
Edges 8 
Directed or Undirected Undirected Graph 
Component(s) 1   
Average Degree 2.286 
Diameter 3 
Graph Density 0.381 
Average Clustering Coefficient  0.6 
 
As can be seen in table 12, Node B and node F both have degree of 3 but as evident from the 
network graph (figure 2) Node B, apart from D, has links with A and E, which in turn are 
isolated and have one link each. Whereas node F is connected to C, D, and G which are 
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connected to each other. This implies that F has access to more resources within that 
relationship triad. 
 
Table 12 Test Case 2 Node level metric for Test Case 2 








A 1 0 0.070 0 0.264 
B 3 9 0.229 0 0.780 
C 2 0 0.158 1 0.855 
D 4 9.5 0.206 0.333 1 
E 1 0 0.070 0 0.264 
F 3 0.5 0.157 0.667 0.802 
G 2 0 0.110 1 0.590 
 
 
A node is likely to be more influential if it is connected to other central nodes, as it would allow 
the node to quickly reach other nodes. It follows from this statement that if the node is 
connected to other well connected nodes, such as F, then those nodes are not dependent on the 
node F for influence and vice-versa. Bonacich (1972a, 1972b) argues that being connected to 
other well connected nodes makes a node central, but not (necessarily) powerful. 
Counterintuitively, being connected to other nodes that are not well connected makes a node 
powerful, because these other nodes are dependent on the node whereas in the case of other 
well connected nodes, they are not solely dependent on one node to access the network flows 
(Hanneman and Riddle, 2005). Bonacich (1972b) proposed that both centrality and power were 
a function of the connections of the nodes in one’s neighbourhood. The more connections the 
nodes in your neighbourhood have, the more central you are. The fewer the connections the 
nodes in your neighbourhood, the more powerful you are.  
 
Average Clustering Coefficient: The clustering Coefficient is one of the main statistical 
property used to describe large graphs (Watts and Strogatz, 1998). The clustering coefficient 
of a node (with a degree of at least 2) is the probability that any two random neighbours of that 
node are linked together. For the whole network, it is calculated as the average of clustering 
coefficients of all nodes with degree greater than 2 (Latapy, 2008). A clustering coefficient of 
1 indicates perfect cluster, or a solid lattice structure, and 0 indicates a perfect random network 
 47 
 
with no clusters. Complex social networks tend to exhibit a high degree of clustering. In the 
test case 1, average clustering coefficient of 0.778 reflects higher probability of two random 
nodes being linked together, whereas in test case 2, a more complex network, has average 
clustering coefficient of only 0.7, highlighting that complex networks do not necessarily have 
higher clustering.  
 
Betweenness Centrality: Betweenness centrality is a node based centrality metric in social 
network analysis. The betweenness centrality of a node is number of geodesic paths on which 
the node appears, normalised by total number of geodesic paths (Freeman, 1977). It can be 
calculated for both directional and unidirectional links. Betweenness centrality highlights 
nodes that are in favoured position to the extent that the node is on the geodesic paths between 
other pairs of nodes in the network (Hanneman and Riddle, 2005) This implies that the more 
other nodes are depended on a particular node to make connections with other nodes, the more 
influence the node has.   
 
As evident from the test case 1, node B lies either between each other pair of nodes or there is 
also a path going through B even if two nodes are directly linked. So if B wants to contact D, 
B can do so without going through any other node, but if D wants to contact A, D has to go 
through B. This study used a unidirectional algorithm (Brandes, 2001). A node with high 
betweenness centrality has high influence over the transfer of information or items through the 
network.   
 
The influence of a node is reduced if the node is not present on all geodesic paths connecting 
any given pair of nodes. For example, consider test case 2. Nodes B and F have same number 
of edges (degree), 3 but between centrality of F is 0.5 whereas B has a betweenness centrality 
of 9. As it can be observed from the network graph, while F is present on geodesic path between 
C and G, but there is also another geodesic path between C and G, G -> D -> C which do not 
pass through F. Whereas in case of B, any path connecting node pair A and E, A and D, and D 
and E has to pass through B, and so the betweenness centrality of B is highest, and puts it in a 
central position vis-à-vis other nodes and exercise control over information flow between those 
node pairs. 
 
Freeman et al. (1984) argue that betweenness centrality highlights nodes with positional 
advantage to the extent that they are on the geodesic pathway between other pair of nodes, that 
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nodes who are “between” other nodes, and on whom other nodes must depend to conduct 
exchanges, will be able to translate this broker role into power. This can be observed in a 
network where two nodes want to engage in a relationship, but the geodesic path between them 
is rendered inaccessible due to a reluctant node or gatekeeper (Mishra et al., 2017). In such a 
scenario, if there exist another geodesic path, the node pair is likely to use that pathway, even 
if it is longer and not convenient.  
 
Eigenvector Centrality: Eigenvector centrality is a metric which incorporates the importance 
of the other nodes to which a node is (directly) connected. This approach forms the 
mathematical basis of the page rank algorithm which formed the core of the original Google 
search algorithm (Page et al., 1999). Bonacich (2007: 555) argues that ‘…eigenvector 
centrality is designed to be distinctively different from mere degree (centrality) when there are 
some high degree positions connected to many low degree others or some low degree positions 
are connected to a few high degree others.’ Since network structures in this study comprise of 
nodes with a varying degree of degrees, eigenvector centrality is a particularly important 
metric.  
 
In larger and more complex networks than the examples discussed earlier, this measure can be 
misleading. Consider a large network, and two nodes, X and Y. Node X is part of a cluster 
within the larger network, and is quite far from other nodes in the network. Node Y on the other 
hand, is at moderate distance for all other nodes in the network. In such a scenario, farness 
measures will be of similar magnitude for Node X and Y but within the network, Node Y is 
more central than node X as Y is able to reach more nodes, with shorter path lengths.  
 
Nodes with higher eigenvector centrality are like node Y. These nodes are the most central 
nodes that is with smallest farness from other nodes when these distances are considered at the 
network structure level. These nodes do not have to be dependent on local nodes, or clusters 
for that matter, to access novel knowledge and information, as they can access information and 
knowledge from distant nodes and clusters due to short path lengths to those nodes.  
 
Eigenvector centrality is calculated via factor analysis. A detailed discussion of factor analysis 
is beyond the scope of this study but a short introduction follows. Factor analysis helps to 
identify the indicator or dimension of the distance among nodes. Position of each node within 
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the network with respect to each dimension is called its eigenvalue, and the set of eigenvalues 
is called eigenvector.  
3.5. Small World  
Small world tendency of a network is observed by a high clustering coefficient and short path 
length (Newman, 2001; Newman, 2003; Steen et al., 2011). The following figure shows small 







Figure 8 Regular, Small World, and Random Networks (adopted from Watts and Strogatz, 1998) 
 
In the figure, the middle configuration of nodes and edges represent a small world network that 
has high clustering coefficient and short path lengths. It differs from the random network and 
regular network in that neither all of its edges are randomly connected nor are they regularly 
laid out.  
 
As discussed in preceding sections, clustering coefficient is a measure of probability of any 
two nodes being linked together, forming a triangular relationship within the network. This 
implies that in a highly clustered network, two nodes connected through a third node, are highly 
likely to be directly connected forming a triangle (Newman, 2001; Steen et al., 2011). 
 
 Path length is the average number of edges between all nodes within a network. Observations 
can be made about small world nature of a network by comparing clustering coefficient and 
path length with a corresponding random network of the same number of connections and 
nodes. The small world coefficient Q is defined as the ratio of clustering ratio and path length 
ratio (Easley and Kleinberg, 2010; Albert and Barabasi, 2002; Boccaletti et al., 2006; Watts 
and Strogatz, 1998); 












𝐶𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =  
𝐶𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘




𝑃𝑎𝑡ℎ 𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =  
𝑃𝑎𝑡ℎ 𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘
𝑃𝑎𝑡ℎ 𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘
 
(Equation 3) 
The clustering coefficient and path length of the corresponding random network can be 
calculated by using following equations,  
 






𝑃𝑎𝑡ℎ 𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ (𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑘𝑟) =  
log 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑁𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑠




If the network has high levels of clustering and short average path length, the network could 
be described as a small world (Watts and Strogatz, 1998).   
 
3.6. Social Network Analysis Data 
This study used Who Works in F1 guides, to construct a longitudinal database of Formula 1 
team employees from 1992 to 2001. The database was coded to identify, for each year, 
individuals working within a team as nodes and the team as the edge connecting all these nodes.   
 
This database was run through a python script (appendix 1) to generate a Gephi compatible 
input file. Gephi was used to run simulations and algorithms to allot a metric value to each 
individual in the network. This process was repeated for the period of 1992-2010, treating all 
links monotonically as outlined above. Thus, nodes in the graph represent individuals and the 
(unweighted) edges denote that the connected individuals worked in the same team for at least 
some time over the period 1992-2001. This study proceeds with the assumption that edge exists 
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between any two nodes if they have worked together in a team. This assumes that edges are the 
only way of knowledge flow. In real life, there are other way for tacit knowledge transfer, such 
as observation or conversation informal interaction between individuals who are not working 
within the same team. But the nature of Formula 1 teams, tightly bounded and tendency to keep 
technological advances secret, highlights difficulty in tacit knowledge transfer through the 
other routes.  
 
This study also allots the same edge weight, 1, to all connections. While an analysis with 
weighted edges could be done, where edges between a pair of nodes could be ranked based on 
standards such as their past links and points the team performances while the pair of nodes are 
working in the team. This was deemed impractical for two reasons, the first being that there is 
no objective standard, other than the one researcher chooses, for allotting weighs to edges, and 
second, this will also result in qualitative categorisation of edges, such as links between a 
technical director and driver will be distinct from link between driver and race engineer, and 
the weighing scale would need to be devised for each category. Both approaches would result 
in bias. Therefore, each edge was allotted the same weight, and analysis was centred on 
centrality and topological (network wide) metrics. 
 
This analysis resulted in centrality metrics, degree, betweenness, eigenvector, and page rank 
centrality and network wide metrics, path length, clustering coefficient, density, and diameter. 
Centrality metrics provided a profile for each individual node in the network and network wide 
metrics contextualised those findings.  
 
3.7 Literature Survey: Databases and Keywords 
The author used the following research databases,  
• Google scholar 
• University of Bath Library 
• Scopus (for author profiles and journal ranking based on SCImago) 
The following keywords were used to find relevant papers; social networks, social network 
analysis, knowledge, knowledge transfer, tacit knowledge, tacit knowledge transfer, knowledge 
transfer and innovation, strategic alliances and knowledge transfer, absorptive capacity, core 
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Chapter 4: Context: Formula 1 - A Small World 
This chapter discusses the context for this study. It begins with a technological overview of 
Formula 1 and how it has evolved over the decades. This discussion highlights the unique inter-
organisational network of the Formula 1 for carrying out network analysis to understand tacit 
knowledge transfer and role of individuals in that process.  
 
The next section discusses small world networks, which are conducive for innovation and high 
knowledge flows, as is the case with Formula 1 and provide a summary of literature on the 
topic and its relevance to this study.  
 
4.1. Technological Overview of Formula 1 
Formula 1 faces a pace of technological development and logistical challenges similar to 
businesses such as information management systems, pharmaceutical industries, and aerospace 
manufacturers where firms form alliances with their competitors to tackle specific projects, 
expand their resource base, and overcome regulatory change. Smith et al. (2007) identify these 
as ideal conditions for fostering knowledge transfer.  
 
In context of Formula 1, knowledge transfer, and more specifically tacit knowledge is of central 
importance. Aversa et al. (2015) highlight the unique the business model of Formula 1 which 
involves trading and selling both technology and human resource with the competitors and 
reflects the important role played by tacit knowledge in this process. This study is focused on 
exploring mechanisms for tacit knowledge transfer and its effect on organisational 
performance. To this end, it is important understand the evolution of the context of the study, 
that is Formula 1 racing and its evolution over the years.  
 
The following table lists a series of key technological discontinuities in Formula 1 history. This 
is followed by a technological overview of Formula 1. 
 
Table 13 Technological discontinuities and regulation changes (adapted from Jenkins, 2010: 888) 
Season Technological discontinuities and regulation changes 
1954 Fuel injection in Mercedes 196 Streamliner 
1955 Disc brakes in Connaught Type B (Syracuse Grand Prix, Italy) 
1955 Rear engine Cooper Climax  
1957 Fuel Regulations 
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1961 Engine capacity reduced to 1.5 litre to encourage Formula 2 entrants to 
participate in Formula 1.  
1962 Stressed monocoque chassis 
1966 Turbo-charged (or supercharged) engines allowed with 1.5L capacity, and 
normally aspirated engines with 3.0L. 
1970 Lotus T72 with side-mounter radiators, rear wings, torsion bar suspension, 
and inward located brakes 
1977 Renault introduced turbocharged RS01 
1981 Reinforced survival cell made mandatory. Ground effect skirts banned.  
1989 Turbo engines and refuelling banned. Engine capacity increased to 3.5L V10.  
1994 Automated driver aids removed.  
1998 Maximum width of cars reduced, use of slick tyres banned.  
2001 Re-introduction of traction control 
2009 Kinetic energy recovery system (KERS) introduced. 
 
These discontinuities are explored in more detail in the following sections.  
 
4.2. Early Days: 1950-1970  
 “Paradigms are universally recognized scientific achievements that, for a time, provide model 
problems and solutions for a community of researchers.” Thomas Kuhn (1996, pg. X) 
 
In the 50s, a Formula 1 car had a large capacity engine in front of the driver and a rear-wheel 
drive.  Performance of the car revolved around the engine (Jenkins, 2010). It was the paradigm 
of grand prix car development (F1 Atlas). Supercharged engines were a norm during that time. 
Normally aspirated engines were limited in capacity to 4.5 litres whereas supercharged engines 
were capped at 1.5 litres. A typical chassis of the time was a tubular frame construction with 
fuel stored behind the driver. In a tubular frame construction, components like engine and 
suspension are attached to a skeletal frame of tubes with body of the car not serving any 
function in structural integrity of the vehicle. Engines in these early cars were placed in front 
of the car, that is in front of the front axle of the car.  
 
Alfa Romeo 158 and 159 were the most successful cars in 1950 and 1951 seasons and became 
a benchmark for other constructors. British team, BRM designed BRM15 to compete with the 
Alfa Romeo. Their car was built following the then norm of tubular frame chassis construction. 
 55 
 
BRM15 had a 1.5 litre engine with 16 cylinders; capable of delivering 615 BHP at 12, 000 rpm. 
The car was never quite able to achieve its peak performance, mainly because of absence of a 
fuel injection system and its reliance on carburettors.  
 
A carburettor is a device that works on Bernoulli’s principle and delivers air and fuel mixture 
(in correct ratio) for combustion in the cylinder of an internal combustion engine. A fuel 
injection system is computerised and sprays fuel into the cylinder at regular intervals and the 
air is delivered separately via a throttle valve which opens on depressing the accelerator. A fuel 
injection system allows for more precise control, better fuel consumption performance, and 
accurate tuning to match driving conditions. Compared to carburettors, fuel injection systems 
are more complex and expensive. Formula 1 teams adopted this technology, irrespective of 
complexity and costs involve, for the performance gains.  
 
Following the FIA’s decision to switch to 2-litre Formula 2 regulation, Ferrari pulled ahead in 
1952 and 1953 with Type 500 and Type 553. Ferrari cars were developing power close to 190 
HP, which was unusual for the time. Maserati engine delivered even more power, 200 HP 
reaching 100 HP per 1000 cc of cylinder capacity; but they could not win the world 
championship. 1954 season saw introduction of 2.5 litre formula. Mercedes with their car, 196 
Streamliner brought an eight-cylinder engine with direct fuel injection and laid the engine on 
its side to keep the centre of gravity as low as possible (Lawrence, 1998). This started the 
decline of the carburettor-based engines, such as the one used in BRM15. In the early phases, 
the Bosch direct injection system dominated Formula 1 but eventually made way for an indirect 
manifold injection system. Though the revolutionary air-valve controlled fuel injection of 
Renault was still 30 years away, fuel injection systems controlled by camshafts had arrived in 
Formula 1 (Wright and Matthews, 2001) and greatly improved fuel efficiency and driving 
dynamics of the Formula 1 cars.   
 
Another invention to make its appearance in 50s decade was that of disc brake. (Jones, 1996) 
Formula 1 was populated by drum brakes so far and it was an English Dentist, Tony Brooks, 
of the British Connaught team who introduced disc brakes to the Formula 1. He won the 
Syracuse Grand Prix in Italy in the year 1955. Though the race did not have World 
Championship status, disc brakes had arrived on the grand prix circuits. It still took some time 
for the disc brakes to become widely adapted in Formula 1 but their utility was clear to all the 
constructors (Wright and Matthews, 2001).  In 1958, during the Italian Grand Prix practice 
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session, Ferrari mechanics removed the disc brakes from one of their sports cars and installed 
them on their Formula 1 cars. This illustrates the tendency of Formula 1 constructors to adopt 
what works and then evolve it into a more comprehensive solution.  
 
In July of 1955, a truly radical innovation made its presence felt in Formula 1, the repositioning 
of engine from the front of the car to the rear of the driver. British teams were responsible for 
this radical change. One of these British manufacturers was Cooper Car Company, run by 
Father-Son duo Charles and John Cooper, who were described as ‘cunning blacksmiths’ for 
their ability to source components from unusual places (Lawrence, 1998). They constructed 
chassis for their cars from the suspension components from Fiat Topolino, scrap materials from 
air raid shelters, aircraft and boat engines (Lawrence, 1998). Cooper was using motorbike 
engines with a short chain drive to rear wheel, located in a ‘mid position’, directly behind the 
drivers in their cars (Jenkins, 2010; Jones, 1996).  
 
These cars turned out to be successful and Cooper progressed to Formula 2 where they started 
competing against Formula 1 manufacturers with the bigger 4.5 litres engines. In their very 
first race, British built Cooper Climax, with Sterling Moss as the driver, beat the works 
Ferrari’s factory team. This was the first instance of a mid-engine Formula 2 car winning a 
Grand Prix. Another British manufacturer, Lotus, entered the Grand Prix championships in the 
same period with front-engine cars but didn’t find much success till they switched to Cooper’s 
idea of ‘mid-engine’ cars in 1960 with Lotus 18 (Crombac, 1986). Lotus founder Colin 
Chapman explained his design philosophy as ‘wind cheating’ (Chapman, 1958). Chapman 
evolved the design process of the car around the chassis instead of engines, as was the norm 
among the contemporary Italians constructors such as Ferrari.  
 
In 1955 British Grand Prix at Aintree, England, first mid-engine car made its debut in Formula 
1 with Jack Brabham in Cooper-Bristol T40. The T40 was fitted with a 2-litre ‘Bristol’ engine 
that was mounted behind the driver. Within matter of few years, this design philosophy was so 
successful that front mounted engines became a thing of past demonstrating Formula 1 team’s 
willingness to adopt innovations that work in a short period of time.  
 
Fuel regulation came into effect after 1957. Before that, teams were free to choose what fuel 
they used. Peter Wright (Wright and Matthews, 2001) describes the practice of constructors 
adding various chemical compound to the fuel in 50s  “...teams were relying on the dark magic 
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of various concoctions.” With the pressure from oil sponsors like Shell, FIA made it mandatory 
for the cars to use ‘commercially’ available variant of fuel. Between 1958-60, FIA regulations 
demanded use of aviation fuel with an octane rating of 130. The idea behind this move was to 
make Formula 1 more relatable to the fans and ordinary viewer.  This forced Formula 1 teams 
to work closely with fuel suppliers to optimise fuel consumption, and consequently, improve 
fuel effecieny.  
 
Until the mid-50s, automotive manufacturers had dominated motor sports and used it as testing 
bed for innovation but that changed after 60s with the advent of the networks of constructor 
organisations and sponsors and manufacturers (Foxall and Johnston, 1991). Setright (1973; 
242) describe these changes, “...the centre of the motor racing world had shifted from Italy to 
Britain, where specialist chassis- building teams used off the shelf engines and transmissions 
supplied by specialists. Only Ferrari and B.R.M. of the regular runners were left building their 
own chassis, engines and gearboxes, and the new era of the Formula 1 ‘special builders’ had 
arrived. ”   
 
The change in the centre of gravity of the motor racing combined with the change in regulations 
championed and encouraged by the companies looking for wider public awareness and 
aspiration for their products through the association with the motor sports, changed the sports 
in fundamental ways (Forxall and Johnston, 1991). The racing cars were now the result of a 
combined effort from a group of specialists employed within the automotive industry supplying 
specialist products and needs (Nye, 1986). Relative uniformity in the car designs of early 60s 
was challenged with the arrival of new teams like Lotus, who forced the industry to focus on 
‘continuous development of components’ – tyres, electronic ignition systems, fuel injection, 
improved spark plug technology, monocoque chassis design, and aerodynamic efficiency 
(Foxall and Johnston, 1991). 1960’s season also saw engine capacity reduced to 2.5 litre 
normally aspirated engines. This advent of a network of constructors working with alliance 
partners to produce a racing car highlights Formula 1 teams’ need for specialist knowledge and 
technology.  
 
The inaugural season of 60s began with two fatal accidents. Drivers Christ Bristow of Cooper 
and Alan Stacey of Lotus lost their lives in an accident during the Belgian Grand Prix at Spa. 
Christ Bristow lost control of his car and did not survive the resulting cartwheeling whereas in 
case of Stacey, a bird flew into his face and he got off the track resulting in a collision. These 
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accidents highlighted how Formula 1 remained a dangerous sport and needed more regulation 
(Jenkins, 2010). To tackle this, FIA brought down the capacity of cars from 2 litres to 1.5 litres 
in 1961. However, it took another eight years for FIA to introduce helmet visors, which could 
have prevented accidents like that involving Alan Stacey. FIA also brought in another rule 
stipulating that cars only use commercial grade fuel with an octane rating of 100 or lower. This 
was done under the pressure of oil suppliers like Shell. This led to further innovation in Formula 
1 as constructors responded to regulation changes. In fact, this process of regulation driving 
innovation repeats itself in Formula 1. For FIA’s every change in rules and regulations 
constructors come up with their own innovation to work around them. FIA regulatory changes 
forced constructors to look for novel knowledge and technologies in the inter-organisational 
network of Formula 1 and innovate. 
 
Cooper started the decade with their car Type T53 Cooper Climax. They won the World 
Championship of 1960. Type T53’s mid engine design and 240 HP 4-Cylinder engine powered 
the car to and beyond 300 km/h. The time of front engine cars was finished for good. Ferrari 
went to great length to dismiss this new design ‘paradigm’ by calling British constructors as 
‘garagistes’ and ‘assemblatori’ and remarking that horses have always pulled, and not pushed, 
the cart (Couldwell, 2003. Beck-Burridge and Walton, 2000. Nye, 1977). But with change in 
the rules focussing on the smaller powertrains in the early 60s, chassis technology became the 
new focus of innovation. Rules were changed partly to encourage participation of new entrants 
from F2 to compete in F1 (Jenkins, 2010). FIA reduced engine capacity to 1.5 litre (normally 
aspirated engine). Ironically, Ferrari followed the path as shown by the garagistes and built a 
mid-engine car using a V6 engine, which gave them the world title in 1961. Cooper and Porsche 
cars could not keep up with the 190 HP, 6-cylinder engine of Ferrari. Next few years saw the 
mid-engine design philosophy becoming the norm in Formula 1.  
 
1962 season saw introduction of stressed monocoque chassis. Unlike tubular frame 
construction, in monocoque construction, loads are carried by the body’s skin. Throughout the 
1950s and early 60s tubular steel spaceframe dominated the chassis design of Formula 1 cars 
(Smith, 2012). But with the FIA bringing down the engine capacity to 1.5 litres, designers 
started putting greater emphasis on the chassis (Jenkins, 2010). Colin Chapman introduced 
Lotus 25 that employed riveted monocoque structure in which aluminium skin carried the 
structural load. Chassis and body formed a single integrated structure as it does in an aircraft 
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(Smith, 2012), and this highlights willingness of Formula 1 constructors to seek knowledge 
and technologies in completely different industries to their own for competitive advantage.  
 
The riveted monocoque structure was lighter and possessed more torsional rigidity than the 
traditional tubular frame structure. Following year, Jim Clark won seven out of ten Formula 1 
races for Lotus in the new car. For next few seasons Lotus dominated the Formula 1, with 19 
wins out of the 39 Grand Prixes between 1962 and 1965.  
 
By the end of 1965 season, engine power had risen to 220 HP with a rise in number of cylinders. 
1966 season saw the introduction of 3-litre formula in the grand prix; Ferrari and Honda 
introduced 12-cylinder cars. Coventry Climax had constructed a 16-cylinder engine, however 
it could never see the starting grid because of issues with camshaft. BRM introduced a 16- 
cylinder engine car, BRM P83 that developed 400 HP but failed to win single grand prix due 
to recurring problems with the engine. Lotus used the same 16-cylinder BRM engine in Lotus 
Type 43 as a stopgap while working on the DFV’s development. Driver’s championship was 
won by Jack Brabham despite his Brabham-Repco car’s 8-cylinder engine only producing a 
‘meagre’ 320 HP at 7500rpm, which was lowest output of any car on the circuit.  Brabham’s 
car though had superior handling it stayed ahead of the grid in the corners.  
 
4th June 1967 saw the arrival of Double Four Valve (DFV) type Ford V8 engine. DFV was a 
result of collaboration between Lotus, Cosworth Engineering, and the Ford company, who 
funded the project. Even though Brabham won the championship in 1967 (it was Jack 
Brabham’s team mate, Denis Hulme) The DFV type Ford V8 driven by Jim Clarke won the 
very first race it took part in at Zandvoort (Dutch Grand Prix). The DFV V8 engine would go 
on to dominate the Grand Prix racing cars till the advent of turbocharged cars and to date 
remains one of the most radical innovations in Formula 1 (Floyd and Jenkins, 2001). The 
engine was developed in response to the new regulations on engine size. DFV was a huge step 
in technological innovation. Chapman designed Lotus 49 around the DFV engine and 
employed it as a major part of the structure to reduce the weight and make car lighter (Floyd 
and Jenkins, 2001). Ford did not award Lotus with the exclusive rights for use of the engine, 
and made it available to other teams in F1. McLaren and Matra were the first teams to take 
advantage of this in 1968 using the Ford Cosworth DFV and Brabham followed in 1969. This 
led to the era of ‘Ford powered kit-cars’ in 70s where Formula 1 became dominated with 
Cosworth DFV engine, gearboxes manufactured by Hewland Engineering (Beck-Burridge and 
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Walton, 2000) and chassis and suspension designed by the constructors. Arrival of DFV ‘kit 
cars’ also put the vertically integrated constructors such as Ferrari and BRM who built their 
own engines and gearboxes at a disadvantage since kit cars were more cost effective.  
 
Next year saw introduction of wings to Grand Prix (Jones, 1996). Aerodynamics finally made 
its presence felt in the car design. It started as little stumps at the front and rear of the vehicle 
at Spa- Francorchamps, Belgian Grand Prix. But within a month, engineers started using 
inverted wing surfaces on the struts at the back. At that time aerodynamics was still in the ‘dark 
magic’ state and needed more research before it could be truly exploited by the constructors 
(Wright and Matthews, 2001). 
 
Table 14 Impact of  individuals on organisational performance 1950 -1970 
Discontinuities in the 
Network 
Individuals Impact on Organisational 
Performance 
Mid-engine cars, fuel 
regulation changes, advent of 
networks of constructors (1958) 
Charles and John Cooper/Jack 
Brabham 
World championship in 1959 
and 1960 challenging the 
domination of Ferrari and Alfa 
Romeo  
Continuous development of 
components – tyres, electronic 
ignition systems, fuel injection, 
improved spark plug 
technology, stress monocoque 
chassis design, and 
aerodynamic efficiency, Ford-
Cosworth DFV engine (1960 – 
1967) 
Colin Chapman (Lotus) 
Keith Duckworth (Cosworth) 
Lotus won four world 
championships between 1960 – 
1970 against established teams 
such as Ferrari, BRM, and 
Cooper. 
 
Following the introduction of 
DFV engine in 1967, the next 
seven consecutive world 
championships were won by 
teams using the DFV engine.  
 
 
It is evident from this discussion that new knowledge and technical changes such as 
repositioning of the engine from front of the car to middle, introduction of disc brakes, 
Cosworth’s Dual Four Valve engine, or Lotus’s riveted monocoque  structure with load bearing 
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aluminium skin were introduced by individuals in pursuit of more performance and competitive 
advantage.  
 
4.3. Innovation in Action 1970-1989  
In 1960s Colin Chapman had established himself as an innovative constructor with his 
monocoque design in early 60s (Crombac, 1986), which remains universal and indispensable 
to this day. His collaboration with Ford and Cosworth, and resultant DFV engine had been very 
successful. Chapman was about to introduce another radical innovation to Formula 1.  
 
A common design philosophy had taken root among Formula 1 constructors when it came to 
designing intake for their normally aspirated engines. Intake was located in the nose of the car. 
Colin Chapman took a radically different approach to this, he decided to adopt solutions from 
aerospace industry and make car more aerodynamic. He did away with the nose intake and 
instead relied on a pair of radiators forming the sides of the car (Jones, 1996). This gave Lotus 
72 an advantage; it could travel 14 km/h faster on long straights than its predecessor 49C (Atlas 
F1) with the same engine. Chapman also used torsion bar suspension (Wright and Matthews, 
2001) and located the brakes inwards to further reduce the unsuspended mass and improve the 
handling of the car. It also had an overhanging rear wing to provide aerodynamic grip to the 
car.  
 
At Zandvoort, Dutch Grand Prix on 21st June 1970 Jochen Rindt raced the Lotus T72 and won 
the race. Rindt went on to win three more Grand Prix, French, British and German. Later in 
1971, Colin Chapman introduced another technological innovation to Formula 1, perhaps not 
quite as successful as his other innovations. His Lotus 56B was not powered by an internal 
combustion engine but by a Pratt & Whitney developed gas turbine engine. The engine was 
developed for locomotives and helicopters and was proved to have an exceptionally bad fuel 
efficiency. It required almost 100 litres of fuels for every 100 km, the driver sat forward in the 
car due to the length of the turbine and there was a considerable lack in the application of the 
accelerator and actual power delivery. It made cornering almost impossible for the drivers and 
put high demands on their skills. (Wright and Matthews, 2001)  
 
Ferrari had merged with Fiat in 1969 and that provided the team with cash injection needed for 
research and development of a new flat 12-engine. The new engine provided some performance 
boost for Ferrari in 1970 but could not keep up with the DFV powered cars. After the merger 
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with Fiat, Ferrari had built a Formula 1 test track in Fiorano, Italy in 1971. At Fiorano, Ferrari 
developed their new car, 312T that used the ‘flat 12-engine’ and a transverse gearbox. They 
tested the car extensively for speed and reliability and introduced it in 1975 season. Nikki 
Lauda won the world championship that year for the Ferrari. This illustrates the importance of 
automotive manufacturers, financial resources, and availability of research facilities for 
Formula 1 constructors. To gain competitive advantage, novel knowledge and technologies are 
needed, and either a team, with considerable financial investment, can develop new 
technologies and solutions, or acquire knowledge through means of alliances, as Lotus did in 
its alliance with Cosworth and Ford.  
 
The French team, Tyrrell did try something radical in 1976 with their P34 which had two 
conventional rear drive wheel and four wheels in the front. Though P34 did win two races 
Tyrrell did not race the car in the next season, as there was no clear advantage of having six 
wheels over four. But a major technological change was around the corner.  
 
Formula 1 teams have avoided the use of turbo chargers. The primary reason for this reluctance 
was the lag between pushing the accelerator pedal down and the actual power delivery. Turbo 
could have been potentially of benefit on long ‘straights’ but not with the ‘lag’ (Henry and 
Brinton, 1988). Race cars need instant delivery of torque to accelerate faster than the 
competitors. Nonetheless, Renault introduced the first car with a turbocharged engine in 1977. 
This marks one of the first times that a manufacturer entered Formula 1 with explicit purpose 
of developing and promoting an automotive technology for adoption in road cars (Henry and 
Brinton, 1988). 
 
Though Formula 1 has seen supercharged cars in 1951 for a brief time, this was the first attempt 
in the last two decades. Jean-Pierre Jabouille was driving Renault and was not competitive in 
the race mostly due to the unreliability of the turbochargers. It took the team few more attempts 
before they could run the car competitively. And eventually Renault went on to win two Grands 
Prix.  
 
Colin Chapman was working on his Lotus 78 in the late 1970s. It turned out to be another 
radical innovation to come out of Lotus. The Lotus 78 was revolutionary (Jenkins, 2010; 
Wright and Matthews, 2001) Peter Wright, the Lotus designer, designed it with the help of a 
wind tunnel and made use of aerodynamic principles to generate grip while cornering. 
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Aerodynamic principles had been used in Formula 1 in past in form of an ‘inverted wing’ and 
‘spoilers’. The Lotus 78 made use of ‘ground effect’ to generate grip instead of only relying on 
the inverted wing. Peter Wright (2001, pg 299), defines ground effect as the effect that ground 
imparts to the free-air aerodynamic characteristics of a body moving through the air. In the 
case of a bird like a swan or a fixed wing aircraft, ground effect increases the lift at a given 
incidence and reduces the induced drag. This increase in aerodynamic efficiency enables the 
swan to accelerate in ground effect to a speed where flight away from the ground is possible. 
Lotus 78 had strips or skirts mounted between the wheels along the sides of the car that reached 
down to the tarmac, and these strips accelerated the wind flowing underneath the car to such 
an extent that a suction effect (or ‘inverse’ ground effect) was created.  
 
This resulted in more grip for the car and it could turn the corners at incredible speed. It took 
Lotus about a year to mature the concept, and Lotus driver Andretti won the championship in 
1978 in Lotus 79. Andretti and his teammate, Ronnie Peterson dominated the Formula 1 
circuits that year. This again illustrates teams’ willingness to innovate and adopt solutions from 
other industries to gain competitive advantage.  
 
The same year also saw the arrival of Gordon Murray’s BT46 which did away with radiators 
all together. The South African, working at Brabham was trying to create an aerodynamically 
symmetrical vehicle without radiator boxes to interrupt the airflow. He instead devised the idea 
of using heat exchanger tiles that were stuck to the body of the car. Though the system worked 
in theory, car couldn’t cope even in the tests and engine went much higher over the advised 
operating temperature. As a result, team had to cut holes right into the body of the car.  
 
80s began in this environment of technological innovation and growing popularity of the sport. 
Twenty teams were competing for the title and with lap times being reduced on an average of 
three second from last year, and the race for technological superiority had begun in earnest. 
Ground effect was truly making the sport faster and cornering speeds had risen to a point where 
transverse acceleration rose to almost 3Gs (drivers experience a rise in their bodyweight as a 
consequence of (de)acceleration under heavy braking or high speed turns, Wright and 
Matthews (2001). The  physical impact on the drivers in corners rose by an order of magnitude 





The attention to detail in Formula 1 had never been more important. Even the location of petrol 
pumps on engines became a point for concern for designers as it caused unwanted turbulence 
in the air flow and to counter it, it was later moved towards the rear of the vehicle. Performance 
gains, irrespective of how infinitesimally small they were became main focus of teams. 
 
Alan Jones won the championship in 1980 driving his Williams FW07B. Wright and Matthews 
(2001, pg 307) described the car as the ‘definitive ground effect’ car. The season of 1981 began 
with a ban on the skirts along the bottom of the sides of the vehicles. Rigid spoilers with at 
least 60mm clearance were introduced to counter the dangers of high cornering speeds due to 
the ground effect (Wright and Matthews, 2001; pg 309). Colin Chapman tried to work around 
this ban with his Lotus Type 88 by designing it with a double chassis but officials did not allow 
this and his car was banned from entering the competition. Nonetheless, 60 mm rule was never 
really followed by constructors during the race, as inspectors were unable to measure the 
difference, they lowered it anyway.  
 
This season also saw the arrival of carbon fibre monocoques, first by Lotus and then by 
McLaren. While McLaren used moulded carbon fibre structures for its MP4/1, Lotus fabricated 
the carbon fibre chassis for Lotus 88 using existing techniques for aluminium monocoque 
structures (Smith, 2012). While carbon fibre monocoque was heavier than an aluminium 
monocoque, the advantage in torsional rigidity and driver safety outweigh the disadvantage 
offered by the increase in the weight of the car.  
 
In 1982, Williams’ Keke Rosberg won the title in a normally aspirated car. This was to be the 
last win for normally aspirated engines, as the turbocharged engines became a norm in 1983 
season. Power output for these new turbocharged engines was higher than the normally 
aspirated engines. As a matter of fact, some engine manufacturers did not quote exact power 
figures of their engines, as the instrumentation on their test beds were insufficient to measure 
the power outputs of the turbocharged 1.5 litre engines. By 1983, engines had far exceeded the 
1000 HP mark. BMW’s 4- cylinder engine that brought victory to Nelson Piquet Jr in 1983 
produced 1250 HP. Driving it around Monza, Italy in the qualifying for Italian Grand Prix, 
Benetton driver Gerhard Berger achieved a top speed of 351.220 km/h which was a new record 
and demonstrated the ability, and rapid evolution, of turbochargers in Formula 1. When Renault 
first introduced turbochargers, there were considerably issues with reliability and performance 
 65 
 
and sea level altitudes, and their utility was limited to tracks such as Kyalami track which is 
located at 1800 metres above sea level.  
 
FIA changed the regulations in 1984 season by introducing pop-off valves to reduce the boost 
pressure coming from turbochargers to a maximum of 4 bars and then reducing it again to 2.5 
bars. FIA also put a limit on the litres of fuel that could be used for every Gran Prix race at 150 
litres. But this restriction was only put on turbocharged engines and the 3.5 litre normally 
aspirated engines were not subjected to fuel restrictions. Though due to the vast difference in 
power generated by turbocharged and non-turbocharged engines, normally aspirated engines 
were never really in any position to win the championship. Nikki Lauda won the title for 
McLaren in 1984 and his teammate, Alain Prost followed him in 1985, 1986.  
 
1988 saw one of the most successful collaborations, in terms of points scored and race wins in 
a single season, in Formula 1 history. McLaren entered into a partnership with Honda. Honda 
was to supply engines for McLaren. Reduced boost pressure had forced the teams to move their 
attention from the pursuit of ever-higher HP figure. Power output of engines was now in the 
vicinity of 700 HP. Teams moved their attention to other aspects of the car. McLaren partnered 
up with Shell to improve the thermal efficiencies in the combustion chambers. With the limit 
of 150 litres of fuel every grand prix, Shell’s unleaded fuel proved to be the distinguishing 
aspect of McLaren-Honda engine, providing superior power level, consumption and reduced 
friction losses. The results were decisive. Ayrton Senna and Alain Prost won 15 out of the 16 
World Championship races for McLaren-Honda in 1988 season. The feat has never been 
equalled, let alone broken, since then. 1989 saw a ban on turbochargers and a return of 3.5 litre 
normally aspirated engines. Shell’s unleaded fuel continued to produce results for McLaren.  
Table 15 Impact of  individuals on organisational performance 1970 - 1990 
Discontinuities in the 
Network 
Individuals Impact on Organisational 
Performance 
Wind tunnel based car 
design, ground effect (1978) 
Colin Chapman, Peter 
Wright (Lotus) 
Lotus won the world 
championship in 1978 
Carbon fibre composite 
monocoque 
John Barnard, Ron Dennis 
(McLaren) 
McLaren went on to win five 
world championships 
between 1981 – 1990, carbon 
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fibre composites were 
adopted by other teams. 
 
4.4. Evolving for 21st Century 1990-2010  
This period is of importance for this study as the social network analysis is focused on this 
period. This period started with a change in regulation that banned turbochargers. One of the 
primary reason FIA banned turbochargers was to keep the costs down but two years after the 
ban, teams were spending 15-30% more on their 3.5 litre engines than what they were spending 
on their 6-cylinder 1.5 litre turbocharged engines (Atlas F1). The normally aspirated engines 
finally broke the 200 HP per 1000 CC of capacity mark and engine output reached 700 HP. 
Tyrrell team’s constructors, Harvey Postlethwaite and Jean-Claude Migeot built the first ‘high-
nose’ Formula 1 car. This innovation in aerodynamics has become indispensable to all modern 
Formula 1 cars.  
 
McLaren won the championship in 1991. But this changed in 1992; the Williams-Renault 
partnership dominated that year. Their FW14B, equipped with active chassis (active 
suspension) adapting to the driving conditions and traction control preventing unwanted wheel 
spin in acceleration led to a world championship for Nigel Mansel. Discussing active 
suspension, Wright and Matthews (2001, pg 325) writes, “ the characteristics of a ground-
effect race car are such that the development of active suspension was inevitable. The effect on 
the performance of the car also made it almost inevitable that active suspension would be 
banned.”  
 
In 1992, FIA introduced some changes to fuel regulations mandating that the fuel used in the 
cars only contains hydrocarbons and limited quantities of nitrogen and oxygen. A year later, 
FIA made it mandatory that the fuel used in cars must comply with European Union’s fuel 
regulations for health and safety. These regulations brought an end to all the ‘dark magic’ 
concoctions involving alcohol, nitrogen compounds and other HP-boosting additives. The 
engine tuning along with race-fuel was responsible for an incremental but an important increase 
in power during the race. New regulations required that teams had to submit a sample of race 
fuel to the authorities before the race and the fuel in the car on the race day should be identical 




Ayrton Senna moved to Williams-Renault in 1994 and he looked poised for another title that 
year. But it was not to be and Senna, along with Austrian driver Roland Ratzenberger suffered 
fatal accidents on consecutive days at Imola in the qualifying session. This created an 
unprecedented backlash against Formula 1 in the media. Wright (2001) described it as 
‘existential crisis.’ FIA banned all the driving aids (e.g. active suspension and traction control) 
that year and in 1995, FIA also lowered the engine capacity to 3.0 litres. These regulation 
changes forced the teams to innovate at a rapid pace, because technologies such as traction 
control and active suspension had made driving Formula 1 car more manageable at high speeds 
(more than 250 km/h) and it was considerably more difficult for the drivers to control the car 
without any of these driving aids (Wright and Matthews, 2001).  
 
In 1996, the William-Renault partnership succeeded and Damon Hill won the championship 
that year. Next few years saw Ferrari’s Schumacher and Williams’ Villeneuve closely fighting 
for the title with Villeneuve coming on the top. In 1998, Renault ended their partnership with 
Williams. Despite having won the championship just the year before, Williams could not win 
a single race in 1998. This goes on to demonstrate the critical nature of a competitive engine 
(and role of engine manufacturers) in grand prix winning car.  
 
The FIA made more changes that year. Car width was reduced from 200 centimetres to 180 
centimetres. Larger cockpits, from safety’s point of view, were made mandatory. Rib-tread 
tyres, instead of the usual treadles slick tyres, were introduced to reduce the contact surface 
available to the car, and as a result reduce the cornering speed. FIA introduced four longitudinal 
grooves on the rear tyre and three on the front. In 1999, FIA stipulated an additional 
longitudinal groove on the front tyre. Later the same year, FIA banned the use of small 
additional wings on the side boxes. These regulations were introduced to make race cars more 
safe for the drivers. Furthermore, Formula 1 was now using fuel with greatly reduced sulphur 
content and aromatic additives that matched the European Standards.  
 
2001 saw the reintroduction of traction control, which has been banned since 1994, to Formula 
1. Schumacher again won the title comfortable with Ferrari winning the constructor’s 
Championship. It’s worth pointing out that at this juncture, Renault bought Benetton and the 
car maker begin taking part in Formula 1 under its own brand name. Ferrari again showed 
absolute dominance in the next season with Schumacher clinching the title with six races to go 
in the season and finishing with a podium place in every race. Ferrari’s ability to tightly 
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integrate its design and engine manufacturing resulted into a superior racing car. Ferrari won 
the 2003 and 2004 World Championships. Schumacher’s role in bring engineering capabilities 
in form of Rory Byrne and Ross Brawn also contributed to Ferrari’s performance.  
 
FIA made head and neck support device (HANS) compulsory for all drivers in 2003. Though 
some drivers did voice complaint but FIA was serious about projecting an image of safe sport 
and to this day the HANS are mandatory. HANS was invented by Professor Robert Hubbard, 
at College of Engineering, Michigan University. An alliance of McLaren, Mercedes, and FIA 
developed the system further for adoption in Formula 1.   
 
2005 season saw FIA introducing new 2.4 litre V8 engines to Formula 1 in place of the 3.0 litre 
V10 that have been powering the cars since mid 90s. In the 2008 season, none of the teams 
used traction control and McLaren won the title and Lewis Hamilton became the youngest 
driver ever to win the championship. It also marked the last year when the cars raced with 
grooved tyres. Slick tyres made their return in 2009 season. In 2009 season, Honda left the 
sports and the team was renamed as Brawn GP and went on to win the driver’s world 
championship with Jenson Button.  
 
2009 also saw some of the biggest changes made to Formula 1 in recent times. New Kinetic 
Energy Recovery Systems (KERS) were introduced to recover the energy from heat that is 
generated during braking. Slick tyres made a comeback to the Grand Prix racing track. 
Aerodynamic regulations were also altered. Front wings were made lower and wider with rear 
wings becoming higher and narrower. All the additional components such as winglets and 
turning vanes were completely removed and diffuser at the rear of the car was moved back and 
upwards. The idea behind these changes was to reduce the reliance on aerodynamic downforce 
for grip and increasing the mechanical grip. Next few years saw continued dominance of Red 
Bull with their exploitation of diffuser at the rear of the car to generate more down force and 
corner at higher speeds. 
 
Table 16 Impact of  individuals on organisational performance 1990 - 2010 
Discontinuities in the 
Network 





automated driving aids 
(1991) 
Patrick Head, Adrian Newey 
(Williams)  
Williams won the next three 
world championships before 
FIA banned automated 
driving aids 
Michael Schumacher joins 
Ferrari with Rory Byrne and 
Ross Brawn (1996) 
Michael Schumacher, Rory 
Byrne, Ross Brawn, Jean 
Todt (Ferrari) 
Ferrari won six world 
championships during 
Michael Schumacher’s 
tenure (1996 – 2006) 
 
 
4.5. Why Formula 1? 
The discussion in preceding sections describes how Formula 1 is composed of a global network 
of constructors, suppliers, and automotive manufacturers which are simultaneously competing 
and collaborating to overcome the technological and regulatory challenges within given time 
constraints. Formula 1 is essentially a prototype business as each year, teams must deliver a 
new product (i.e. car) and continuously evolve and introduce innovations over the season to 
maintain competitive advantage. Teams have to do this while simultaneously develop next 
year’s product which, depending on regulations, could be considerably different in technical 
specifications than the present product and presents challenges associated with fast clockspeed 
industries.  
 
The availability of performance metrics, that is grand prix results, make understanding the 
effect of this network on knowledge transfer process possible. Formula 1 is always at the 
cutting edge of automotive technology and how firms in Formula 1 manage pace of the 
technological development and regulatory challenges offer lessons for businesses such as 
information management systems, pharmaceutical industries, and aerospace manufacturers 
where firms form alliances with their competitors to tackle specific projects, expand their 
resource base, and overcome regulatory change.  
 
There have been knowledge transfer studies focused on Formula 1 in the literature. Jenkins 
(2010) studied the technological discontinuity in Formula 1, Jenkins and Tallman (2015) 
researched the role of geography of knowledge sourcing in Formula 1 with a longitudinal 
single-case study focused on Ferrari. Aversa et al. (2015) research in Formula 1 identified 
business modes; a) of selling technology to competitors and b) developing and trading human 
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resources with competitors as high-performance business models. Pinch et al. (2003) studied 
the evolution of clusters in Formula 1 and their (positive) effect on the dissemination of 
knowledge through the cluster. Jenkins and Floyd (2001) studied technological trajectories of 
three key technologies in Formula 1 at component, firm and system levels of analysis to 
understand relationships between technological transparency, co-evolution, and dominant 
design. Judde et al. (2013) studied the regulation change and its (positive) effect on the 
championship uncertainty and (no effect) long-term dominance. 
 
While comprehensive in their scope, these studies have not explored the role played by 
individuals in knowledge transfer process and organisational performance in inter-
organisational network. Formula 1 research in the literature is focused on exploring the 
business models and geographical location of organisations within the network, and there is a 
dearth of studies exploring the role of individual(s) or gatekeepers who influence and shape 
organisational performance. This study will fill that gap in the literature by using Formula 1 as 
a context for applying social network analysis.  
 
4.6. Small World 
The small world problem was first formulated by social psychologists in late 60s (Milgram, 
1967; Travers and Milgram, 1967). The problem can be stated, in most simple terms as the 
probability of two people in the world knowing each other. Building up on that, one can expand 
the problem statement and argue that while two people might not know each other directly but 
they may have mutual acquaintances or intermediaries between them.  
 
Watts and Strogatz (1998) came up with the analogous concept; small world networks. Watts 
and Strogatz (1998) defined small world networks as networks that are highly clustered, like 
regular lattices, yet have small characteristic path lengths, like random graphs. Social 
networks involving individuals or organisations are topologically different than physical 
networks, such as lattice arrangement in solid structures. This is not to say that social networks 
are like random graphs. Social networks have locales and clusters where if a node A in a social 
network is connected to node B, and node B is connected to node C, then there is a higher 
probability that node A and node C are acquainted, than two random nodes selected from a 
given population. This is not the case in a random graph where probability of any two nodes 
being connected is the same. Small world networks model social networks, and consist of a 
network topology like a regular lattice, and possessing average node to node distance 
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comparable to that of random graphs (Adamic et. Al., 2003; Albert and Barabasi., 1999; 
Newman, 2001; Kleinberg, 2000). The technological overview of the Formula 1 network shows 
small world properties. This has implications for how nodes behave within the network.  
 
Uzzi et al. (2007) posit that small world as a research tool allows for an unusually parsimonious 
set of explanations for many different systems as well as the behaviour of the nodes embedded 
within them (Uzzi et al., 2007 pg. 12.) The small world phenomena is important in studying 
real life networks as it establishes the fact that even in large networks with thousands of nodes, 
there is  a relatively short path connecting any given pair of nodes (Albert and Barabasi, 1999).  
Telesford et al. (2011) highlight the unique ability of small world networks to simultaneously 
have highly clustered regions with strong connection within the community of nodes and 
exhibit shared (or distrusted) processing through the network. 
 
Researchers have studied small world phenomena with a focus on concept of small distances 
or path length between any two nodes in a network (Conwan and Jonard, 2004; Newman, 
2001). A small world network facilitates innovation by creating ‘short cuts’ in a large network 
(Cowan and Jonard, 2004). Newman (2001) cites examples of scientific community with a 
network structure of a small world. In such a network it should be relatively easier for one actor 
working on a new problem to find an expert on the subject matter.  
 
Small world phenomena have been observed in many real life contexts. Nervous systems, 
collaborations in scientific publishing, investment banking, and film collaborations. (Newman, 
2001; Newman, 2003; Schnettler, 2009).  Some scholars (Buchana, 2002; Telesford, 2011) 
argues that small world networks are ubiquitous though there are many examples of real life 
networks that are not small world.  Goyal et al. (2006) found that authorship network of 
economists (1980 – 1999) was a small world network, Moody (2004) found that not to be true 
for sociology authorship network (1963 – 1999). Schnettler (2009) and Newman (2003) 
comment on common occurrence small world phenomena and suggest that small world 
network conditions are not demanding. Relatively less demanding conditions for existence of 
small world networks explain why they appear ubiquitous (Telesford, 2011).  
 
Robins et al. (2005) found another potentially reason for ubiquity of small world networks. 
They found in their simulations that even node centric processes can lead to small world 
networks, especially in cases where nodes has more than one connection. Scholars have also 
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found that node centric processes and attributes affect the whole network and there is a 
relationship between node level and network level metrics (Baum et al., 2003; Corrado and 
Zollo, 2006; Guimera et al., 2005). Mishra et al. (2017) highlight the nature of gatekeepers. 
There gatekeepers can span boundaries of different clusters in the network and may lead to 
formation of small worlds. This may lead to creation of more gatekeepers who can encourage 
more information and knowledge flow and facilitate network growth without losing 
connectivity.  
 
4.7. Innovation and Small World Networks 
 
One of the first studies to explore the relationship between small world networks and 
innovation was focused on examining technology alliance in chemicals and electronic 
industries (Verspagen and Duysters, 2004).  Verspagen and Duysters (2004) described the 
network as highly clustered and having low average path length between any two nodes. 
Balconi et al. (2004) also identified similar characteristics in their study of Italian inventors. 
They found that the collaboration networks in the electrical and chemical industries are more 
connected than other networks. Despite the differences in their respective methodology, 
Verspagen and Duysters (2004) used European MERIT CATI dataset and Balconi et al. (2004) 
used patent data to establish connections, their finding are similar. This implies that certain 
traits within certain industries are more conducive for small world networks.  
 
Cowan et al. (2007) did a simulation based study where they showed how small worlds form 
within innovation networks when embeddedness is a driver for alliance formation. This 
embeddedness leads to cluster formation which is critical for formation of small world 
networks. Gay and Dousset (2005) did a study on biotechnology sector (specifically antibody 
industry) and found that the industry network had small world characteristics. They also 
remarked on how 72% antibody industry network alliances involved some form of research 
and development agreement. In this particular study, robustness of small world structures 
within the main component of the network point to relationship between aspects of technology 
and innovation process. Cowan et al. (2007) simulation study supports this argument that there 
is a link between industry specific innovation processes and small world networks.  Uzzi (1997) 
has identified embeddedness as arising from repeated interactions between firms based on trust 
and shared understanding. In case of small world networks, this embeddedness allows for inter 




Although these studies identify small world phenomena’s occurrence in alliances centred on 
innovation, they fail to provide evidence for a relationship between small world networks and 
innovation outcomes (Steen et al., 2011). The common occurrence of small world network in 
different industries and systems imply that small world network properties have little influence 
on innovation. Uzzi and Spiro (2005) study challenges this assumption and demonstrates the 
influence of small world on innovation. The study is set in Broadway, and analyses the 
collaborations data between 1945 and 1989. Using the data on teams of artists, Uzzi and Spiro 
created a network of musicians working on different musicals in different periods. They found 
that small world indicator, called small world coefficient and performance is an inverted U 
shape. This implies that possibility of musical being successful, at the peak value of small 
world indicator, is three times higher than where the small indicator is at its lowest value.  
 
Granovetter (1973) conclusions about redundant information in networks and Burt’s (2004) 
observations about connections between disparate groups giving rise to innovation complement 
Uzzi and Spiro’s findings. A network with a very large Q implies a densely connected network 
where there is no diversity of knowledge or mechanism to introduce novel knowledge through 
disparate cluster of nodes or peripheral nodes.  
 
Small world networks have implications for innovation and knowledge transfer. Small world 
networks are structured such as to encourage knowledge flows within the network. The clusters 
within the network involve nodes in cohesive communities exchanging information, and 
relatively short path lengths ensure that novel knowledge can be introduced via individual (s) 
from a different cluster. This face to face interaction is critical for tacit knowledge which is 
embedded in individual and difficult to transfer in the context of Formula 1 (Argote and Ingram, 
2000; Cummings and Teng, 2003; Squire et al., 2009, Aversa et al., 2017)  
 
The small world nature of Formula 1 network will imply unusually large information flowing 
within the network through links between nodes (gatekeepers) who have either worked together 
in past or connected to each other through another actor (Uzzi and Spiro, 2015; Mishra et al., 
2017). The small world of Formula 1 means that novel knowledge is introduced in the network 




Small world networks also have implications for state of innovation (Uzzi and Spiro, 2005; 
Burt, 2004; Steen et al., 2011). A moderately high small world coefficient will imply novel 
knowledge flow between peripheral nodes and central clusters. This type of knowledge is 
critical for innovation. 
 
As discussed in previous sections, Formula 1 offers an ideal context for this study. A 
technological overview of the Formula 1 network, with its high information flow and 
technological innovation, highlights the small world properties of the network. The next 
chapter shows the importance of individuals with high tacit knowledge content on the 
organisational performance in the small world network of Formula 1. The quantitative 









Chapter 5: Interviews and Case Studies: Qualitative Analysis 
This chapter is divided in two sections. The first section is focused on interviews and analysis 
and the second chapter is focused on case study analysis.  
5.1 Interviews 
Interview analysis was done based on the framework developed in chapter 2 (figure 3, page 
18). The goal of analysis was to verify the veracity of the framework and explore the existing 
academic consensus on nature of tacit knowledge transfer in Formula 1. To this end, the 
following table lists labels developed from the framework and wider literature for analysing 
interviews.  
Table 17 Labels for analysing interviews 
Labels  
Motivation behind Strategic Alliances  
This construct focuses on why organisations get 
into alliances in inter-organisational networks.  
Smith et al., 2007; Stauffer, 1999; McEvily et 
al., 2004; Kogut, 1988; Inkpen and Tsang, 2005; 
Grant and Baden-Fuller, 2004 
Process facilitating knowledge transfer 
This construct identifies key processes in alliances 
and the wider inter-organisational network that 
support knowledge transfer.  
 
Szulanski, 1996; Chen 2004; Cavusgil et al., 
2003; Song et al., 2003; Appleyard 1996; Aversa 
et al., 2015; Baughnet al., 1997; Choi and Lee 
1997; Dodgson 1996; Mowery et al., 1996 
Factor affecting said processes  
This construct explores the factors that affect the 
process identified as facilitating knowledge 
transfer 
Rebnitsch and Ferretti, 1995; Ahuja, 2000; Song 
et al., 2014; Garud and Nayyar, 1994; Simonnin, 
1999; Cummings and Teng, 2003; Schulze et al., 
2014  
Industry variables and their role (Competition, 
Technology, Evolution) 
This construct describes how various aspects of 
industry affect knowledge transfer process in 
inter-organisational networks. 
Ahuja, 2000; Pinch et al., 2003; Aversa et al., 
2015; Yoshino and Rangan, 1995; Gomes-
Casseres, 2006; Pinch et al., 2003; Rond and 
Marjanovic, 2006; Jenkins and Tallman, 2015; 
Ahuja et al., 2008; Dyer and Singh, 1998. 
Nature of knowledge transfer (Degree of 
Tacitness) 
This construct explores how the degree of 
tacitness affects the knowledge transfer process.  
Chen, 2004; Cummings and Teng, 2003; 
Reagans and McEvily, 2003; Zhao and Lavin, 
2012; Argote and Ingram, 2000; Lam 1997; 
Nelso and Winter, 1992; Polanyi, 1964, 1967; 
Battistella et al., 2016 
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Dimensions of knowledge transfer (prior 
alliances, core competencies, absorptive capacity, 
trust) 
This construct explores how various dimensions 
of knowledge transfer (as identified in the 
literature) affect the process.  
 
Lyles, 1998; Lyles and Gundegran, 2006 
Quintas et al., 1998; Ahuja, 2000 
Tsai, 2001; Lichtenthaler and Lichtenthaler, 
2010 
Critical factors for success of knowledge transfer 
process in alliances 
This construct identifies which factors are critical 
for successful knowledge transfer in alliances.  
Inkpen and Tsang, 2005; Kogut, 1988, Adams et 
al., 1998; Grand and Baden-Fuller; 2004; Hardy 
et al., 2003; Appleyard 1996; Baughn, et al., 
1997; Choi and Lee, 1997; Dodgson, 1996; 
Mowery et al.,1996; Garuda and Nayar, 1994; 
Cummings and Teng, 2003.  
 
Motivation Behind Strategic Alliances 
Interviewee 1 suggests that key aspect behind formation of strategic alliances in Formula 1 is 
to win races, and the Formula 1 car is an alliance. The interviewee goes on to highlight the case 
of Red Bull Racing team and Renault Sports, their engine supplier and the series of problems 
faced by their alliance because of underperforming Renault engine. Alliance formation is also 
motivated by a search of knowledge they do not have and to encourage knowledge flow 
between partners.  
 
Interviewee 2 argued that knowledge transfer is indeed a driving force behind alliance 
formation. Interviewee 3 suggested that it is difficult to ascertain exact motivation for alliance 
formation in Formula 1 considering that there is a history of organisations investing 
considerable resources, monetary and human, only to come short and get beaten by smaller 
British teams with miniscule operating budgets. Interviewee 3 also highlighted how in recent 
years one team, Mercedes AMG, has been head and shoulder above everyone and it can be 
attributed to their different inter-organisational structure (compared to teams such as Ferrari 
and Lotus) and investment in research.  
 
Process Facilitating Knowledge Transfer in Alliances 
Interviewee 1 suggests that it is the myriad of connections between people in collaborating 
organisations that facilitate knowledge transfer and cites the example of current Formula 1 tyre 
supplier, Pirelli which has engineers working with every team. Interviewee 2 suggests that prior 
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alliances and co-location (geographical proximity) plays a key role in facilitating knowledge 
transfer and goes on to highlight how Hass F1, an US based Formula  1 constructor, opened a 
technical centre in the motorsport valley in Britain. This, the interviewee argues, explains why 
teams like HRT could not perform well. Synergetic and complementary alliances are essential 
for knowledge transfer.  
 
Interviewee 3 highlighted research collaboration, funding, and lack of capability as key factors 
facilitating knowledge transfer in alliances. Interviewee 3 also argued that less regulation can 
facilitate Formula 1 teams to get into alliances for knowledge transfer.  
 
Factors Affecting said Processes 
Interview 1 argues that clusters are an important factor that affects the processes facilitating 
knowledge transfer. Clusters encourage knowledge sharing within the cluster boundary but also 
isolate the members from accessing those outside of clusters, and this is known as paradox of 
clusters and is key factor that affects the process of knowledge transfer. Interviewee 1 also 
argues that since Formula 1 teams rely on tacit knowledge within individuals than on 
intellectual property, people to people contact and the accompanying network is essential for 
knowledge transfer.  
 
Interviewee 2 suggests that it is lack of capability which is behind processes that facilitate 
knowledge transfer in alliances. Formula 1 is a prototypical product business and as such lacks 
economies of scales and by entering in alliances and knowledge transfer, teams can access 
knowledge they lack and make cost savings. Interviewee 3 argued that it is the decline of 
Formula 1 which is encouraging teams to get into alliances and facilitate knowledge transfer 
to access novel knowledge and gain competitive advantage.  
 
Industry Variables and their Role  
Interviewee 1 argues that beyond competition, technology, and pace of evolution, regulation is 
the key industry variable that affects knowledge transfer in alliances in Formula 1. Regulations 
can change the balance of competition and the direction of evolution of technology. Regulatory 
interventions also cause disruption, as observed in case of introduction of turbocharges by 




Interviewee 2 argued that innovation also plays a role in affecting knowledge transfer process 
in alliances in Formula 1. The interviewee goes on to highlight how Mercedes had refused to 
form an alliance with Red Bull Racing for the 2016 season because of Red Bull’s ability to 
exploit their expertise in aerodynamics and potentially perform better than the works teams, 
that is Mercedes. Interviewee 3 argues that from perspective of the wider automotive industry, 
Formula 1 technology is not suitable for road cars and as such does not require substantial 
investment or participation on their part.  
 
Degree of tacitness 
Interviewee 1 suggests that various partners absorb tacit knowledge by working closely with 
Formula 1 teams and apply it to their other partners within Formula 1, and in some cases, in 
their road car business. Interviewee 2 identifies tacit knowledge as very important since it is 
difficult to imitate and it copes with Formula 1 teams’ need for secrecy. Formula 1 teams do 
not file patents, and tacit knowledge drives innovation within Formula 1 teams.  
Interviewee 2 goes on to argue that quickest way to innovate is to hire people from companies 
you are trying to imitate. Tacit knowledge is also a driving factor behind interfirm mobility 
between teams. Interviewee 3 suggests that tacit knowledge enhances organisational impact 
and ability of teams to do system integration. The interviewee also highlights Lotus teams 
culture and approach to racing which was inherently tacit and led to them become one of the 
most successful teams in Formula 1 history.  
 
Dimensions of Knowledge Transfer  
Interviewee 1 argues that a history of prior alliances can only benefit alliance partners if they 
can deliver technology that is appropriate and goes on to cite case of Ross Brawn at Mercedes 
and his role in encouraging development of hybrid engine technology and Red Bull’s expertise 
in aerodynamics. The interviewee also suggests that there is little if any transfer from Formual 
1 to automotive industry. About core competencies, interviewee 1 suggests that Formula 1 team 
share only those technologies that they either view as obsolete or not threatening to their own 
prospects in races.  
 
Interviewee 2 suggests that while prior alliances can play a constructive role in knowledge 
transfer, but they can also be a hindrance. In terms of protecting their core competencies, 
interviewee 2 argues, teams do not share the source of their key competitive advantage, as was 
the case when Mercedes refused to supply Red Bull Racing with the power units. It was 
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believed that with their expertise in aerodynamics and Mercedes power unit, Red Bull car 
would have been a better performing package than Mercedes’. Interviewee 2 also highlights 
how Mercedes does not deliver engine updates to its other alliance partners as quickly as to its 
own factory team. Absorptive capacity is important to knowledge transfer as collaboration is 
drive by a desire to learn which is different than their domain expertise.  
 
Interviewee 3 highlights the importance of prior alliances, cites the case of BRM, a British 
engine manufacturer and Lotus Formula 1 team partnership in 1960s. In this case, BRM 
withdrew from the sport because of regulation change, and it was the relationship between 
BRM technical director, Rudd and Lotus team principal, Chapman, which led to Rudd moving 
to Lotus and few seasons later, wining world championship. The interviewee also highlights 
merger as another key variable that allows teams to absorb knowledge and core competencies 
of their alliance partners and facilitates knowledge transfer.  
 
Other Factors affecting Knowledge Transfer 
Interviewee 1 suggests that primary factor motivating knowledge transfer is ability to access 
novel knowledge. The interviewee also highlights alignment, complementaries, and 
competencies as external factors influencing knowledge transfer. Interviewee 2 highlights 
integrative capability as another factor affecting the process.  
Interviewee 3 argues that regulations are restrictive and negatively affect knowledge transfer 
by setting tight boundaries and allowing for minimum manoeuvrability for engineers and 
researchers in Formula 1.   
 
Critical Factors for Success of Knowledge Transfer Process in Alliances 
Interview 1 highlights system integration as the critical factor for success of knowledge transfer 
in alliances in Formula 1. A Formula 1 team’s ability to integrate different and varied 
technologies into the race car is key for knowledge transfer success. Formula 1 teams have a 
long history of integrating different and novel technologies into race cars, such as 3-D printing. 
Cultural alignment also plays an important role in success of knowledge transfer process, as 
can be observed in the way Mercedes AMG racing team has organised itself as a distinct 
company from the parent organisation, Daimler AG. 
 
Interviewee 2 suggests financial resources, technical expertise, and ways of doing things are 
critical for knowledge transfer success. Formula 1 teams are good at exploiting their partners’ 
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knowledge and learn how to work with a particular technology. Another factor affecting the 
success of knowledge transfer is the type of alliance, if it is customer and component producer 
alliance, then it has more chances of being successful. Interviewee 2 also highlights how it is 
difficult to measure success of knowledge transfer, and how it is idiosyncratic to the task. 
Interviewee 3 highlights research and development as the critical factor behind the success of 
knowledge transfer in alliances in Formula 1. 
 
 Directionality and other Aspects 
Interview 1 argues that directionality is important but not the critical factor for knowledge 
transfer success. Other aspects such as knowledge, people, relations, and organisations coming 
together play a role in success of knowledge transfer. Knowledge transfer process is also driven 
by constant development. In terms of transfer of technology between Formula 1 and automotive 
industry, the interviewee 1 suggest that while technological overlaps do exist, compatibility of 
capabilities more analogues to aerospace and defence industries. Although in past, alliance 
partners have tried rotating their engineers through Formula 1 for capability development, as 
Honda did with their alliance partner McLaren in late 1980s. Formula 1, as an industry, has 
more in common with aerospace and Silicon Valley based companies like Apple, Google, and 
Tesla than automotive industry.  
 
Interviewee 2 highlights that Formula 1 offers a test bed for technology where companies can 
push the technological boundaries of their products and highlights the long standing electronic 
component manufacturer, Magneti Marelli, a partner of Ferrari, as using Formula 1 to test 
specific technological components. Interviewee 2 describes Formula 1 as the Big Brother of an 
R&D lab. Big Brother is a voyeuristic reality television program.  
Interviewee 2 argues that Formula 1 has a responsibility to build technologies for automotive 
industry and both industries share plenty of application and opportunities for developing 
technologies. Practices, or way of doing things, in Formula 1 offer universal lessons for all 
industries.  
 
Interviewee 3 suggests that there is little bidirectional transfer between Formula 1 and the 
automotive industry since early 1980s as the engine and chassis technologies of Formula 1 cars 
and road cars have developed in different directions. The interviewee also highlights how it is 
easier to design a Formula 1 engine than a road car engine and that current Formula 1 engine 
is a dead-end technology.  
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The following table lists the interview findings and corresponding tacit knowledge transfer 
variables identified in the framework.  
Table 18 Interview findings 
Variable for Tacit Knowledge Transfer Interview Findings 
Degree of tacitness, trust, and technology Certain individuals are key exponents of tacit 
knowledge. 
 
Degree of tacitness, prior alliances, proximity to 
core competencies  
Movement of these individuals is linked with 
improved organisational performance. 
Prior alliances, proximity to core competencies, 
technology, evolution of the industry, and 
competition 
Formula 1 cars are prototypes that are essentially 
an alliance between chassis constructor, engine 
manufacturer, and various technical partners.  
Degree of tacitness, technology, competition, 
evolution of the industry, motivation behind 
strategic alliances, and trust 
Motivation behind this alliance is accessing the 
knowledge that can help the team win races. 
Teams are looking for knowledge within the 
inter-organisational network for competitive 
advantage. 
 
Degree of tacitness, trust, and technology Most innovations and technologies developed in 
Formula 1 are not patented and teams rely on 
individuals and the knowledge (of technologies 
and way of doing things) residing within them for 
improvement and performance gains.  
 
Competition, technology, and proximity to core 
competencies 
If a team does not have access to such 
knowledge, it will rely on movement of 
individuals from other successful teams and their 
know-how to access the said knowledge.  
 
Degree of tacitness, trust, and competition. Team’s ability to integrate individuals and 
technologies is critical for its success. Teams are 





Competition, and evolution of the industry Regulation changes play a key part in facilitating 





5.1.1 Interview Findings 
Interviewees emphasised the unique nature of Formula 1 cars, and termed them as an alliance. 
The prime objective of this alliance is to win races. This alliance is primarily formed to acquire 
the knowledge, resources, and capability that a team lacks. These alliances are driven by past 
collaboration and geographical colocation. Geographical co-location is a particularly important 
aspect of success in Formula 1 as most of the teams and suppliers are located in what is known 
as motorsport valley in United Kingdom and motorsport valley in Italy. Knowledge flow itself 
is bidirectional and is driven by its value for application.  
 
Formula 1 cars are prototypes and make achieving economies of scales difficult. Getting into 
an alliance not only facilitates cost saving but also provides access to otherwise difficult to 
reach knowledge. Alliance and knowledge sharing are also dependent on the partner’s ability 
to innovate. Companies do not get into alliance if their partner can “out-innovate” them in 
performance 
 
The process of knowledge transfer manifests in the connections between people in 
collaborating organisations. This network of organisation relies on movement of personals to 
gain knowledge, capabilities, and processes and as a result Formula 1 teams have a high 
interfirm mobility. Knowledge moves in clusters and is dependent on people-to-people contact. 
This network of people is critical as Formula 1 technological gains are never patented or seen 
as intellectual property that needs to be protected and rely on their personnel to propagate 
knowledge through the organisation. This makes members of world championship winning 
teams attractive for other teams and not necessarily because they can potentially bring same 
technologies but more so because they bring their know-how that is tacit knowledge.  Hiring 
personnel from successful teams is also considered a way to encourage innovation. 
 
The network of people driving knowledge sharing is contextualised by the competition and 
technological evolution as well as regulation. Regulation change can alter the balance of 
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competition and change the trajectory of technological evolution. Regulatory changes can also 
cause disruption. The nature of knowledge is critical for transfer process. Learning the 
processes and way of doing things is perhaps more important that the technologies. This type 
of tacit transfer is critical for partners in alliances. Lack of capability and monetary resources 
also affect the process of knowledge transfer. Research collaboration is also a motivating factor 
behind knowledge exchange between alliance partners’. Interviewee three presented the view 
that less regulation can facilitate more collaboration, knowledge exchange, and innovation. 
 
A history of past alliances can have a positive effect on the transfer process if alliance partner 
can deliver technology appropriate for the team. Prior alliances can also be a hindrance as well. 
Teams often refuse to collaborate where their core competencies can complement partner’s 
core competencies resulting in partner having a better car on the track. The absorptive capacity 
of a potential alliance partner is critical for knowledge transfer success and often teams form 
alliances to access the knowledge that the team lacks. The ability to integrate different 
technologies, knowledge, and people is at the core of a team’s success. Financial resources play 
a key role in success or failure of knowledge transfer process as well as ability of personal in 
the team. Partners are protective of their core competencies and only share technologies that 
they have already incorporated in their cars and in process of developing and improving it 
 
The nature of Formula 1 means that alliances are primarily driven by ‘knowledge’, knowledge 
that can help a team win races. Other external factors such as corporate alignment and 
complementary competencies do play a role but gaining knowledge and technologies remain 
the prime motivator for these alliances. The nature of knowledge transfer is determined, and 
driven, by the organisational culture and the ability of teams to integrate different personal and 
technologies. In terms of the ability of alliance partners, the ability to absorb and incorporate 
knowledge depends on cultural compatibility and prior alliances. Regulations negatively affect 
this process by restricting the ability of teams to apply all their technical know-how.  
 
A critical factor for success of knowledge transfer in alliances is research and development. 
Teams investing in research are not only able to innovate but also gain from knowledge of 
alliance partners. Formula 1 cars are essentially an alliance. These cars are result of integration 
of the technological know-how of the alliance partners thus system integration is critical for 
success of the alliances. How external capabilities, financial resources, and personal are 




Formula 1 is essentially a prototype development business and is dependent on factors such as 
knowledge, people, and relationships coming together and having compatible capabilities. 
Formula 1, as a business, shares more similarities with computer manufacturers like Apple or 
Google, video game developers, and aerospace and defence manufacturers than automotive 
companies. 
 
Performance of alliances in Formula 1 can only be judged within their unique context and intra-
industry alliance knowledge transfer success is judged on different parameters than the external 
knowledge transfer. Formula 1 teams do offer certain universal lessons in terms of “practices” 
and “how to do things”. Formula 1 also offers a unique research and development laboratory 
for automotive and other manufacturers to test their products and technologies.  
 
Interviews also highlight that it is difficult to decipher the exact motivations behind strategic 
alliances between automotive manufacturers and Formula 1 constructors. Participation in 
Formula 1 requires a substantial investment without any guarantee of returns, and there are 
concerns with damage to the brand. Automotive manufacturers do not want to make such an 
investment and lose against smaller teams with fewer resources. 
 
In terms of knowledge transfer from Formula 1 to road cars, the technology being used and 
developed in Formula 1 is not suitable for road cars. Cross over between racing and road car 
technology is almost non-existent.  Interviewees argued that there was an alignment between 
road and Formula 1 technologies in pre 1990s era and since then, Formula 1 cars have been 
following a different technology trajectory to that of road cars.   
 
In terms of directionality, the process of building a road car engine is much more challenging 
than that of a Formula 1 (or an Indy Car) engine. There are certain venues for transfer of 
expertise, practices, and way of doing thing, but beyond that there is not much scope for 








5.2 Case Studies 
The following case studies explore the interview findings through specific cases. The 
qualitative analysis provides a comprehensive and contextual exploration of interview findings. 
There are three cases, Renault RS01: the first grand prix car to use turbocharges, Ford Cosworth 
DFV: the most successful grand prix engine in the history of the sport, and tenure of Ross 
Brawn at Ferrari between 1996 and 2006. The following table highlights reasons for selection 
of specific cases,  
Table 19 Case Studies 
Cases Interview findings and Framework of Tacit Knowledge Transfer  
Renault RS01 Renault RS01 was the first grand prix car to use turbo charged engine. This 
engine was based on the LeMans engine and involved close cooperation 
between LeMan engine designer and the Formula 1 engine designer and 
driver. It facilitates an examination of importance of individuals, tacit 
knowledge, impact of individuals on the organisational performance system 
integration capabilities, and role of regulations in motivating innovation.  
Ford Cosworth 
DFV  
The DFV engine remains the most successful grand prix engine in the history 
of the sport. The collaboration between Lotus and Cosworth allows for an 
examination of individuals, their impact on the organisational performance, 
role of prior alliance, proximity to core competencies, trust, role of regulations.  
Ferrari: Brawn Era Ferrari had its most successful ten year period with Brawn, Byrne, 
Schumacher, and Todt in the team between 1996 and 2006. This case allows 
for exploration of role of individuals, their impact on organisational 




5.2.1 Renault RS01: The Yellow Teapot 
FIA rules have permitted the use of 3.0 litre normally aspirated engines or 1.5 litre forced 
induction engines in Formula 1 cars since 1966. Despite this, most constructors stayed away 
from using turbocharged engines mainly due to the issue of ‘power lag’ and ‘fair equivalency’. 
During late 1970s, Ford Cosworth DFV engines dominated Formula 1. Though constructors 
like Ferrari were focusing on developing their own flat-12 engine, almost all other constructors 
were using Ford’s DFV engine.  Renault was the first constructor in more than two decades to 
introduce a forced-induction engine in 1977. The engine in RS01 was based on the 2.0 litre V6 
engine used by Renault in LeMans Sports Racing car. RS01 was designed by Andre de 
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Cortanze and Jean-Pierre Jabouille, who also drove the car in grands prix. RS01 made its first 
appearance on Grand Prix circuit in 1977 at British Grand Prix in Silverstone. Renault entered 
Formula 1 with a turbocharged engine to promote its range of turbocharged road going cars 
(Wright and Matthews, 2001, pg. 208).  
 
Turbocharging was originally developed in the United States during the World War II for 
aircraft engines and was applied to road cars only in 1960s. Turbochargers work by taking the 
residual energy in the exhaust gases and expanding it through a turbine to drive the intake 
compressor, and by doing so, expand the piston engine output to almost double its capacity 
(theoretically).  
 
Renault’s involvement in motor sports started with the founding of a new factory at Viry-
Châtillon on 6 February 1969. Initially Renault focused on a new 2-litre V6 engine for 
competing in the European 2-litre sportscar series and subsequently moved to the FIA World 
Sportscar Championship with a turbocharged variant. Renault Sport was founded in 1976 and 
started working on a single-seater programme with the V6 engine in European F2. In sportscars 
the turbocharged Renaults proved to be successful and in 1978, Renault won the Le Mans and 
subsequently focused on being competitive in Formula 1. The turbocharged engine was derived 
from CH series of engines designed by Francois Castaing, and the Formula 1 variant for RS01 
was developed by Bernard Dudot.  
 
Renault struggled with their car for first two years, primarily due to lack of reliability of the 
turbocharger. Turbocharged engines presented problems, such as driveability due to turbo lag, 
need for electronic fuel and ignition management for precise control of lean mixtures without 
detonation, and special fuel (Wright and Matthews, 2001). Ken Tyrell dubbed Renault RS01 
as ‘the yellow teapot’ due to its frequent breakdowns and engine emitting steam (or smoke) 
while parked at the side of the track. In the South African Grand Prix at Kyalami, Renault was 
the fastest car in the qualification, first for a turbocharged cars. The high altitude of Kyalami 
created problems for Ferrari’s flat 12 and Cosworth’s DFV but saw Renault’s turbocharged 
engine running at its maximum capacity.  
 
By 1979, Renault’s car started to show promise. François Castaing, Michel Tétu and Marcel 
Hubert developed the new ground effect chassis, RS10 for the season and at Monaco Grand 
Prix, Renault fitted its turbo-charged engine to the new chassis. RS10 started delivering results 
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with the very next grand prix in Dijon, France. It was the first time since 1906 that a French 
driver won the French Grand Prix in a French car with a French engine using tyres from a 
French manufacturer (Michellin) and a French fuel supplier. Next few years saw Renault 
making steady progress in drivers and constructors championship. Renault never won the world 
championship with their turbocharged engines but the innovation that they introduced in the 
Formula 1 car engine technology is analogous to disruption (Christensen, 2006). RS10 had 
higher boost pressure and an inter cooled turbocharged engine that produced more power than 
the normally aspirated engine with twice the capacity (Wright and Matthews, 2001). Turbo-lag 
presented problems for the Renault cars in the corners but in the straight line, normally 
aspirated engines were no match for the Renault. Other constructors noticed this development 
and started working on the turbocharged engines that could produce more power than the 
existing normally aspirated engines. This is an example of Formula 1 teams learning from their 
competitors. This pursuit of ever-higher power output could only be supported by the 
automotive manufactures, and turbocharging brought back the support of the automotive 
manufacturers to Formula 1 (Wright and Matthews, 2001, pg. 38). The automotive 
manufacturers, on their part, were aware of the potential that turbocharging offered for road 
cars in terms of cheaper manufacturing costs, smaller capacity engines, fuel efficiency, and 
emissions, and Formula 1 provided a laboratory for the manufacturers to test out the 
technology. 
 
Early years of 80s saw BMW, Porsche, Honda, Ferrari, Ford Cosworth, and Alfa Romeo 
introducing turbocharged engines, with the BMW turbo engine becoming the first turbocharged 
engine to win the world championship in 1981 followed by TAG Porsche in 1982. With the 
help of fuel chemists, the power output of the turbo engines kept on climbing. BMW even 
produced a 1200 HP four-cylinder engine.  Most manufacturers’ engines were producing about 
800 HP per litre. The pressure of air; being fed by compressor in these turbocharged engines 
was 4 bar and with the high-density fuel, they did not last more than few laps.  
 
Wrigh and Matthews (2001, pg. 208) argue that this intensive development of turbochargers in 
Formula 1 ‘undoubtedly’ benefited the road cars. The development of turbochargers in Formula 
1 played a constructive role in the development of electronic fuel injection and computer 
controlled ignition. Turbocharged engines are difficult to fuel across the wide range of rpm, 
throttle and boost settings, making electronic fuel injection and computer controlled ignition 
and fuelling essential for extracting full potential of these engines. Turbocharged engines were 
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generating four times the power for a given cylinder size compared to a normally aspirated 
engine and this presented heating issues. To counter this, specialist fuel blends were developed 
to provide internal cooling and high-energy release.  
 
This series of changes is a common occurrence in Formula 1, one innovation leading to another. 
It was the introduction of turbocharging by Renault that led to electronic fuel injection, 
controlled ignition, and specialist fuel blends in the Formula 1.  This highlights how knowledge 
flows across the organisational boundary in a network. Once Renault had introduced 
turbochargers, and demonstrated its capability, other teams followed and found themselves 
developing technologies such as controlled ignition and electronic fuel injection to fully exploit 
turbochargers.  
 
Renault was able to employ this technology effectively because it had this set of knowledge in 
past projects (Szulanski, 2000) and they had used the turbocharged engines in the past projects, 
including their Le Marns sports racing car and had entered the Formula 1 with intentions to 
promote their road going turbo-charged cars.  Renault was also an expert in the knowledge 
field (Szulanski, 2000) as one of the biggest French Automotive manufacturers and was a 
pioneer in developing turbocharged engines for Formula 1 and road cars in Europe. In addition 
to their expertise, Renault was able to target outcome of specific action (Suzlanski, 1996) with 
their continuous development of inter-cooled engines and high boost pressure.  
 
Renault established the performance incentives of switching to turbocharged engines and 
entered the Formula 1 with the intention of promoting their road going turbocharged cars, but 
in doing so their innovation in the engine technology revolutionised the Formula 1 and led to 
the development of other technologies such as pneumatic valve, electronically controlled fuel 
management, and electric ignition. This is significant in the context of monopoly of Ford 
Cosworth DFV engines in Formula 1. Renault identified that to break the monopoly, Formula 
1 needed a different approach to engine design. Ferrari was employing the same approach with 
their development of flat-12 naturally aspirated engine. Renault identified the gap in the 
Formula 1’s knowledge base, an important feature for any knowledge transfer process (Carlile 
and Rebentisch, 2003). FIA regulations allowed the use of 1.5 litre forced induction engines 
since 1966 car, constructors ignored them due to false equivalency but Renault realised the 




An important feature of any knowledge transfer process is the source firm’s ability to abstract 
the knowledge from the day-to-day context (Sobek et al., 1998) and provide all the necessary 
background information to the recipient (Carlile and Rebentisch, 2003). Renault, followed by 
BMW, Porsche, Honda, and other manufacturers’ experience of turbocharged engines in grand 
prix helped them in developing a more comprehensive technology for their road cars (Wright 
and Matthews, 2001). Engine manufacturers demonstrated that their experience of 
turbocharged engines in the context of Formula 1 can help with the implementation of the same 
technology in production cars.  
 
This needs to be seen in the context two different units of analysis, first is the firm itself where 
manufacturers like Renault and BMW’s development of turbocharged engines in Formula 1 
led to vertical knowledge transfer (Brooks, 1968) to their road going cars. The second unit of 
analysis is the industry itself where one observes the intensive development of turbochargers 
in Formula 1 providing benefits for the production cars (Wright and Matthews, 2001). In the 
case of auto manufacturers, vertical knowledge transfer takes place with sharing of all the 
relevant information and data. In case of constructor and engine suppliers, such as BMW and 
Brabham, the car and turbocharged engine is developed in parallel. 
 
Squire et. al (2009) highlight the importance of source firm engaging in communication and 
sustained dialogue with the recipient firm to facilitate the transfer of tacit knowledge. 
Automotive manufacturers taking part as constructors and making their own engines and 
chassis had more success in transferring the knowledge. Constructors with automotive 
manufacturers acting as engine suppliers perhaps had more difficulty in transferring the tacit 
knowledge but the concurrent development of car and engine with continuous interaction could 
have facilitated tacit knowledge transfer. Renault got involved in sports racing, and 
subsequently in Formula 1, to promote their production cars with turbo-charged engine. 
Renault engineers who worked in the technologically demanding and sophisticated field of 
Grands Prix went on to work on the production cars and carried their tacit knowledge with 
them.  
 
Szulanski (1996) highlight the role of the recipient firm in knowledge transfer process and its 
ability to take appropriate actions to prepare its staff for absorbing the knowledge. This was 
the case with Renault RS01 and RS10. Renault were producing their own turbocharged engine 
and ground effect chassis, Renault engineers knew the technology and the development curve 
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and could better absorb the knowledge from their Formula 1 operations to production car 
operations. For other constructors and automotive manufacturers, collaboration on 
turbocharged engines led to specialist in the industry who developed facilities and personnel to 
engineer and refine these engines (Wright and Matthews, 2001).  Mietzel (2007) highlight the 
importance of a firm’s ability to convey the set of knowledge gained to others for the success 
of knowledge transfer (cited by Schulze et al., 2014).  This construct perhaps best manifests 
itself in case of vertically integrated constructors such as Renault where they used their 
expertise on turbochargers in Formula 1 to develop and refine their road going cars 
 
Prior alliances play an important role in successful collaborations (Fosfuri and Tribo, 2008). In 
these terms, constructors in Formula 1 had always been involved with automotive 
manufacturers, and with the success of Ford Cosworth DFV engine, many had experience of 
successful knowledge transfer. Renault’s Formula 1 team started their operations with Amédée 
Gordini who had experience of designing Grand Prix cars.  The option to run a turbocharged 
engine had been in the rules for many years, but nobody had dared to pursue it until Renault. 
It had secretly begun track testing with a 1.5-litre version of the turbo engine in 1976, and a 
short programme of races was scheduled for the following year. 
 
5.2.2.  Ford – Cosworth DFV Engine 
FIA changed the rules in the 1965 season, raising the maximum engine capacity from 1.5 litre 
to 3.0 litre. Up to that point, Coventry Climax had been supplying Lotus with its engines, but 
they decided not to produce the higher capacity engine and as a result Lotus was forced to look 
elsewhere. Lotus founder Colin Chapman turned to Cosworth, a company founded by former 
Lotus gearbox engineer, Keith Duckworth and Mike Costin. Duckworth informed Chapman 
that while Cosworth can produce a grand prix engine, the firm would need funding for the 
associated development costs. Chapman secured this funding through Ford.  
 
Dual Four Valve (DFV) type Ford V8 engine was introduced in June, 1967. Even though 
Brabham won the championship in 1967 (with the driver Denis Hulme) DFV type Ford V8 
driven by Jim Clarke won the very first race it took part in at Zandvoort (Dutch Grand Prix). 
The DFV engine would go on to dominate the Grands Prix till the advent of turbocharged cars 




Ford-Cosworth DFV engine powered cars won 10 constructors and 12 drivers world 
championships in next 16 years without any major changes to bore and stroke or any major 
castings.  Ford-Cosworth DFV engine powered cars won 65% of all Grands Prix in Formula 1 
between its introduction in 1967 and its final appearance in 1983 against 10 other engine 
makers with as many as 30 different engine specifications (Cosworth Story, 2011). This 
highlights three important facets of alliances in Formula 1, as discussed by interviewees earlier;  
 
• DFV alliance formation was driven by the need of a Formula 1 team’s need to access 
external knowledge and technology.  
• This need arose because of an external regulatory change.  
• Alliance partners had a history of prior alliances. 
 
Keith Duckworth and Mike Costin founded Cosworth in 1958. One of the earliest projects of 
Cosworth involved tuning of 1.1 litre Coventry Climax engine for sports cars. Over next few 
years, Cosworth took on a number of projects involving tuning or customisation of engines for 
a particular class of racing or private customers. Their first experience of competing in a FIA 
sanctioned series came with their customisation of the Ford’s New Anglia 105E engine for the 
Formula Junior category (Burr, 2015).  
 
This engine was an 8-port IL4 1.0 litre and had oversquared bore to stroke ratio (B/S) of 1.67 
with a push road overhead valve system (bore diameter of 80.96 mm and stroke length of 48.42 
mm.)  It had a 3-main-bearing crank (Cosworth story,2013). Cosworth Formula Junior engine 
produced around 75 HP compared to the 39 HP of the stock unit. This was achieved using 
individual tuned inlets and exhaust systems and a long period camshaft (Cosworth story, 2013). 
The Cosworth engine won nearly half of all the races it took part in between 1960 – 1963 and 
dominated the erstwhile dominant Fiat engine cars in the category. Cosworth continued to work 
on the engine, and expanded the cylinder volume to 1.1 litre. The new larger capacity engine 
had some experimental features such as 50 degree downdraught inlet ports (Burr, 2015) and 
produced more power than the original variant.  
 
Cosworth continued its collaboration with Ford and worked on single overhead cam for Ford 
Cortina engines in the Formula 2 category with 1.0 litre engines. Ford also provided Cosworth 
with funding for manufacturing a Single Camshaft Type A (SCA) engine with the same 
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downdraught inlet ports as in Formula Junior engine. Cosworth continued to work on the 
engine and introduced fuel injection in second year of its development.  By 1965, the engine 
was producing 140 HP and dominated its category by winning almost all races of the season 
(Burr, 2015; Cosworth story, 2013). 
 
Lotus has been collaborating with Cosworth on their cars in the Ford Formula Junior, Formula 
2, and Formula 3 category and were successful. This history of successful prior alliances in 
other categories led to Lotus collaborating with Cosworth on the new grand prix engine. Ford 
had provided funding for Cosworth’s engines in the past and Lotus and Cosworth managed to 
secure funding for the new engine (£1.6 million at 2013 level, Cosworth story, 2013). The 
project involved not only a design for the new 3.0 litre V8 grand prix engine, but also design, 
development, and production of 1.6 litre Formula 2 engine for the 1967 season (Jenkins and 
Floyd, 2001).   
 
Funding was used, in parts, to develop the Formula 2 Four Valve Type A (FVA) engine with 
four valves per cylinder (v/c) double overhead camshaft (DOHC) head on the Ford ‘Cortina’ 
120E 1.6 litre block (Cosworth Story, 2013.) The funding for the 3.0 litre V8 grand prix engine 
was dependent on the success of the FVA engine in Formula 2. The new 4 v/c designs of the 
FVA was successful in its category and outperformed its competitors by delivering almost 40% 
more HP. FVA design accomplished this by generating higher brake mean effective pressure 
(BMEP) at a higher piston speeds with similar weight and price and HP ratio (Cosworth Story, 
2013; Jenkins and Floyd, 2001).  
 
Another distinguishing feature of FVA engine was the way the inlet flow was aimed at the 
opposite cylinder wall to produce a circular motion in the plane of crankshaft rotation which 
was then much amplified in velocity by the rising piston during compression. This is called 
‘tumble swirl’ or barrel turbulence (Reeves et al., 1999). It produces a gain of the product 
volumetric efficiency (EV) and combustion efficiency (EC), the first element being reduced by 
the extra pressure loss to produce the swirl but the second element more than compensating for 
this through faster burning.  
 
Duckworth believed that barrel turbulence was one of the, if not the most important feature in 
producing the superior FVA performance. Duckworth gave many interviews in the 70s and 80s 
explaining his design philosophy and the FVA and DFV engines, but when it came to the 
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cylinder head (port shapes), he said he wished to keep it to himself as it was obvious that most 
people had not thought through the problem. Cosworth never patented the technology as that 
would have meant describing the phenomena and then it could have been adopted by 
competitors. This tendency to keep source of competitive advantage tacit and within 
individuals and not make it explicit by patenting or other forms of intellectual copyrights is a 
feature of Formula 1.  
 
The Cosworth FVA dominated the F2 Championships from 1967 to 1971. The Cosworth FVA 
won 78% of all races that year against Ferrari’s V6 and BMW’s IL4 M12/2. FIA changed 
regulations for the 1972 season, and new 2 litre engines were introduced. The championship 
was won by a car using Ford Cosworth BDA-base engine, which was essentially a production 
version of FVA with a belt drive that connected it to the DOHC.  The FVA engine was 
specifically developed for Brian Hart who modified his 1.85 litre BMW, and adapted it for the 
head/piston design of BMW’s IL4 M12/6 2L F2 engine. He won the championships in 1973, 
1974, and 1975.  
 
FVA won another three Formula 2 championships between 1976 – 1984. In 1976, FIA had 
changed regulations Formula 2 category and engines and allowed 2.0 litre engines with six 
cylinders. BMW used this design of FVA engine and modified it by destoking it to 1.5 litre and 
fitting in turbochargers (Cosworth story, 2013.) This turbocharged engine, the M12/13, became 
first turbocharged engine to win the World Drivers’ Championship in 1983, and ended the Ford 
Cosworth DFV domination.  
 
Keith Duckworth started working on the design of DFV in March 1966 (Burr, 2015; Cosworth 
story, 2013). By this time, the FVA engine was already producing 200 HP in testing, and 
Duckworth decided to use the FVA head technology for the new V8 DFV. Duckworth opted 
for a V8 configuration instead of the then popular V12 and inline designs to achieve lower 
weight and higher mechanical efficiency (Burr, 2015).  
 
FIA had mandated that Formula 2 engines be only 1.6 litre. FIA regulation and the physical 
dimensions of the cast-iron engine block led to Cosworth designing FVA with B/S of 1.24. The 
cast iron block was 85.72 mm, and the production size was 80.96 mm (Cosworth story, 2013.) 
DFV engine’s bore diameter (80.674 mm) was slightly reduced from FVA’s (80.96 mm).  The 
stroke was reduced from 69.144 mm to 67.77 mm. These design changes were necessary to 
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meet FIA’s 3.0 litre regulation. Therefore; DFV ended up with a B/S of 1.323.  DFV’s 
combustion chamber volume was also reduced compared to FVA but it retained the flat-top 
piston configuration of the FVA.  This resulted in valve interference angle being reduced to 32 
degree though it did allow the downdraught to be increased to 35.  
 
The barrel turbulence feature of the FVA was retained in the DFV design. Duckworth kept this 
feature hidden for many years (Burr, 2015). FVA and DFV shared; valve sizes, lifts, timings, 
pistons (albeit with improved ring materials made from stainless steel with molybdenum 
fillings to prevent scuffing), fuel injection system (mechanically driven in DFV instead of the 
electrically driven system in FVA), and the exhaust system (Cosworth story, 2013) 
 
DFV was designed solely by Keith Duckworth with Mike Hall (Former BRM designer) 
working on the side accessories from Duckworth’s design schemes. The entire process only 
took nine months. Duckworth explained the relatively short time scale for the development of 
DFV because of his experience of working on the FVA engine (Burr, 2015; Cosworth story, 
2013).  The development, and success, of the DFV engine can be attributed to one individual 
with requisite knowledge and expertise, Keith Duckworth (Burr, 2015). 
 
The DFV engine was developed in response to the new regulations on engine size. DFV was a 
huge step in technological innovation. Chapman designed Lotus 49 around the DFV engine 
and employed it as a major part of the structure to reduce the weight and make car lighter 
(Floyd and Jenkins, 2001). Ford did not award Lotus with the exclusive rights for use of the 
engine, and made it available to other teams in F1. McLaren and Matra were the first teams to 
take advantage of this in 1968 using the Ford Cosworth DFV and Brabham followed in 1969. 
This led to the era of ‘Ford powered kit-cars’ in 70s where F1 became dominated with 
Cosworth DFV engine, gearboxes manufactured by Hewland Engineering (Beck-Burridge and 
Walton, 2000) and chassis and suspension designed by the constructors. Arrival of DFV ‘kit 
cars’ also put the vertically integrated constructors such as Ferrari and BRM who built their 
own engines and gearboxes at a disadvantage. 
 
Cosworth engineers were former Lotus employees and had experience of working with race 
engines and had used this set of knowledge in past projects and were an expert in the knowledge 
field (Szulanski, 1996 and Szulanski, 2000) enabling them to better articulate the knowledge 
required. Also, DFV was based around the same engine block as FVA. Early involvement of 
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Ford in development of DFV engine was limited to funding but gradually it evolved into wider 
areas and Ford worked with Cosworth and used the DFV in its sports racing car, P68 in BOAC 
500 race at Brands Hatch in Kent in 1968.  (In context of FVA) 
 
Cosworth has been working exclusively for Lotus and used that knowledge and experience to 
design the DFV engine demonstrating an ability to abstract the knowledge from the day-to-day 
context (Sobek et al., 1998). Cosworth founder, Keith Duckworth had worked at Lotus in the 
past and was approached by Colin Chapman for the development of the DFV engine. He 
understood the background, existing technologies, appropriate contextual information and 
nomenclature to develop the new engine with the funding from the Ford.  
 
The process of knowledge transfer was also facilitated by the parallel development of Lotus 49 
and the DFV engine and Cosworth and Lotus shared technical information and requirement at 
all times. Lotus founder, Colin Chapman was heavily involved with the projected and along 
with Cosworth founder, Keith Duckworth who was also a former Lotus engineer. Chapman 
designed Lotus 49 around the DFV engine and employed it as a major part of the structure to 
reduce the weight and make car lighter (Floyd and Jenkins, 2001).  
 
Constructors in Formula 1 had always been involved with automotive manufacturers, and with 
the success of Ford Cosworth DFV engine, many had experience of successful knowledge 
transfer highlighting how recipient firm’s experience of successful collaborations in the past 
can play a constructive role in knowledge transfer process (Fosfuri and Tribo, 2008). 
Duckworth established strict rules for the maintenance of DFV engines. DFV engines were 
only worked and repaired in the Cosworth workshop. When the numbers of engines needing 
repairs and maintenance became too large in 1970s, Cosworth allowed a certain number of 
outside workshops to perform repairs and maintenance work, but only with the Cosworth 
spares. Cosworth workshop would often return the DFV engine after maintenance work with 
the comment that “It is better to be un-informed than ill-informed” (Burr, 2015: 122).  
Cosworth employed this approach to protect their core competencies and ensure that 
innovations like ‘barrel turbulence’ continue to provide them with the technical advantage over 
their competitors.  
 
Cosworth could convey this set of knowledge to others (Mietzel, 2007, cited by Schulze et al., 
2014) and the other firms were able to apply the set of knowledge independently (Cummings 
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and Teng, 2003) due to the technical competence of engineers working at Cosworth and 
Formula 1 teams. Ford also used variants of the DFV engine in Formula 1 and North American 
auto racing championships. DFL variant was particularly successful in LeMans.  
 
Ford and Cosworth took their relationship forward with Cosworth developing a dual overhead 
camshaft 16-valve inline four-cylinder engine for road use in the Ford Escort, demonstrating 
one of the key aspect of successful knowledge transfer, that is the recipient firm is satisfied 
with the set of knowledge (Cummings and Teng, 2003). Key lessons from this successful 
collaboration include the importance of individual relationships in knowledge transfer and 
alliances, and the importance of keeping source of competitive advantage tacit. 
 
5.2.3. Ferrari: Brawn Era 
After winning two consecutive drivers’ world championship, Michael Schumacher left 
Benetton to join Ferrari in 1996. Rory Byrne and Ross Brawn followed Schumacher and left 
Benetton to join Ferrari as chief designer and technical director respectively in 1997.  
The 1996 and 1997 seasons saw Williams’ FW18 and FW19 cars winning the championship, 
in large parts due to Williams’ technical director, Adrian Newey. Newey exploited a regulation 
loophole in later stage of 1995 season, moving the diffuser to the top of the plank allowing for 
a bigger exist area thus creating a more powerful diffusion in FW17B. Newey also designed a 
stepped gear arrangement for the gearbox. This allowed for extra clearance space and helped 
the team to hide the change in the position of diffuser. This approach of keeping innovations 
hidden, and not filing patents or intellectual property right claims, for competitive advantage 
is a characteristic of Formula 1.      
Newey left Williams at the end of 1996 season and remained on the ‘gardening leave’ for the 
1997 season before joining McLaren for the next season. But his incremental design innovation 
allowed William-Renault FW19 to stay ahead of the competition from Ferrari. Ferrari F310B, 
designed by John Barnard, was developed with Byrne and Brawn, and the car remained 
competitive with Williams’ FW19 but the championship was won by Williams (albeit only in 
the last race.) 
Jenkins and Tallman (2015) have argued that recruitment of Schumacher allowed Ferrari to not 
only have access to a world class driver for the first time since departure of Alain Prost in 1991, 
it also allowed the team to tap into the knowledge of individuals that Schumacher brought with 
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him from Benetton (Ross Brawn and Rory Byrne.)  Jean Todt also played an important role by 
shielding the team from corporate interference from the parent company. This resulted in a 
transformation on the engineering capability of Ferrari who had been struggling to build John 
Barnard’s designs as recently as the last season because of lack of technical capability.  
 
The 1998 season also saw FIA changing technical regulations, reducing the track width and 
introduction of grooved tyres to reduce mechanical grip and bring down speed to ‘reduce risk’.  
Renault pulled out of their alliance with Williams in that season and with the departure of one 
of the best Formula 1 car designers in form of Adrian Newey, Williams were not able to match 
their performance of last two seasons. The Newey designed McLaren MP4-13 won the 
championship that year.  
 
The MP4-13 had a lower nose than other cars to lower the centre of gravity, thus compensating 
for loss in mechanical grip from grooved tyres. McLaren MP4-13 used the Mercedes Ilmor 
designed engine, using aluminium and beryllium alloy for piston and cylinder lining. Beryllium 
played a critical role in Mercedes engine delivering more power than the Ferrari engine. 
Mercedes engine in McLaren revved at the same rate as Ferrari engine but due to elastic 
properties of beryllium, could make longer stokes and deliver more power than the Ferrari 
engine. Ferrari and other teams were not aware of how McLaren and Mercedes were 
accomplishing that despite having same revs per minutes (rpms) as the Ferrari engine.  
McLaren Mercedes also switched to Bridgestone tyres whereas Ferrari stuck with Goodyear 
tyres, deepening their collaboration with the tyre supplier.  
 
The Byrne designed Ferrari F300 was not as fast as Newey’s McLaren MP4-13 as the start of 
the 1998 season but by the end of the season, engine development at Ferrari had paid off and 
Ferrari secure three consecutive poles to finish the season. 1999 and 2000 saw Ferrari 
developing its vehicle dynamics facilities and research and development group (Brawn and 
Parr, 2016). Bridgestone started supplying tyres to all teams from 1999 season, ending 
whatever technical advantage McLaren had because of their tyres. Ferrari won the constructor 
world championship that season but McLaren’s Mikka Hakkinen won the driver’s world 
championship.  
 
The 2000 season saw the first Ferrari Formula 1 car that was designed and built under Brawn 
and Byrne team and was not compromised in any way by lack of skilled resources and facilities. 
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The Ferrari F1-2000 had its ‘vee’ angle increased by ten degrees to 90’ allowing for lower 
centre of gravity. This allowed for more stability and control. Schumacher became first Ferrari 
driver to win the world championship that year since 1979.  
 
FIA introduced another set of regulation in the year 2001, banning use of beryllium. Beryllium 
is a highly carcinogenic and poisonous metal. The FIA ban led to Mercedes Ilmor  engine 
losing its technical advantage over Ferrari. Newey said that the 2001 engine had no more power 
than the 1998 Mercedes-Ilmor engine as it became challenging, and cost prohibitive, to find a 
substitute for beryllium with similar elastic properties. The FIA also reintroduced traction 
control in 2001 season.  Ferrari scored more point than McLaren and other teams after the 
introduction of traction control halfway through the season. This continued in the 2002 season 
which was dominated by the Ferrari F2002 which won fifteen grands prix out of the nineteen 
that it took part in 2002 and 2003.  
 
Newey believed that McLaren car development had not been fast enough to react to changes 
in regulation and Ferrari challenges and it was system driven thinking which made it difficult 
for McLaren to win grand prix (Motorsport, 2016). McLaren’s approach to car design relied 
on hierarchy of systems and the relationship between them, and Newey believed that that made 
McLaren slow to react to changes. The Newey designed MP4-18 for 2003 season did not pass 
FIA tests, including the crucial side impact crash tests and crashed several times during testing. 
McLaren decided to race MP4-17D, an evolved version of 2002 car for the 2003 season. This 
highlights how regulations can affect the development process and innovation within the inter-
organisational network.  
 
FIA issued another notice for sporting regulation change late in the 2003 season. FIA mandated 
single lap qualifying with parc ferme. This essentially meant that Ferrari could not alter the 
weight distribution of the F2003 GA between the qualifying and the race. Ferrari with its longer 
wheelbase needed changes to its weight distribution (front biased) for fastest qualifying times 
and race times. These changes allowed McLaren to compete with Ferrari in the final round of 
2003 season but Byrne and Brawn redesigned the 2004 car to cope with the new parc freme 
regulations. New V10 in the Ferrari F2004 weighed only 90 Kgs and produced 900bhp, that is 




Ferrari’s domination of 2004 forced McLaren and Newey to react with another radical design 
change, which resulted in the McLaren MP4 20. To cope with Newey’s design changes, 
Mercedes Ilmor had to lower the crankshaft height which affected the reliability of the car. Last 
two seasons had seen McLaren and other teams moving to Michelin tyres with the exception 
of Ferrari which deepened its partnership with Bridgestone. FIA banned tyre changes for the 
2005 season which created problems for Bridgestone tyres’ rigid sidewall design. This design 
had the effect of forcing the tread to move more than the full radial flexi sidewall design of 
Michelin tyres used by other teams.  
 
This regulation change proved to be particularly advantageous for the Renault factory team 
which had been developing a rear weight bias car that exploited the longitudinal grip offered 
by full radial flexi sidewall Michelin tyres. Renault’s Fernando Alonso won the championship 
that year despite the McLaren MP4 20 being faster. This illustrates the importance of system 
integration in Formula 1. One component (engine in this case) on its own cannot sustain team 
performance over a season, and the whole package, or alliance as interviewees called it, needs 
to perform.  
 
The 2006 season saw a major regulation change (Jenkins, 2014) with the end of V10 engines 
in Formula 1. V8 engines were introduced to Formula 1 and tyre changes were permitted again.  
Bridgestone changed their rigid sidewall design and adapted full radial flexi sidewall design of 
Michelin tyres. Adrian Newey left McLaren that season and joined the Red Bull Racing. 
Competition for Ferrari came from the Bob Bell designed Renault R26. Renault and a few other 
teams were using ‘tuned mass damper’ in the nosecone of their cars in the 2006 season to keep 
tyres in contact with the surface when going over kerbs and in corners. Renault had in-effect 
designed the R26 chassis around the tuned mass damper.  
 
FIA banned the use of tuned mass damper by the Turkish grand prix and Renault struggled to 
win point in next two grands prix. It was considered a controversial decision by FIA since the 
FIA was consulted about the system during its development. Despite the setback, Renault 
managed to win the world constructor and driver championship that season.  
 
The 2007 season saw Ross Brawn, Rory Byrne, Jean Todt, and Michael Schumacher leaving 
Ferrari. Ferrari’s CEO Luca di Montezemolo decided to replace the technical direction, chief 
designer, and principal position with home grown talent. Stefano Domenicali became team 
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manager. The structures and programs put in place by Brawn and team carried on, partly due 
to the inertia, and kept team performance high but Domenicali was not empowered to make 
decisions such as long term investment for new technical projects, or play the role of gatekeeper 
between the team and the management as done by Jean Todt.  
 
Ferrari has failed to win drivers’ championship since the 2007 season and constructors’ 
championship since 2008 season. This goes on to highlight  the importance of individuals, 
especially those with access to novel knowledge and way of doing things, to competitiveness 
of a team.  
 
5.2.4. Case Study themes 
Key themes that have emerged from case studies are; 
• There are key individuals who have more influence on a team’s performance than 
others.  
• These individuals either bring the engineering know-how with themselves or a 
network to access the expertise.  
• Formula 1 teams pursue knowledge transfer to gain competitive advantage. 
• This knowledge often resides within individuals, especially since most technical gains 
and innovations are never patented and often, kept secret.  
• Formula 1 teams have a non-traditional management structures.   
• Regulations are key externalities that motivate teams to get into alliance and pursue 
knowledge (and individuals with the said knowledge) to successfully respond to these 
challenges. 
• Formula 1 teams face rapid changes in product and process technology, competitors’ 
performance and strategic actions, and regulations.  Formula 1 is a fast clockspeed 
industry. 
• Formula 1 teams are engaged in constant improvement of components and 
technologies. 
 
These key findings of case studies support and complement interview findings as shown in 
table 12. These qualitative findings highlight the key role played by individuals in the inter-
organisation network of Formula 1. Certain key individuals, such as Michael Schumacher and 
Adrian Newey, have a positive impact on organisation performance. The next chapter provides 
 101 
 
the social network analysis of the Formula 1 network and helps visualise the importance of 













Table 20 Case Study and Interview Findings (Source: Interviewees and case studies) 
Case Studies 
 
Renault RS01: The Yellow Teapot Ford – Cosworth DFV Engine Ferrari: Brawn Era 
Interview findings 
Individuals are key exponents 
of knowledge and impact 
organisational performance.  
 
Andre de Cortanze and Jean-Pierre built the 
RS01 which allowed Renault to enter the 
Formula 1. 
Colin Chapman brought funding for Cosworth, 
facilitating the building DFV engine which went on to 
win more 10 constructor world championships and 12 
driver world championships.  
When Schumacher joined Ferrari, he brought Rory 
Byrne and Ross Brawn from Benetton. Ferrari went on 
to win five drivers’ and six constructors’ world 
championship in next ten years. Similarly, Adrian 
Newey’s move to McLaren resulted in McLaren 
wining two consecutive world championships while 
Williams, his former team, lost the world title. 
Innovations and technological 
improvements are not patented 
and teams instead rely on 
knowledge residing within 
individuals. 
Renault relied on Andre de Cortanze and Jean-
Pierre Jabouille to adopt the 2.0 litre LeMans 
turbocharged engine for Formula 1. 
Duckworth did not disclose barrel turbulence, and 
tried to restrict DFV engine maintenance to keep the 
design confidential. 
McLaren and Mercedes Illmor did not discuss their 
use of byrillium in pistons.  
Formula 1 car is an alliance.  Renault RS01 was result of an alliance between 
grand prix driver/designer and Renault Sports 
Racing. 
DFV engine came about because of alliance between 
Lotus, Ford, and Cosworth  
Performance of McLaren MP4-13 was dependent on 
the Mercedes-Illmor engine and Newey’s designs. 
Teams are driven by 
knowledge 
Renault’s involvement in Formula 1 allowed 
them to develop turbocharging technology for 
application in their road going cars. 
Lotus’ Chapman sought Cosworth, and funding from 
Ford for the DFV engine because the team lacked the 
knowledge to build the engine.  
Schumacher and Todt pursued Ross Brawn and Rory 
Byrne for their expertise in engineering and design. 
Required knowledge is 
accessed via movement of 
individuals 
Francois Castaing, designer behind 
turbocharged Renault RS10, joined Renault 
from Gordini, after the former took over the 
latter.  
Relationship between Chapman and Duckworth (who 
had worked at Lotus) was key for the development of 
DFV.  
Ferrari benefited in its technological capability via 
movement of Ross Brawn and Rory Byrne.  
System integration is key for 
competitive advantage 
Castaing and Jabouille’s experience of engine 
and car design was key for Renault’s F1 
program. 
Lotus won world championship with the DFV engine 
because of the deep integration between the engine 
development and the Lotus 79. 
McLaren lost the championship to Renault in 2005 
despite having the faster car, because Renault’s car 
performed better as a package 
Regulation changes drive 
knowledge transfer through 
technological discontinuities 
Renault RS01 was introduced only after FIA 
changed regulations allowing turbocharged 
cars. 
DFV engine was developed in response to changes in 
regulations.  
Beyrillium based piston, a key part of Mercedes Illmor 
engine in McLaren, was banned by FIA, resulting in 
McLaren losing their advantage over Ferrari.  
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Chapter 6. Social Network Analysis: Quantitative Analysis 
 
Formula 1 network for 1992 – 2010 is shown in figure 9. The figure shows all participating 
nodes in Formula 1 between 1992 and 2010, and all the edges. There are 976 nodes connected 
through 26, 717 edges within the Formula 1 network for the period under consideration. The 
figure shows all the nodes; drivers, engineers, technical directors, design directors, team 
principals, and team owners in the current season.  
 
An edge between two nodes imply that they have either worked together in the same team in 
the past or are working together in the present. The size of the node indicates its degree that is 
the number of connections that the node has with other nodes. The higher the degree, bigger 





Figure 9 Formula 1 Network Graph 1992 – 2010 
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Figure 9 gave an overview of the wide network of Formula 1 and its interconnectedness. In the 
network, even the most peripheral nodes are connected and can reach any other node within 
the network via three edges on average.  
 
Table 19 highlights these metrics and gives a yearly overview of node level and network level 
metrics in Formula 1 network for the period 1992 – 2010. An average degree of 57 implies that 
on average, every individual in Formula 1 is connected to 57 other individuals working in the 
industry. The interconnected nature if further highlighted by ‘higher than average’ density for 
a real-life network (Newman, 2003; Albert and Barabasi, 1999).  The network diameter 
suggests that even the most distant placed nodes can reach each other through five path lengths. 
 
The graph density of the Formula 1 network is 0.058 which is high for a real-life network 
(Mishra et al., 2017) and highlights the densely interconnected nature of the industry, as shown 
in the network graph and also reflected in case studies and interviews.  Similarly, a high 
clustering coefficient and  short average path lengths, indicate that network is rich in clusters, 
as expected of an industry like Formula 1,  and has  high information flows.
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6.1. Small World 
Watts and Strogatz (1998) defined small world networks as networks that are highly clustered, 
like regular lattices, yet have small characteristic path lengths, like random graphs. Formula 
1 network does exhibit this network phenomena with high clustering coefficient and low 
average path length. This essentially implies that Formula 1 network has clusters or regions of 
specialization (such as engine suppliers or electrical systems manufacturer) with distributed 
processing across the network through connected nodes (people), resulting in an efficient 
knowledge transfer process. 
 
Table 21 Metric Table 1992- 2010 
Network Wide Metrics  1992 - 2010 
Nodes 976 
Edges 26, 717 
Average Degree 56.59 
Network Diameter 5 
Graph Density 0.058 
Average Clustering Coefficient 0.763 
Average Path Length 2.659 
 
Given the size and density of the Formula One network (table 20) it is possible to construct an 
equivalent random graph. The clustering coefficient and path length can be calculated using 
equations 4 and 5. These can then be compared with the actual network as shown in table 16.   
 




F1 network Ratio Small World 
Coefficient Q 




















The Formula 1 network has a relatively high clustering coefficient compared to its average path 
length, with the latter being more similar to a random network. Thus the small world quotient 
(equation 1; the ratio of clustering ratio to path length ratio) is much greater than 1 and indicates 
that the Formula 1 network has a small world nature. 
 
This essentially implies that Formula 1 network has clusters or regions of specialization (such 
as engine suppliers or electrical systems manufacturer) with distributed processing across the 
network through connected nodes (people), resulting in an efficient knowledge transfer 
process. Small world networks also influence innovation (Verspagen and Duysters, 2004, 
Balcon et al., 2004, Cowan et al., 2007, Gay and Dousset, 2005) and this points to the inherent 
innovativeness of Formula 1.
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6.2. Top and Bottom Nodes 
The following table lists the top 30 nodes in the network, ranked according to their degree 
centrality.  
Table 23 Metric table for top 30 nodes (according to their degree) 
Nodes Degree Betweenness 
Centrality 
Page Rank EigenVector 
Centrality 
Pat Symonds 317 5022 0.004 0.713 
Luca Di Montezemolo 315 4057 0.004 0.984 
Flavio Briatore 313 8908 0.004 0.689 
Alan Permane 303 5515 0.004 0.65 
Rory Byrne 300 3528 0.004 1 
Mike Gascoyne 299 23470 0.005 0.423 
Michael Schumacher 294 5060 0.004 0.957 
Jock Clear 294 5891 0.004 0.53 
Luca Badoer 291 13090 0.004 0.89 
Steve Nielsen 291 7726 0.004 0.556 
Mattia Binotto 283 9047 0.004 0.787 
Ron Dennis 278 3374 0.004 0.404 
Neil Oatley 278 3375 0.004 0.404 
Rubens Barrichello 275 18516 0.004 0.647 
Ross Brawn 274 5606 0.004 0.86 
Luigi Mazzola 273 3730 0.004 0.885 
Frank Williams 270 5033 0.004 0.376 
Stefano Domenicali 257 777 0.003 0.902 
Jean Todt 256 1473 0.003 0.852 
Tim Densham 253 8390 0.004 0.444 
Giancarlo Fisichella 252 17333 0.004 0.476 
Adrian Newey 250 7640 0.004 0.372 
Andrew Alsworth 246 5153 0.003 0.504 
Mark Smith 246 10335 0.003 0.428 
Patrick Head 240 3233 0.004 0.351 
Dickie Stanford 240 3786 0.004 0.349 
Ron Meadows 236 1800 0.003 0.447 
Jarno Trulli 235 17180 0.004 0.291 
Craig Wilson 233 5660 0.003 0.422 
 109 
 
When movement of these higher ranked nodes is plotted with team performance, it can be 
observed from the movement of nodes that a positive co-relation exists between rise in team 
performance and movement of these ‘high metric value’ individuals. In 2002 season, BAR 
Honda scored less than 10% of constructor championship points but as can be seen in the figure 
10, with involvement of Jock Clear and Andrew Alsworth, their performance rises and within 
next two season they score almost 20% of all constructor championship points and are second 
in the world championship. 
 
 
Figure 10 Team Performance 
To take three specific examples, beginning with the case of Andrew Alsworth, he spent seven 
years at Benetton (1992-1998). Benetton score 21.87% of total constructor world 
championship points in 1992, and only 7.93% in 1998 when Andrew Alsworth left the team 
for BAR. The seven-year period saw Benetton’s performance deteriorate. When Alsworth 
joined BAR in 1999, the team could not score any points in the world championship but by the 
time he left the team (2005), BAR scored 11.92% of world championship points. In 2006, BAR 
was taken over by Honda and run as a factory team till 2008, when they pulled out of the sport. 
At that point, the team was taken over by Ross Brawn and ran with essentially the same staff. 
During Andrew Alsworth’s time at Honda and Brawn, team went from scoring 5.15% of 



















































































































contribution to performance of Benetton between 1992 and 1998 is -1.991, BAR between 1999 
and 2005 is 1.70, Honda/Brawn between 2006 and 2009 is 5.395. 
 
Adrian Newey was car designer for Williams between 1992 and 1996. Williams won four 
championships in that period, and their percentage of points scored in constructors’ world 
championship went from 39.42% in 1992 to 42.07% in 1996. Newey joined McLaren in 1997 
season, and the team scored 14.25% of championship points that season. When Newey left 
McLaren in 2005, team scored 24.66% of championship points. Newey started working at Red 
Bull in 2006, and the team scored only 2.28% of championship points that season. In 2010, 
Red Bull scored 25.92% of championship points. Newey’s time at different teams resulted in 
more championship points. Newey’s net contribution to performance of Williams between 
1992 and 1996 is 0.53, McLaren between 1997 and 2005 is 1.157, and Red Bull between 2006 
and 2010 is 4.728.  
Ross Brawn was involved as technical director at Benetton between 1992 and 1996. Benetton 
score 21.87% of championship points in 1992 season. For the 1996 season, Brawn’s last season 
at Benetton, the team scored 16.35% of championship points. Brawn joined Ferrari in 1997 
season, and the team scored 23.78% of total championship points that season. In 2006, when 
Braw left Ferrari, team scored 28.63% of championship points. Brawn spent next two years at 
Honda, before taking over the team after Honda pulled out of the Formula 1. Honda scored 
only 1.35% of championship point in 2007 season, and in 2009 season, the team scored 26.73% 
of championship points. Team was taken over by Mercedes for the 2010 season, and team 
scored 11.15% of championship points in its debut season. Brawn’s net contribution to 
performance of Benetton between 1992 and 1996 is -1.104, Ferrari between 1997 and 2006 is 
0.485, Honda/Brawn between 2007 and 2009 is 8.46, Mercedes for the 2010 season is 11.15.  
It is interesting to note that nodes such as Luca Badoer are in top 30 most connected nodes. 
Luca Badoer was the test and reserve drive for Ferrari between 1998 and 2010. Ferrari won six 
world championships in this period. Luca Badoer, a reserve and test driver, stands out in the 
network visualisation whereas it is difficult to identify his contribution and importance within 
the qualitative analysis carried out in the interviews and case studies. This highlights the 
suitability and comprehensive nature of the network analysis of the Formula 1 network. 
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The net contribution of these nodes is positive, cumulatively, whereas in case of the bottom 30 
nodes, the trend is either for negative or 0 net contribution to team’s performances. The 
following table lists bottom thirty nodes listed according to their degree.  
Table 24  Metric table for bottom 30 nodes (according to their degree) 
Nodes Degree Betweenness 
Centrality 
Page Rank EigenVector Centrality 
Eric Van De Poele 5 0 0 0.004 
Denis Nursey 5 0 0 0.004 
Ray Boulter 5 0 0 0.004 
Taki Inoue 5 0 0 0.001 
John Creak 5 0 0 0.001 
Hideki Noda 5 0 0 0.003 
Nicholas Wirth 5 0 0 0.003 
Richard Taylor 5 0 0 0.003 
Domenico 
Schiattarella 
5 0 0 0.003 
Trevor Sheumack 7 0 0 0.003 
Andrea Chiesa 7 0 0 0.003 
Glanfranco 
Palazzoli 
7 0 0 0.003 
Peter Wyss 7 0 0 0.003 
Jean-Pierre Paoli 7 0 0 0.001 
Robert Dassaud 7 0 0 0.001 
Eric Guilloud 7 0 0 0.002 
Michel Tifu 7 0 0 0.002 
Darry Hindenoch 7 0 0 0.003 
Eric Vullemin 7 0 0 0.003 
Jean-Pierce 
Chatenet 
7 0 0 0.003 
Erik Bernard 7 0 0 0.003 
Shinji Nakano 7 0 0 0.005 
Henny Vollenberg 8 0 0 0.003 
Brendan Gribben 8 0 0 0.003 
Dave Luckett 8 0 0 0.003 
Gordon Coppuck 8 0 0 0.003 
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Philippe Alliot 8 0 0 0.001 
Tino Holloway 8 0 0.001 0.001 
Jerry Bond 8 0 0.001 0.001 
Carlo Gancia 8 0 0 0.007 
 
 
For instance, Nicholas Wirth spent two seasons with Simtek (1994-1995). The team score no 
points in either season. Wirth joined Benetton in 1996, and the team scored 16.35% of the 
championship points that season. Wirth left in 1999, and the team scored 3.85% of total points 
in the championship. Wirth’s net contribution to the team performance of Simtek is 0, and for 
Benetton is -3.125. Looking at other bottom nodes, Such as Richard Taylor and Domenico 
Schiattarella, it can be observed that their team (Simtek) did not score any points during their 
stint. It can be deduced that nodes with higher degree have a positive influence on team 
performance, as can be observed in figure 7 where the movement of three highly connected 
nodes, Ross Brawn, Adrian Newey, and Andrew Alsworth is mapped and compared against 
the normalised team performance. 
 
 
Figure 11 Effect of movement of highly connected nodes on team performance 
 
To examine the effect more rigorously, analysis was extended. Table 17 and Table 18 lists the 
top thirty highly connected and bottom thirty least connected nodes respectively. To calculate 
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effect of a node on a team’s performance, the net performance point (that is the difference 
between team performance when the node left the team and when node started working at the 
team) was divided by the number of years spent by the node at that team as shown in table 24 
for the node, Mike Gascoyne. 
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Similarly, for a bottom placed node, Taki Inoune, the cumulative effect on performance is 
calculated as follow,  
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It is important to note that each node’s performance generates a number of data points in form 
of positive or negative effect on the team performance for their association with each team. So 
for example, in case of Mike Gascoyne in table 19, there are five data points, 1, -0.675, -1.413, 
3.947, and 1.233. Similarly, Taki Inoune’s association with Simtek and Footwork generates 
two data points, 0 and -1.1. 
 
The analysis (figure 7) shows that the movement of top 30 nodes in the network (organised 
according to their degrees), tends to produce a positive effect on performance. When compared 
with results of the bottom 30 nodes, it can be observed that nodes with lower degrees and 
connections tend to either have no effect on a team’s performance or have negative effect.   
 
Figure 12 Performance of top and bottom placed 30 nodes on team performances 
Table 21 highlights the statistical significance of the research findings, pointing towards a 
positive association between improvement in team performance and movement of high metric 
value nodes. 
 
Table 27 Statistical test for performance impact of highly connected nodes 
z-Test: Two Sample for Means Top 30 Nodes Bottom 30 Nodes 
Mean 1.513 -0.492 
Known Variance 13.450 1.544 
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Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
z 4.262 
P(Z<=z) one-tail 1.01289E-05 
z Critical one-tail 1.645 
P(Z<=z) two-tail 2.02579E-05 
z Critical two-tail 1.960 
 
Most of the bottom placed nodes are drivers. These lower ranked driver nodes only spent a few 
seasons in each team before leaving the network. This led the author to analyse the difference 
between technical and engineering members of a team with its drivers (with considerably 
higher degree than the bottom place nodes.) Social network analysis highlights the effect of a 
team’s engineering employees and drivers. Comparing drivers’ effect on team performance 
with that of other members of the team who worked in an engineering or design capacity, 
highlights how technical staff, compared to drivers, have more influence on the team 
performance.  This corresponds to the case study findings.  
 
 
Figure 13 Effect of technical members and drivers on team performance 
 
These differences are statistically significant as shown in the following table.  
Table 28 Statistical significance test for impact of nodes in technical roles 
z-Test: Two Sample for Means   
 Technical Driver 
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Known Variance 12.89 19.91 
Observations 52 72 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
z 1.737 
P(Z<=z) one-tail 0.0412 
z Critical one-tail 1.645 
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.0824 
z Critical two-tail 1.96 
 
 
The analysis in table 26 and table 27 establishes the following,  
• Networked individuals improved organisational performance in an inter-organisational 
network.  
• Among networked individuals, those individuals who are in technical and managerial 
capacity affect organisational performance to a greater degree than others.  
 
These conclusions highlight the central role of individuals with high tacit knowledge content 
in improving organisational performance within inter-organisational networks and challenge 
the existing consensus on relation based and organisational ecology view of organisations and 
sources of their competitive advantage. The next chapter discusses these research findings in 















Chapter 7. Discussion of Research Findings 
The following sections lay out research findings and their main implications. This study 
proposes a novel method to track movement of tacit knowledge within inter-organisational 
network and highlights the idiosyncratic nature of Formula 1 industry, the unique time 
constraints facing Formula 1 teams, the connection between individuals and knowledge 
transfer, interactions between the teams and automotive sector and other technology 
companies, and the influence of individuals on team performance. The following subsections 
discuss the key findings.  
 
7.1. Movement of Individuals, Tacit Knowledge, and Competitive Advantage   
In the context of Formula 1, knowledge transfer, and more specifically tacit knowledge is of 
central importance. Aversa et al. (2015) and Jenkins (2010) highlight the unique the business 
model of Formula 1 which involves trading and selling both technology and human resource 
with the competitors and reflects the important role played by individuals, conduits of tacit 
knowledge in this process. This study shows that this movement can be tracked using social 
network analysis.  
 
The mapping of movement of individuals, and tacit knowledge inherent within them, facilitates 
a rich analysis. The movement of individuals; those with high degrees, within the inter-
organisational network; has a positive effect on team performance. These nodes, such as Adrian 
Newey and Ross Brawn have a positive effect and improve team’s performance.  
 
A high degree value implies that the node has more connections than other nodes in the 
network. These connections are associated with the movement of individuals among teams. 
While it can be observed from these figures that movement of high degree nodes have a positive 
effect on team’s performance and lower degree nodes lead to negative or no net effect on team’s 
performance, these observations are subjected to statistical test to make them more robust. This 
result provides quantitative support for associating tacit knowledge transfer with having a 
positive effect on the team performance. Identifying the bridges or gatekeepers in the network 
(Burt, 2005; Mishra et al., 2017; Granovetter, 2005) is crucial for understanding nodes 
facilitating non-redundant knowledge flows within the network. 
 
The following table lists a few high metric value nodes who are key for team performance, as 
highlighted in case studies and interviews.  
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Table 29 High metric value nodes and corresponding case studies and interview findings 
Nodes Social network analysis metrics Case studies and interviews 
Ross Brawn Degree: 274  
Betweenness centrality: 5606 
Eigenvector centrality: 0.86 
Brawn was technical director for Ferrari 1997 – 2006, a period in which the team 
won 6 world championships. Brawn founded GP for 2009 season after Honda left 
the sport, and won constructor’s championship the same year.  
Adrian Newey  Degree: 250 
Betweenness centrality: 7640 
Eigenvector centrality: 0.504 
Adrian Newey designed cars have won seven world championships between 
1992-2010, and are considered most aerodynamically efficient cars in Formula 1.  
Michael Schumacher  Degree: 294 
Betweenness Centrality: 5060 
Eigenvector Centrality: 0.957 
 Michael Schumacher was instrumental in bringing Ross Brawn and Rory Byrne 
to Ferrari from Benetton. Schumacher won five world championships with Ferrari, 
and Ferrari won six constructor championships in that period.  
Rory Byrne Degree: 300 
Betweenness Centrality: 3528 
Eigenvector Centrality: 1 
Byrne designed world championship wining cars at Benetton and Ferrari, and won 
seven constructor championships with those teams. 
Ron Dennis Degree: 278 
Betweenness Centrality:3375 
Eigenvector Centrality: 0.404 
Ron Dennis was team principal (and CEO) of McLaren from 1981 to 2009. 
McLaren won seven constructor championships, and ten drivers’ championships 
in his tenure. He was also responsible for McLaren’s engine deal with Mercedes 
Illmor. 
Frank Williams Degree: 270 
Betweenness Centrality: 5032 
Eigenvector Centrality: 0.376 
Frank Williams is the founder and team principal of Williams, and was responsible 
for highly successful collaboration with Renault between 1992 and 1997. 




These nodes with high degree also have moderately high betweeness centrality and eigenvector 
centrality values, which is not always the case in real networks. For instance, Brawn has 
eigenvector centrality of 0.86 and betweenenss centrality of 5606. Both these metrics reflect 
the node’s importance within the network. High eigenvector centrality value implies that 
Brawn is connected to other nodes which are considered important in the network. Brawn’s 
high betweeness centrality value reflects his favoured position in the network to the extent that 
he is on the links between other pairs of people in the network. This implies that more people 
are depended on Brawn to make connections with other people, making his influence stronger 
compared to other nodes. This trend, high values for betweeness, and eigenvector centrality, 
can be observed for all top 30 nodes (based on their degrees).  
 
Nodes with high betweenness centrality, such as Brawn play the role of lead user in the network 
(Kratzer et al., 2015) High betweenness centrality is an effective indicator of an individual’s 
‘lead user’ status. Lead users, in context of a social network, are defined as nodes with needs 
that cannot be met by existing solutions (von Hippel, 1986; Franke and Shah, 2003; von Hippel, 
2007; Kratzer et al, 2015). Lead users are innovative members of an organisation who seek 
collaboration and assistance of others because the challenges facing them exceed their 
capabilities. These users seek feedback from their peers, help them to advance and improve 
their own ideas (Frank and Shah, 2003). It is important to note that these users are centrally 
embedded among their peer and well positioned to take advantage of their knowledge 
(Fleming, 2007). For a lead user, his/her peer provide input for ideas in the development phase 
of a new product, and such an innovative approach requires access to tacit knowledge which 
can only be exchange through direct contract (Polyani, 1966, 12967; Nonaka, 1994). 
 
Studies have shown that lead users are able to take knowledge from a different domain and 
apply it to their context to come up with innovative solutions (Tietz et al., 2005; Lettl et al., 
2006; Riggs and von Hippel, 1994; Luthje et al., 2005). This behaviour is consistent with the 
pattern of innovation requiring a novel (re)combination of diverse knowledge domains 
(Schumpeter, 1939; Usher, 1954; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Cummings and Teng, 2003; Squire 
et al., 2009). Gilsing et al. (2008) have established in their study of networks in pharmaceutical, 
chemical and automotive industries that there exists a positive relationship between innovation 
and betweenness centrality. This highlights the central role played by nodes with high 
betweenness centrality such as Ross Brawn and Michael Schumacher in driving innovation 




When Schumacher moved to Ferrari from Benetton in 1996, he was followed by Benetton’s 
chief designer, Rory Byrne, and technical director, Ross Brawn (table 28). All three nodes have 
high degree, betweenness centrality, and eigenvector centrality values in the network model. 
Schumacher, Brawn, and Byrne have been part of the Benetton team that won two consecutive 
drivers’ and constructors world championship.  Over the next few seasons with Ferrari, Brawn 
and Byrne designed and built five world championship winning cars. They also transformed 
the engineering capabilities of Ferrari (Brawn and Parr; 2014.)  
 
Similarly, Adrian Newey’s designs at Williams, and then at McLaren resulted in the teams 
winning five world championships between them. Adrian Newey had a similar effect on Red 
Bull Racing later. His design innovations in aerodynamics, such as reconfiguring diffuser in 
Williams 17B and designing blown diffuser with customised engine mapping from Renault 
have been some of the key sources of Williams’ and Red Bull’s technical advantage over other 
teams and led to those teams winning six world championships between them (in the period 
under consideration.)  
 
This study demonstrates how the process of knowledge transfer is facilitated by connections 
between people in collaborating organisations, such as collaboration between Lotus and 
Cosworth on the DFV engine (Uzzi and Spiro, 2005; Chen, 2004; Lyles and Gundegran, 2006.) 
A history of past alliances can also have a positive effect on the transfer process if the 
technology being delivered is appropriate (Lyles and Gundegran, 2006.) The relationship 
between Colin Chapman and Keith Duckworth, who had worked for Chapman at Lotus, was 
foundational for the success of the project. But prior alliances can also be a hindrance to the 
knowledge transfer process when their core competencies can result in alliance partner having 
a better performing car (Lyles, 1998, Quintas et al., 1997; Ahuja, 2000.) Partners are protective 
of their core competencies and only share technologies that they have already incorporated in 
their cars and in process of developing and improving it. Duckworth’s reluctance to share the 
technical know-how behind barrel turbulence is one such instance of partners protecting core 
competencies. The ability of partners to absorb knowledge being transferred is also a challenge 
and depends on resources, personal and financial (Tsai, 2001; Lichtenthaler and Lichtenthaler, 
2010; Squire et al., 2009.) As pointed by interviewee one, the network of organisations is 
dependent on the movement of people to gain knowledge, capabilities, and process (Chen, 




The relationships between people in this network is a source of technical advantage and since 
teams are working under time constraints to produce a complex engineering prototype, they 
always need to be able to be in a position to access this knowledge and capability pool in the 
network.  The interviewees pointed out how this is also source of one of the more idiosyncratic 
character of Formula 1, which is the lack of intellectual property rights. Teams start working 
on cars for next season half way through the current season and consequently, are always under 
a process of constant development and innovation. This does not allow for the time required to 
file intellectual property claims and patents (Aversa et al., 2015; Aversa and Berinato, 2017.) 
 
Teams also want to maintain their source of competitive advantage, and filing a patent 
application will involve disclosing not only the technology but also how it is applied by the 
team. Mercedes’ use of beryllium allowed McLaren MP4-13 to produce more power than the 
Ferrari engine due to inherent elasticity of beryllium allowing for longer stokes despite revving 
at the same rate. McLaren and Mercedes managed to keep this source of technical advantage 
secret for a season before other teams and FIA found out. If McLaren and Mercedes were to 
patent the technology or file application for IP rights, their source of advantage would have 
been disclosed and allowed other teams to exploit it as well.  
 
Another example would be Newey (table 23) changing gear arrangement for the gearbox of 
Williams FW17B to hide the change in position of diffuser. This allowed FW17B better grip 
in corners and was present in Williams FW18 and FW19 cars which ended up winning the 
world championship.  Similarly, Duckworth kept the concept of barrel turbulence and 
continuously refused to share how he had accomplished it in FVA and DFV engines.  
 
Another recent instance of this practice is the refusal of Ferrari and Mercedes to provide 
engines to Red Bull Racing. Red Bull Racing has been struggling with their engine 
manufacturer, Renault’s performance since reintroduction of 1.6l V6 turbocharged engines in 
2014. In this scenario, Mercedes and Ferrari engines, central to their core competencies, would 
have complimented Red Bull Racing’s aerodynamic capabilities. This could have resulted in a 
better car than what Mercedes and Ferrari would been able to manufacture. Formula 1 teams 
are willing to enter into an alliance but not if that leads to their alliance partner and competitor 




The aversion to patents and IP rights make role of individuals in Formula 1 network that much 
more important. Hiring members of world championship winning teams is considered a key 
for bringing critical technologies and according to interviewees, more importantly, for their 
know-how and tacit knowledge (Chen, 2004; Nelson and Winter, 1995; McEvily et al., 2004; 
Palacios-Marques et al., 2013.) These individuals carry the knowledge within themselves and 
their hiring is an efficient way to encourage innovation and technological development. This 
is one of the factors influencing Formula 1 teams’ high interfirm mobility.  
 
Movement of individuals, especially those in managerial positions such as technical directors 
and chief designers, is an important factor in teams’ success. Most individuals in managerial 
positions in Formula 1 also work in a technical capacity, such as technical director and team 
principal. These individuals in managerial positions, such as team principal, technical director, 
and chief engineer, are also involved in day to day operations in their administrative as well as 
technical capacity. They play this role on both the factory floor and grand prix circuit. An 
example of this will be Ross Brawn, who at Ferrari was not only responsible for the technical 
aspects of building a grand prix car but also played a key role in developing Ferrari’s vehicle 
dynamics facilities and expanding their research and development capabilities. Successful 
Formula 1 team principals, such as Colin Chapman, Frank Williams, and Ron Dennis are often 
responsible for technical as well as administrative management of the car, and derive their 
success, in parts from their ability to achieve synergy between their administrative and 
technical goals (Aversa et al., 2015).   
 
This study has highlighted how the movement of networked individuals, gatekeepers with high 
tacit knowledge content lead to improved organisational performance. This is the primary 
research finding of this study and contribution to knowledge. When these individuals, such as 
Ross Brawn or Adrian Newey, move from one team (organisation) to another, they not only 
bring their technical expertise and tacit knowledge about the car (product) but also their 
network which allows them to access expertise and tacit knowledge residing in other 
individuals within the network. Using social network analysis, this study has codified such 
movements and visualised the relationship between improvement in organisational 




Therefore; the research findings challenge the central thesis of resource based (and relational 
view) of organisations’ competitive advantage, that a pair or network of firms can develop 
relationships that result in sustained competitive advantage (Dyer and Singh, 1998; 675).  
 
Table 30 Different views of competitive advantage (adapted from Dyer and Singh, 1998; 674) 




Relational View Individual-based 
view (this study) 
Unit of analysis Industry Firm Pair or network of 
firms 
Individuals 
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Table 29 illustrates how this study challenges, and distinguishes itself from resource based, and 
relational view of the firm by identifying individuals and the tacit knowledge within them as 
source of competitive advantage and improvement in organisational performance.  
 
The research findings also challenge the organisational ecology view of inter-organisational 
networks. The organisational ecology view is centred on competition and constraints of 
resources. This study demonstrates how gatekeepers can alter competition and organisation’s 
resource constraints within inter-organisational network by bringing in novel knowledge 
necessary for innovation and performance improvement.  
7.2. Nature of Formula 1 
 
Formula 1 faces a pace of the technological development and logistical challenges like 
businesses such as information management systems, pharmaceutical industries, and aerospace 
manufacturers where firms form alliances with their competitors to tackle specific projects, 
expand their resource base, and overcome regulatory change. Smith et al. (2007) identify these 
as ideal conditions for fostering knowledge transfer.  
 
Formula 1 cars are essentially an alliance between the team, engine manufacturer, electronic 
system provider, brake manufacturers, fuel supplier, and sponsors. In this alliance, role of the 
constructor is that of a system integrator (Wright and Matthews, 2001.) For instance, in the 
case of the DFV engine, it came about because of an alliance between Lotus, Cosworth, and 
Ford where Ford provided corporate sponsorship for the project, Cosworth provided technical 
expertise and engineering in building the engine, and Lotus acted as a system integrator. This 
alliance is focused on ‘winning races’ and that is the only measure of performance (Jenkins, 
2010; Jenkins and Tallman, 2015; Aversa et al., 2015, Aversa and Berinato, 2017)   
 
The primary motivation for formation of such alliances within Formula 1 is acquiring 
capabilities and resources that the team lacks (Argote and Ingram, 2000; Deeds, 2003; Gupta 
and Govindarajan, 2000; Schulze, 2001; Cummings and Teng, 2003; Schulze et al., 2014; 
Pinch et al., 2003; Jenkins, 2010.) These alliances are primarily driven by ‘knowledge’, 
knowledge that can help a team win races (Argote and Ingram, 2002; Winter, 1995; Szulanski, 
1996; Lyles and Gudergan, 2006; Gomes-Casseres, 2006; Dyer and Singh, 1998.) This explains 
why Formula 1 teams can change their longstanding relationships with engine manufacturers 
or tyre suppliers or any other alliance partner if they are not performing in grands prix. Other 
 125 
 
external factors such as corporate alignment and complementary competencies do play a role 
but gaining knowledge and technologies necessary for winning grands prix remains the prime 
motivator for these alliances. This can be observed in case of Renault’s alliance with Red Bull 
Racing and the Newey designed exhaust blow diffusers for RB6.  
 
Interviewees cite examples of collaborations in Formula 1, such as Lotus and Cosworth, 
Mercedes and McLaren, and Red Bull Racing and Renault. Such alliances facilitate cost saving 
and also provide access to otherwise difficult to reach knowledge (Szulanski, 2000; Cummings 
and Teng, 2003; Inkpen, 2008.) Alliance and knowledge sharing are also dependent on the 
partner’s ability to innovate (Inkpen, 2008; Salk, 1996, Hardy et al., 2003; Lichtenthaler and 
Lichtenthaler, 2010.) Companies do not get into an alliance if their partner can “out-innovate” 
them in performance, they look for complementary competencies. Red Bull is known for their 
capabilities in the area of aerodynamics and chassis manufacturing, and combining those with 
the complementary competencies of Renault’s engine manufacturing is advantageous for both 
alliance partners.  
 
Research collaboration also plays a role in encouraging alliance formation and knowledge 
sharing. Interviewees highlighted how Formula 1 act as a research laboratory for automotive 
manufacturers (Aversa et al., 2015; Aversa and Berinato, 2017; Foxall and Johnston, 1991; 
Jenkins and Floyd, 2001.) However, interviewee three argued that technology being used in 
Formula 1 is not suitable for road cars and cross-over between racing and road car technology 
is non-existent and has been the case since early 1990s. This stands in contrast to Renault’s 
participation in Formula 1 in 1970s to promote turbochargers in their road cars (Jenkins, 2010.) 
Before the 1990s, the technological advances in racing still had relevance for the road cars.  
 
Formula 1 cars are result of integration of the technological know-how of the alliance partners 
thus system integration is critical for success of the team. This type of tacit knowledge is critical 
for building the car and its performance especially considering how Formula 1 cars are 
essentially a prototype. How external capabilities, financial resources, and personal are 
integrated into the process of building a car influences success or failure of the team. Teams 
are dependent on factors such as knowledge, people, and relationships coming together and 
having compatible capabilities. Formula 1, as a business, is more similar in nature to 
technology firms like Apple or Google, video game developers, and defence manufacturers 
than automotive manufacturers. 
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7.3. Formula 1: A Small World Network 
Small world networks have been shown to exist in a range of field, from neural networks to 
creative collaborations in film industry (Newman, 2001; Newman, 2003; Schnettler, 2009).  
The ubiquity of small world networks has led researchers to speculate that small world 
networks are fundamental to how biological, social, and physical networks organise themselves 
for success.  
 
Research has shown that small world networks do have an impact on performance (Uzzi and 
Spiro, 2005) though the positive effect only lasts up to a threshold beyond which either it has 
no or negative effect on the performance. Focusing on small world coefficient Q (equation 1), 
research has established that as small world coefficient Q increases, the constituent clusters of 
small world become more connected through nodes who either have worked together in past 
or are connected through a past collaboration with another node. This has implications for tacit 
knowledge within an organisation. A small value of Q will imply that knowledge will remain 
in separate organisations that make up the network and the few inter-organisational links that 
do exist in such a network are not made up of repeat ties or first-hand ties making it difficult to 
transfer novel knowledge. At the medium level of small world coefficient Q, connectivity 
between team rises as does cohesion within the network. These ties are either repeated links 
and have many common third-party relationships that facilitate dispersion of novel knowledge 
and creativity in the network.  
 
The Formula 1 network presents such a scenario. The small world coefficient Q of the Formula 
1 network is 13.974, which is much larger than 1 indicating the small world behaviour of the 
network. Table 29 highlights the other real world small world networks. It can also be noted 
from the table 29, that small world coefficient of Formula 1 network is close to the median of 
small world Q of real-world networks but when compared to a network such as one in 
Verspagen and Duysters (2004) study into strategic technology alliances, Q for Formula 1 
network appears small. In this regard, Grannovetter (1973) have argued in their study that 
innovation and small world Q share an inverted U relationship. This means that a very large 
small world coefficient has negative implications for innovation within the network as that 
implies a tightly connected network with either no or very small path lengths, thus reducing 




The small world nature of Formula 1 network will imply unusually large information flowing 
within the network through links between nodes who have either worked together in past or 
connected to each other through another actor (Uzzi and Spiro, 2015; Mishra et al., 2017). This 
supports findings of interviews and case studies that tacit knowledge transfer facilitate via 
individuals. The novel knowledge is introduced in the network via these individuals and then 
dispersed through the whole network and constituent clusters. Small world networks also have 
implications for state of innovation (Uzzi and Spiro, 2005; Burt, 2004; Steen et al., 2011).  
 
Research has shown that innovation arises from connections between disparate groups in a 
network (Burt, 2004; Gay and Dousset, 2005; cown et al., 2007; Steen et al., 2011), and high 
value of small world coefficient Q implies that such connections exist either through nodes 
who have worked together or with have a connection through a third actor.  This small world 
phenomenon highlights how innovation (Gilsing et al., 2008) thrives in Formula 1 teams and 





Table 31 Small world networks in real life (adopted from Uzzi et al., 2007; 80) 
Authors Network Period Q 
Moody (2004) Sociologists co-authorship 1963-1999 0.72 
    
1989-1999 0.63 
Baum et al. (2003) Canadian banks 1952-1957 1.21 
    
1969-1974 5.9 
    
1985-1990 10.78 
Schilling and Phelps (2007) US alliances in 11 2-digit SIC 
codes 
1992-200 2.71 
Davis et al. (2003) US Corporations interlocks 1982 5.27 
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1999 4.54 
Flemming et al. (2007) US patenting inventors 1986-1990 6.8 
Watts (1999) Power grids   10.61 
Median Q     10.61 
Mishra (2017) Formula 1 Network  1992 - 2010 13.974 
Kogut and Walker (2001) German firms 1993-1997 20.38 
Davis et al. (2003) US Director interlocks 1982 65.48 
    
1990 65.84 
    
1999 68.14 
Kogut and Walker (2001) German corporation ownership 1993-1997 87.91 
Verspagen and Duyster 
(2004) 
Strategic alliances 1980-1996 531.25 
Watts (1999) Hollywood Film Nodes 1898-1997 2396.85 
 
7.3.1 Fast clockspeed and small world network of Formula 1 
 
Formula 1 cars are essentially a prototype (Aversa et al., 2015; Aversa and Berinato, 2017; 
Foxall and Johnston, 1991; Jenkins and Floyd, 2001; Jenkins, 2010). This prototype is 
continuously evolved over the season and incremental innovations are necessary to maintain 
competitive advantage over other teams. This process happens while simultaneously team is 
developing next year’s race car, which could be, due to regulation changes, considerably 
different, technologically, compared to the present car.  
 
Formula 1 teams need to continuously evolve their product and process technologies to 
maintain their competitive advantage. Scholars (Fines, 1998; Williams, 1994; Mendelson and 
Pillai, 1999; Nadkarni and Narayana, 2007; Souza et al., 2004) have identified this need for 
firms to keep pace with the increasing velocity of change or clockspeed to survive and remain 
competitive as one of the key challenges for modern industries.  
 
To keep up with the fast clockspeed, industries frequently introduce incrementally new 
products with progressively shortening development time and time between redesigns (Holt, 
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2002; Mendelson and Pillai, 1999; Souza et al., 2007). Formula 1 teams work within a  set of 
regulations that do not allow a complete product redesign; i.e. a redesigned race car is not 
allowed halfway through a season. Therefore, Formula 1 teams have adopted principles of lean 
production (Womack et al., 2003; 2007) and focus on continuous evolution and improvement 
of various components, improving reliability, and integrated product and process design while 
working on designs and improvements for the next season. 
 
In this fast clockspeed environment, teams rely on movement of individuals to introduce novel 
knowledge and facilitate innovation. This is where small world network structure of Formula 
1 allows teams to exploit access to large knowledge flows via movement of individuals within 
the network and innovate to maintain their competitive advantage. 
 
7.4. Way of Doing Things 
Another theme that emerges from interviews and case analysis is the importance of processes 
and ways of doing things. Processes and ways of doing things is more important than the 
technology itself. For instance, as highlighted by interviewee one, Formula 1 teams have been 
using 3-D printing to test scale models in the wind tunnel since early 1990s. This ability to take 
an existing technology and incorporate it in existing processes to improve efficiency lies at the 
core of how Formula 1 teams operate. For instance, Ferrari encountered this issue when they 
found their engineers struggling to build John Barnard’s car designs for 1995 season. When 
Rory Byrne and Ross Brawn joined Ferrari, they focused on improving engineering capabilities 
as well as building a resource pool of engineers (Brawn and Parr, 2014) They also invested in 
building vehicle dynamic facilities and research and development group to capture the tacit 
knowledge within the group. A critical factor for success of knowledge transfer is research and 
development. Teams investing in research are not only able to innovate but also gain from 
knowledge of their partners.  
 
The importance of processes also stands out in the Renault case in late 1978 where Francois 
Castaing and Bernard Dudot used the CH series of engines from sportscar racing to develop 
the 1.5l V6 turbocharged engine for the Renault RS01. It is also evident in Duckworth’s 
experience of working with Ford engines which he adapted for the F2 in form of FVA engine. 
FVA engine’s distinguishing feature, the barrel turbulence, helped him design and build the 





Exhaust blown diffusers were not new to Formula 1 and were introduced in Renault RE40 in 
1983 by Jean-Claude Migeot and most teams either use the technology in 2010 or had used it 
in past. What was new in Newey’s design was how the vertical window in the diffusers allowed 
it to be blown both over and under by the exhaust. This helped the airflow going up the outside 
shoulder of the upper diffuser deck and the high speed exhaust gas will drive more flow through 
the diffuser to increase downforce.  This in itself would not have allowed for any substantial 
advantage over other teams, but Newey worked closely with Renault to change engine mapping 
for off throttle overrun. Practice off throttle overrun forces fuel through the engine even when 
the throttle pedal is not depressed and resulting in exhaust cases being blown. This type of 
engine mapping is quite common in rallying cars to prevent or minimise the turbo lag, and 
Renault had a history of participation in rally car championships. This allowed Renault to bring 
their prior experience in engine mapping and compliment Newey’s exhaust blown diffuser 
design resulting in greater downforce and thus higher cornering speed. One of the factors 
behind Red Bull Racing’s success was their ability to integrate Renault’s engines in every 
aspect of their car designs and performance expectations. Red Bull made sure their 
development and innovation activities accounted for the role of engine manufacturer. This 
practice of complimentary competency and system integration can be also observed in Lotus 
49 which was designed around the Cosworth DFV engine.  
 
7.5. Regulations and Geographical Proximity 
Regulations play a critical role in affecting knowledge transfer (Jenkins, 2010.) Having the 
right individual to respond to regulation changes is important for a team’s success. The network 
of people driving knowledge sharing is contextualised by the competition and technological 
evolution as well as regulation. Regulation change can alter the balance of competition, and 
change the trajectory of technological evolution. Regulatory changes can also cause disruption.  
 
Ross Brawn’s role at Brawn GP, and later at Mercedes AMG is an instance where having the 
right individual to respond to the regulation change was key for team’s performance. Brawn 
was one of the key figures behind hybrid engine technology development at Mercedes in 2010 
and 2011. This early investment in the technology paid off when FIA changed the regulation 
and mandated use of 1.6L turbo hybrid engines with energy recovery systems for 2014 season.  
Similarly, collaboration between Lotus and Cosworth was result of FIA changing regulations 
for engine capacity from 1.5 litre to 3.0 litre. The then Lotus engine partner, Coventry Climax 
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decided not to produce the higher capacity engine and it forced Chapman to collaborate with 
Cosworth, resulting in the most successful Formula 1 engine ever produced, the DFV engine.  
 
Formula 1 teams are driven by past collaboration and geographical colocation (Jenkins and 
Tallman, 2015; Jenkins and Tallman, 2010.) Geographical location plays an important role in 
ability of a Formula 1 team to be able to exploit resources. Most Formula 1 teams are 
concentrated in what is known as motorsport valley in England. This area not only has teams’ 
manufacturing and research and development facilities but also an established supply chain 
and various universities to guarantee materials, technology, and human resources needed for 
perhaps most technical sport in the world. Similarly, Italy has its own motorsport valley centred 
on Maranello with Ferrari and Toro Rosso, as well as Moto GP firms such as Ducati.  
 
The success of knowledge transfer process is based on the nature of the alliance. Intra-industry 
alliances, such as that between Cosworth and Lotus and McLaren and Mercedes, are judged on 
the parameter of grands prix wins whereas inter-industry alliances, such that between McLaren 




















Chapter 8. Conclusion and Limitations 
This research contributes to knowledge by proposing a novel method of tracking tacit 
knowledge transfer in inter-organisational networks. Tacit knowledge is difficult to codify and 
transfer (Polanayi, 1965; 1967) and scholars have argued that critical organisation knowledge 
is often tacit (Arthur et al., 1995; Boisot, 1998, Nonaka and Takechi, 1995). This is important 
in context of inter-organisational networks of alliances, as firms form alliances to access novel 
knowledge for competitive advantage (Cumming and Teng, 2003; Lyles and Gudergan, 2006; 
Dyer and Singh, 1998). Therefore, understanding the tacit knowledge transfer in inter-
organisational networks is important not only from a knowledge management perspective but 
also from, an organisational performance perspective.  
 
This research proposes the use of social network analysis to track movement of individuals in  
inter-organisational networks (Formula 1) and assigns ametric value to each individual within 
the said network. By tracking movement of individuals, and the tacit knowledge inherent in 
them, this methodology allows for measurement of the impact of the movement of individuals 
on organisation’s performance. Individuals with higher impact share certain mathematical 
traits, such as high degree centrality and betweenness centrality value, and therefore can be 
compared against individuals with little or no impact on the organisation’s performance. This 
allows for statistical comparison between the two sets of individuals and enhances the validity 
of the proposed methodology by providing a self-validation mechanism.  A social network 
analysis of individuals within the inter-organisational network also facilitates identification of 
roles that have greater effect on team performance compared to others. These findings are 
reinforced by qualitative analysis in form of interviews and case studies.  
 
The study has also identified an unusual structure of management in Formula 1 teams. Teams 
have a management structure which allows team principals, technical directors, and other 
senior managerial staff to work simultaneously on administrative as well as technical level in 
the factory and grand prix circuits with rest of the team. Team principals in Formula 1 often 
play many roles, such as chief executive and chief technical officer and are key for team’s 
performance.  
 
Team principals are responsible for tightly knitted team structure which allows teams to 
respond to external factors such as regulation changes and improvement in competitors’ 
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performance by aligning their managerial and technical resources without going through a 
series of managerial positions. This type of organisational structure is highly unusual for any 
multi-national organisation (Morschett et al., 2015).  
 
8.1. Effect of Movement of Tacit Knowledge on Organisation Performance  
Research findings highlight the critical role played by knowledge in inter-organisational 
networks. Gaining access to novel knowledge which can provide a competitive advantage is 
core motivation behind alliance formation within networks (Argote and Ingram, 2000; Deeds, 
2003; Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000; Schulze, 2001; Cummings and Teng, 2003; Schulze et 
al., 2014).  This study shows that tacit knowledge transfer is critical for the specific context of 
Formula 1 because of the nature of the industry. Formula 1 teams do not file patent applications 
or register their intellectual property because that would involve disclosing the source of their 
competitive advantage and instead rely on the individuals within the organisation to have the 
(tacit) knowledge and know-how of processes to gain advantage over others. Therefore; as 
highlighted by interviewees; teams are often looking to employ individuals from world 
championship winning teams, so that they can exploit their tacit knowledge of processes and 
way of doing things (Chen, 2004; Nelson and Winter, 1995; McEvily et al., 2004; Palacios-
Marques et al., 2013) These inter-organisational networks rely on individuals to respond to 
externalities, such as industry or in case of Formula 1, FIA sporting regulations.  
 
This tacit knowledge can be accessed through individuals who move from one organisation to 
another within an inter-organisational network (Cummings and Teng, 2003; Inkpen, 2008.) 
The tacit knowledge transfer takes place through individuals involved in research and 
development. These research collaborations between firms in an inter-organisational network 
facilitate the process of knowledge transfer (Uzzi and Spiro, 2005; Luthje et al., 2005; Squire 
et al., 2009) This exchange of knowledge between individuals is encouraged by a history of 
constructive past alliances between their respective organisations (Lyles and Gundegran, 
2006). 
 
These individuals carry the (tacit) knowledge which is a key for organisations’ competitive 
advantage (Argote and Ingram, 2002; Winter, 1995; Szulanski, 1996; Lyles and Gudergan, 
2006; Gomes-Casseres, 2006; Dyer and Singh, 1998.) This study has shown that movement of 
individuals with high level of connectedness (degree centrality) and betweemmess centrality 
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has a positive effect on competitive performance whereas movement of individuals with lower 
levels of connectedness tends to have no or negative effect on organisation’s performance.  
 
Analysis also highlights a qualitative difference between categories of nodes in the network. 
Individuals who are working in a technical capacity, such as race engineers, designers, and 
technical directors have more influence on the team performance than the drivers. This was 
again corroborated by statistical significance test and case studies and interview analysis. The 
analysis highlighted the importance of individuals in senior technical positions in world 
championship winning teams, such as Ross Brawn and Adrian Newey whose movement to 
another team leads to a greater positive influence on team performance than compared to 
individuals in the role of drivers.  This conclusion is context specific to Formula 1 teams. 
Nonetheless, it highlights how individuals in certain roles can affect inter-organisational 
network to a greater degree than others.  
 
The movement of individuals, and tacit knowledge within them encourages innovation. Ability 
to innovate plays a key part in intra and inter-organisational relationships (Lictenthaler and 
Lichtenthaler, 2010; Tietz et al., 2005; Lettl et al., 2006; Riggs and von Hippel, 1994; Luthje 
et al., 2005; Squire et al., 2009). This study also demonstrates that firms in an inter-
organisational network do not want to be out innovated by their partners so they protect their 
core competencies.  
 
8.2. Small World Network of Formula 1 
The network of Formula 1 teams is a small world knowledge network which has favourable 
implications for knowledge transfer (Verspage and Duysters, 2004; Uzzi and Spiro, 2005.) 
These networks have high clustering and short distance between any randomly selected pair of 
nodes. This implies that Formula 1 network has large knowledge flows, primarily through 
nodes who have either worked with each other or have another actor in common. These 
knowledge flows through individuals, especially those nodes who are on the periphery of the 
network have a positive effect on the state of innovation (Uzzi and Spiro, 2005; Burt, 2004; 
Schnettler, 2009; Steen et al., 2011).  
 
The small world network structure and accompanying large knowledge flows facilitate 
innovation in the Formula 1 network structure allowing teams to maintain their competitive 
advantage in this fast-clockspeed industry. Unlike other fast-clockspeed industries, such as 
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semi-conductors, Formula 1 teams cannot completely redesign their product in middle of a 
season, i.e. the race car, so they rely on incremental improvements and innovation to 
continuously improve the product and maintain their competitive advantages.  
8.3. Movement of Tacit Knowledge in Inter-organisational Network 
Social network analysis is a sociological tool relying on mathematic and statistics to understand 
social interactions among organisations, and individuals. In the case of Formula 1, application 
of social network analysis and various metrics present a dense inter-organisational network full 
of clusters and short path lengths facilitating knowledge flow. The Formula 1 network is an 
unusually dense and highly interconnected with small diameter for a real life network (Albert 
and Barabasi, 2002; Hanneman and Riddle, 2005; Newman, 2001, 2003; Uzzi, 1998; Watts 
and Strogatz, 1998; Uzzi and Spiro, 2005). It is also full of clusters which are essentially 
individual teams, which is to be expected as movement of individuals centrs around certain key 
nodes who are central to a team, such as Ron Dennis and Frank Williams.   
 
These clusters at their centre have certain nodes or nodes with high values for metrics such as 
degree centrality and betweenness centrality (Albert and Barabasi, 2002; Hanneman and 
Riddle, 2005; Newman, 2003) These centrality measures give an indication of importance of 
these nodes in determining knowledge exchange and access within intra-organisational and 
inter-organisational networks (Freeman, 1977; Freeman, 1984;  von Hippel, 1986; Franke and 
Shah, 2003; von Hippel, 2007; ; Gilsing et al., 2008; Kratzer et al, 2015) Social network 
analysis also highlights the positive co-relation between movement of these nodes and the 
performance of teams.  Statistical analysis of these nodes, compared to lower ranked nodes, 
supports the conclusion that there is a link between movement of these individuals and team 
performance. These findings are also supported by the qualitative analysis of interviews and 
case studies.   
 
8.4. Regulations 
Researchers (Porter, 1991; Ambec et al., 2011) have argued that well-designed regulations can 
enhance competitiveness and innovation. This study illustrates that regulations can effectively 
alter the trajectory of technological evolution and competition (Jenkins, 2010). Regulatory 
changes also force Formula 1 teams to respond quickly to changes that affect their core 
competencies, such as engine capacity, fuel efficiency, and electronic driving aids. Regulatory 




Formula 1 teams respond to these regulatory changes through innovation and technological 
improvements. These are often accomplished by either forming alliances or movement of 
individuals with requisite expertise to respond to these changes. Regulations are a key external 
factor that motivates alliance formation and movement of individuals to access relevant 
knowledge and know-how in Formula 1.  
 
This study has demonstrated a novel way of analysing tacit knowledge transfer in inter-
organisational networks. It identifies the effect of network position of an individual, who is 
conduit of tacit knowledge transfer (Deeds, 2003; Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000; Pfeffer and 
Sutton, 2000) on team performance. This study has also shown how different category of nodes 
influence the team performance to different extent.  
 
Using the context of Formula 1, this study has demonstrated the suitability of social network 
analysis, a sociology-graph theory based methodology to trace and identify movement and high 
metric value individuals within the inter-organisational network.  The use of metrics gives 
mathematical structure to the analysis. The analysis has identified the small world network 
structure of Formula 1 network. The small world structure of Formula 1 facilitates knowledge 
flow and innovation within the network by introducing novel knowledge through nodes on the 
periphery.  
 
For industry, this analysis highlights the positive effect of movement of networked individuals 
on a firm’s performance. This is particularly relevant for industries that share Formula 1’s 
technological and competitive context such as pharmaceutical, aerospace, and information 
management. This research shows that in an industry like Formula 1, performance is positively 
affected by movement of highly networked individuals among competitors 
 
8.4. Implications for teaching and research, and motor sport policy 
This study provides a framework for analysing tacit knowledge transfer in inter-organisational 
networks and in doing so offers a pedagogical tool to examine knowledge transfer process and 
other variables involved. By highlighting role of individuals in improving organisational 
performance, this study challenges researcher in the field of knowledge management, strategy, 
and organisational networks to explore individuals as unit of analysis. This study has not 
explored the implications of patents within the context of movement of tacit knowledge via 
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individuals in inter-organisational networks and that represents a future avenue for any 
researcher in the field.  
 
In terms of motor sport policy, this study has highlighted how critical networked individuals 
can improve organisational performance and in some cases, such as Luca Badoer, these 
individuals are not the most obvious. The research findings suggest that organisations within 
the motor sport industry and regulators would benefit from reassessing their policy with 
individuals as one of the key pillars of their planning. In today’s environmentally conscious 
world where government regulators are increasingly demanding more stringent standards, 
individuals with expertise and high tacit knowledge content can prove important for developing 
new solutions and improving organisational performance.  
 
8.5. Limitations and Future Work 
As with any other study, this research was done within boundary conditions. Inter-
organisational network structures are dependent on their empirical settings (Ahuja, 2000; 
Provan et al., 2007; Rowley et al., 2000). This presents challenges to generalisability of social 
network studies, and whether learning from one study done in a particular empirical setting can 
offer lessons for another context. Empirical setting encompasses the industrial setting as well 
as cultural setting. Scholars have studied how national cultures influence and give rise to 
different network practices (Cook et al., 2005; Hofstede, 2001). Such differences based on 
empirical settings make it difficult to extrapolate learnings from one context to another. This 
does not invalidate findings of social network analysis in a particular industry. It still offers the 
methodological and certain broader lessons about movement of individuals and the 
accompanying tacit knowledge that are applicable to other industries.  
 
Access to novel knowledge is an important source of competitive advantage (Argote and 
Ingram, 2002; Winter, 1995; Szulanski, 1996; Lyles and Gudergan, 2006; Gomes-Casseres, 
2006; Dyer and Singh, 1998; Dyer and Singh, 1998; Cummings and Teng, 2003, Chen, 2003; 
Ahuja, 2000) but it is not the only source from which firms’ draw their competitive advantage. 
In specific context of Formula 1, financial resources also play a critical role in teams’ ability 
to be competitive and win grands prix.  It is not uncommon for Formula 1 teams to withdraw 





In certain cases, such as Ferrari between 1996-2006, many highly connected nodes, such as 
Ross Brawn, Rory Byrne, Michael Schumacher, and Jean Todt were involved in the team. In 
such cases, these individuals have a cumulative effect on team’s performance which is greater 
than their individual contribution over that period. Based on the research findings of this study, 
gathering these highly connected nodes together would have a greater positive effect on team’s 
performance than any single node in its individual capacity. However, this needs further 
research to establish a clear causal link as there are other factors that influence organisational 
performance.  
 
This study has been focused on individual level and inter-organisational level of analysis and 
highlights the impact of individuals within the inter-organisational network. There are many 
other factors that will affect performance of a firm such as financial resources at a team’s 
disposal, geographical location, patent portfolio, and regulations. In addition, an individual’s 
impact may take some time to become apparent (perhaps even after the individual has left the 
firm). Formula 1 teams also have different cultural practices, and that affects individual 
performance.  
 
This suggeststhat future work should focus on analysis at the firm level to understand the effect 
of cumulative metric value of all members of the team and other contextual factors such as 
regulations, technology available, cultural practices, geographical location, patent portfolio, 
and suppliers’ performance. Particularly, social network analysis can be used to explore the 
effect of existing patent portfolio and its role as the source of competitive advantage in inter-
organisational networks.  
 
Future work can explore the generalisability of research findings by applying the proposed 
methodology to the case of Formula E. Formula E is a FIA sanctioned electronic single seater 
racing championship. Formula E is a relatively new FIA category but already has 
manufacturers such as Audi, BMW, Jaguar, Porsche, Renault, Mercedes AMG, and Mahindra 
participating in the world championship. Being an electric racing series, the knowledge 
generated within the series is of relevance for automotive manufacturers, especially 

























Appendix 1 Python Syntax 
 
#!/usr/bin/env python 
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*- 
 
fi = 'Input.csv' 
fo = 'Output.csv' 
 
def main(): 
    constructor = list() 
    nodes = list() 
    cyear = '' 
    fr = open(fi, 'r') 
    for i, line in enumerate(fr.xreadlines()): 
        if i > 0: 
            iline = line.strip().split(',') 
            print iline 
            if len(iline) == 2 and iline[0].strip() != '': 
                if len(iline) == 2 and iline[1].strip() == '': 
                    # Constructor 
                    print 'constructor' 
                    print iline[0] 
                    constructor.append(iline[0].strip()) 
                    nodes.append([]) 
                if len(iline) == 2 and iline[1].strip() != '': 
                    # nodes 
                    print iline[0] 
                    nodes[len(constructor) - 
1].append(iline[0].strip()) 
                    cyear = iline[1].strip() 
 
    print constructor 
    print nodes 
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    fw = open(fo, 'w') 
    for c, constructor in enumerate(constructor): 
        print constructor 
        fw.write(','.join((constructor, '\r\n'))) 
        for n, i in enumerate(nodes[c]): 
            for l in xrange(n + 1, len(nodes[c])): 
                print i, ', ', nodes[c][l], ', ', cyear 




























Appendix 2 Performance of top thirty nodes 
  
Year Joined Year Left (left after finishing the season Net Effect 
Mike Gascoyne 
    
     
Sauber 1992 1993 2 1 
Team Performance 0 2.8 2.8 
 
     
Tyrrell 1994 1997 4 
 
Team Performance 3.1 0.4 -2.7 -0.675 
     
Jordan 1998 2000 3 
 
Team Performance 8.18 3.94 -4.24 -1.4133333 
     
Benetton/Renault 2001 2003 3 
 
Team Performance 2.26 14.1 11.84 3.94666667 
     
Toyota 2004 2006 3 
 
Team Performance 1.3 5 3.7 1.23333333 
     
     
Andrew Alsworth 
    
     
Benetton 1992 1998 7 
 
Team Performance 21.87 7.93 -13.94 -1.9914286 
     
BAR 1999 2005 7 
 
Team Performance 0 11.92 11.92 1.70285714 
     
Honda/Brawn 2006 2009 4 
 
Team Performance 5.15 26.73 21.58 5.395 
     
     
Alan Permane 
    
Benetton 1992 2001 10 
 
Team Performance 21.87 2.26 -19.61 -1.961 
     
Renault 2002 2008 7 
 
Team Performance 5.2 11.4 6.2 0.88571429 
     
     
Steve Nielsen 
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Tyrrell 1992 1997 6 
 
Team Performance 1.44 0.4 -1.04 -0.1733333 
     
Benetton 2000 2001 2 
 
Team Performance 4.62 2.26 -2.36 -1.18 
     
Renault 2002 2009 8 
 
Team Performance 5.2 5.36 0.16 0.02 
     
     
Luigi Mazzola  
    
Ferrari 1992 2010 19 
 
Team Performance 5.14 20.63 15.49 0.81526316 
     
     
Dickie Stanford 
    
Williams 1992 2010 19 
 
Team Performance 39.42 3.56 -35.86 -1.8873684 
     
Mattia Binotto 
    
Ferrari 1995 2010 16 
 
Team Performance 17.1 20.63 3.53 0.220625 
     
     
Jock Clear 
    
Williams 1995 1998 4 
 
Team Performance 26.3 9.13 -17.17 -4.2925 
     
BAR 1999 2005 7 
 
Team Performance 0 5.15 5.15 0.73571429 
     
Honda/Brawn 2006 2009 4 
 
Team Performance 12.25 26.73 14.48 3.62 





Team Performance 11.15 
 
11.15 11.15 
     
     
Pat Symonds  
    
Benetton 1992 2001 10 
 
Team Performance 21.87 2.26 -19.61 -1.961 
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Renault  2002 2010 9 
 
Team Performance 5.2 8.5 3.3 0.36666667 
     
     
Rory Byrne 
    
Benetton 1992 1996 5 
 
Team Performance 21.87 16.35 -5.52 -1.104 
     
Ferrari 1997 2007 11 
 
Team Performance 23.78 45.84 22.06 2.00545455 
     
     
Adrian Newey 
    
Williams 1992 1996 5 
 
Team Performance 39.42 42.07 2.65 0.53 
     
McLaren 1997 2005 9 
 
Team Performance 14.25 24.66 10.41 1.15666667 
     
Red Bull 2006 2010 5 
 
Team Performance 2.28 25.92 23.64 4.728 
     
     
Ron Dennis 
    
McLaren 1992 2010 19 
 
Team Performance 23.8 23.66 -0.14 -0.0073684 
     
     
Neil Oatley 
    
McLaren 1992 2010 19 
 
Team Performance 23.8 23.66 -0.14 -0.0073684 
     
     
Rubens Barrichello 
    
Jordan  1993 1996 4 
 
Team Performance 0.2 5.29 5.09 1.2725 
     
Stewart 1997 1999 3 
 
Team Performance 1.35 8.65 7.3 2.43333333 
     
Ferrari 2000 2005 6 
 
Team Performance 39.35 13.55 -25.8 -4.3 
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Honda/Brawn 2006 2009 4 
 
Team Performance 12.25 26.73 14.48 3.62 





Team Performance 3.56 
 
3.56 3.56 
     
     
Ross Brawn 
    
Benetton 1992 1996 5 
 
Team Performance 21.87 16.35 -5.52 -1.104 
     
Ferrari 1997 2006 10 
 
Team Performance 23.78 28.63 4.85 0.485 
     
Honda B 2007 2009 3 
 
Team Performance 1.35 26.73 25.38 8.46 





Team Performance 11.15 
 
11.15 11.15 
     
     
Jean Todt 
    
Ferrari 1994 2007 14 
 
Team Performance 17.67 45.84 11.15 0.79642857 
     
     
Luca Di Montezemolo 
    
Ferrari 1992 2010 19 0.8205263 
Team Performance 5.04 20.63 15.53 
 
     
     
Flavio Briatore 
    
Benetton 21.87 2.26 -19.61 
 
Team Performance 
    
 
2002 2008 7 
 
Renault 5.4 11.4 6 0.85 
Team Performance 
    
     
Michael Schumacher 
    
Benetton 1992 1995 4 2.5725 




     
Ferrari 1996 2006 11 1.072 
Team Performance 16.83 28.63 11.8 
 








     
     
Luca Badoer  
    
Scuderia Italia 1993 
   
Team Performance 
    








     
Forti 1996 
   
Team Performance 
    
















     
     
Frank Williams 
    
Williams 1992 2010 19 -1.887 
Team Performance 39.42 3.56 -35.86 
 
     
     
Stefano Domenicali 
    
Ferrari 1995 2010 16 0.218 
Team Performance 17.14 20.63 3.49 
 
     
     
Tim Densham 
    
Tyrrell 1992 1998 
  
Team Performance 0 0 
  
     
Benetton 1999 2001 3 -0.53 
Team Performance 3.85 2.26 -1.59 
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Renault 2002 2010 9 0.366 
Team Performance 5.2 8.5 3.3 
 
     
     
Giancarlo Fisichella 








     
Benetton 1998 2001 4 -1.4175 
Team Performance 7.93 2.26 -5.67 
 
     
Renault 2005 2007 3 -4.806 
Team Performance 25.88 11.46 -14.42 
 
     
Force India 2008 
   
Team Performance 0 
   
     
Ferrari 2009 2010 2 5.33 
Team Performance 9.97 20.63 10.66 
 
     
     
Mark Smith 
    
Jordan 1992 2000 9 0.415 
Team Performance 0.2 3.94 3.74 
 








     
Renault 2002 2004 3 3.25 
Team Performance 5.2 14.96 9.76 
 
     
Jordan 2005 
   
Team Performance 1.69 
   
     
Red Bull 2005 2008 4 -0.12 
Team Performance 4.61 4.13 -0.48 
 
     
Force India 2009 2010 2 0.75 
Team Performance 2 3.5 1.5 
 
     
     
Patrick Head 
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Williams 1992 2010 19 -1.887 
Team Performance 39.42 3.56 -35.86 
 
     
     
Ron Meadows 
    
BAR 2001 2005 5 0.26 
Team Performance 3.85 5.15 1.3 
 
     
Honda 2006 2009 3 4.823 
Team Performance 12.25 26.73 14.48 
 





Team Performance 11.15 
 
11.15 11.15 
     
     
Jarno Trulli 
    
Minardi 1997 
   
Team Performance 
    
     
Prost 1997 1999 3 0.7 
Team Performance 0 2.1 2.1 
 
     
Jordan 2000 2001 2 0.18 
Team Performance 3.94 4.3 0.36 
 
     
Renault 2002 2004 3 3.25 
Team Performance 5.2 14.96 9.76 
 
     
Toyota 2004 2009 6 1.32 
Team Performance 1.3 9.25 7.95 
 
     
Lotus 2010 
   
Team Performance 
    
     
     
Craig Wilson 








     
Williams 1998 2002 5 2.336 
Team Performance 9.13 20.81 11.68 
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BAR 2003 2005 3 0.32 
Team Performance 4.17 5.15 0.98 
 
     
Honda 2006 2008 3 -3.3 
Team Performance 12.25 2 -10.25 
 





Team Performance 11.15 
 
11.15 11.15 
     
     
Dominic Harlow 
    
Jordan 2003 2005 3 -0.15 
Team Performance 2.08 1.63 -0.45 
 
     
Spyker 2006 2007 
  
Team Performance 0 0 
  
     
Force India 2008 2010 3 0.6 






















Appendix 3 Performance of bottom thirty nodes  










Team Performance 0 
 
0 0      
Footwork 1994 1995 1 
 
Team Performance 2.2 1.1 -1.1 -1.1      
     
Patrick Friesacher 





Team Performance 0.9 
 
0.8 0.8      
     
Hideki Noda 





Team Performance 0.48 
 
-0.24 -0.24      
     
Nicholas Wirth 
    
Simtek 1994 1995 2 
 
Team Performance 0 0 0 0      
Benetton 1996 1999 4 
 
Team Performance 16.35 3.85 -12.5 -3.125      
     
Richard Taylor 
    
Simtek 1994 1995 2 
 
Tea Performance 0 0 0 0      
     
Domenico Schiattarella 
    
Simtek 1994 1995 2 
 
Team Performance 0 0 0 0      
     
Andrea Chiesa 







0 0 0      




    
Tyrrell 1991 1992 1 
 
Team Performance 3 1.44 -1.56 -1.56      
     
Denis Nursey 
    
Tyrrell 1991 1992 1 
 
Team Performance 3 1.44 -1.56 -1.56      
     
John Creak 
    
Footwork 1994 1995 1 
 
Team Performance 2.2 1.1 -1.1 -1.1      
     
Eric Van De Poele 
    
Brabham 1991 1992 1 
 
Team Performance 0.7 0 -0.7 -0.7      
     
Trevor Sheumack 
    
Fondmental 1991 1992 1 
 
Team Performance 0 0 0 0      
     
Erik Bernard 
    
Lotus 1993 1994 1 
 
Team Performance 2.9 0 -2.9 -2.9      
     
Jean-Pierce Chatenet 
    
Lotus 1993 1994 1 
 
Team Performance 2.9 0 -2.9 -2.9      
     
Peter Wyss 
    
Fondmental 1991 1992 1 
 
Team Performance 0 0 0 0      
     
Robert Dassaud 
    
Ligier 1991 1992 1 
 
Team Performance 0 1.4 1.4 1.4      




    
Larrousse 1991 1992 1 
 
Team Performance 0.4 0.24 -0.16 -0.16      
     
Glanfranco Palazzoli 
    




0 0 0      
     
Eric Guilloud 
    
Larrousse 1991 1992 1 
 
Team Performance 0.4 0.24 -0.16 -0.16      
     
Eric Vullemin 
    
Lotus 1993 1994 1 
 
Team Performance 2.9 0 -2.9 -2.9      
Jean-Pierre Paoli 
    
Ligier 1991 1992 1 
 
Team Performance 0 1.4 1.4 1.4      
     
Darry Hindenoch 
    
Lotus 1993 1994 1 
 
Team Performance 2.9 0 -2.9 -2.9      
     
Shinji Nakano 
    
Prost 1996 1997 
  
Team Performance 0 0 
 
0      
     
Gordon Coppuck 
    




0.7 0.7 0.7      
     
Dave Luckett 
    




0.7 0.7 0.7      
     
Tino Holloway 
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Larrousse 1991 1992 1 
 
Team Performance 0.4 0.24 -0.16 -0.16      
     
Philippe Alliot 
    
Larrousse 1991 1992 1 
 
Team Performance 0.4 0.24 -0.16 -0.16      
     
Henny Vollenberg 
    
Larrousse 1991 1992 1 
 
Team Performance 0.4 0.24 -0.16 -0.16      
     
Brendan Gribben 
    
Larrousse 1991 1992 1 
 
Team Performance 0.4 0.24 -0.16 -0.16      
     
Jerry Bond 
    




0.7 0.7 0.7      
     
Carlo Gancia 























Appendix 4 Performance of top thirty nodes in technical roles 
  
Year Joined Year left (after finishing the season) Net Effect 
Mike Gascoyne 
    
Sauber 1992 1993 2 
 
Team Performance 0 2.8 2.8 1.4      
Tyrrell 1994 1997 4 
 
Team Performance 3.1 0.4 -2.7 -0.675      
Jordan 1998 2000 3 
 
Team Performance 8.18 3.94 -4.24 -1.41333      
Benetton/Renault 2001 2003 3 
 
Team Performance 2.26 14.1 11.84 3.946667      
Toyota 2004 2006 3 
 
Team Performance 1.3 5 3.7 1.233333      
     
Andrew Alsworth 
    
Benetton 1992 1998 7 
 
Team Performance 21.87 7.93 -13.94 -1.99143      
BAR 1999 2005 7 
 
Team Performance 0 11.92 11.92 1.702857      
Honda/Brawn 2006 2009 4 
 
Team Performance 5.15 26.73 21.58 5.395      
Alan Permane 
    
Benetton 1992 2001 10 
 
Team Performance 21.87 2.26 -19.61 -1.961      
Renault 2002 2008 7 
 
Team Performance 5.2 11.4 6.2 0.885714      
     
Steve Nielsen 
    
Tyrrell 1992 1997 6 
 
Team Performance 1.44 0.4 -1.04 -0.17333      
Benetton 2000 2001 2 
 
Team Performance 4.62 2.26 -2.36 -1.18 
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Renault 2002 2009 8 
 
Team Performance 5.2 5.36 0.16 0.02      
Luigi Mazzola  
    
Ferrari 1992 2010 19 
 
Team Performance 5.14 20.63 15.49 0.815263      
     
Dickie Stanford 
    
Williams 1992 2010 19 
 
Team Performance 39.42 3.56 -35.86 -1.88737      
     
Mattia Binotto 
    
Ferrari 1995 2010 16 
 
Team Performance 17.1 20.63 3.53 0.220625      
     
Jock Clear 
    
Williams 1995 1998 4 
 
Team Performance 26.3 9.13 -17.17 -4.2925      
BAR 1999 2005 7 
 
Team Performance 0 5.15 5.15 0.735714      
Honda/Brawn 2006 2009 4 
 





Team Performance 11.15 
 
11.15 11.15      
     
Pat Symonds  
    
Benetton 1992 2001 10 
 
Team Performance 21.87 2.26 -19.61 -1.961      
Renault  2002 2010 9 
 
Team Performance 5.2 8.5 3.3 0.366667      
     
Rory Byrne 
    
Benetton 1992 1996 5 
 
Team Performance 21.87 16.35 -5.52 -1.104 
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Ferrari 1997 2007 11 
 
Team Performance 23.78 45.84 22.06 2.005455      
     
Adrian Newey 
    
Williams 1992 1996 5 
 
Team Performance 39.42 42.07 2.65 0.53      
McLaren 1997 2005 9 
 
Team Performance 14.25 24.66 10.41 1.156667      
Red Bull 2006 2010 5 
 
Team Performance 2.28 25.92 23.64 4.728      
     
Ron Dennis 
    
McLaren 1992 2010 19 
 
Team Performance 23.8 23.66 -0.14 -0.00737      
     
Neil Oatley 
    
McLaren 1992 2010 19 
 
Team Performance 23.8 23.66 -0.14 -0.00737      
     
Ross Brawn 
    
Benetton 1992 1996 5 
 
Team Performance 21.87 16.35 -5.52 -1.104      
Ferrari 1997 2006 10 
 
Team Performance 23.78 28.63 4.85 0.485      
Honda B 2007 2009 3 
 





Team Performance 11.15 
 
11.15 11.15      
     
Stefano Domenicali 
    
Ferrari 1995 2010 16 0.218 
Team Performance 17.14 20.63 3.49 
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Tim Densham 
    
Tyrrell 1992 1998 
  
Team Performance 0 0 
  
     
Benetton 1999 2001 3 -0.53 
Team Performance 3.85 2.26 -1.59 
 
     
Renault 2002 2010 9 0.366 
Team Performance 5.2 8.5 3.3 
 
     
     
Mark Smith 
    
Jordan 1992 2000 9 0.415 
Team Performance 0.2 3.94 3.74 
 








     
Renault 2002 2004 3 3.25 
Team Performance 5.2 14.96 9.76 
 
     
Jordan 2005 
   
Team Performance 1.69 
   
     
Red Bull 2005 2008 4 -0.12 
Team Performance 4.61 4.13 -0.48 
 
     
Force India 2009 2010 2 0.75 
Team Performance 2 3.5 1.5 
 
     
     
Patrick Head 
    
Williams 1992 2010 19 -1.887 
Team Performance 39.42 3.56 -35.86 
 
     
     
Ron Meadows 
    
BAR 2001 2005 5 0.26 
Team Performance 3.85 5.15 1.3 
 
     
Honda 2006 2009 3 4.823 
Team Performance 12.25 26.73 14.48 
 







Team Performance 11.15 
 
11.15 11.15      
     
Craig Wilson 








     
Williams 1998 2002 5 2.336 
Team Performance 9.13 20.81 11.68 
 
     
BAR 2003 2005 3 0.32 
Team Performance 4.17 5.15 0.98 
 
     
Honda 2006 2008 3 -3.3 
Team Performance 12.25 2 -10.25 
 





Team Performance 11.15 
 
11.15 11.15      
     
Dominic Harlow 
    
Jordan 2003 2005 3 -0.15 
Team Performance 2.08 1.63 -0.45 
 
     
Spyker 2006 2007 
  
Team Performance 0 0 
  
     
Force India 2008 2010 3 0.6 


















Appendix 5 Performance of top thirty drivers 
  





    
Benetton 1992 1995 4 2.5725 
Team Performance 21.87 32.16 10.29 
 
     
Ferrari 1996 2006 11 1.072 
Team Performance 16.83 28.63 11.8 
 








     
     
Luca Badoer  
    
Scuderia Italia 1993 
   
Team Performance 
    








     
Forti 1996 
   
Team Performance 
    
















     
     
Rubens Barrichello 
    
Jordan  1993 1996 4 
 
Team Performance 0.2 5.29 5.09 1.2725      
Stewart 1997 1999 3 
 
Team Performance 1.35 8.65 7.3 2.433333      
Ferrari 2000 2005 6 
 
Team Performance 39.35 13.55 -25.8 -4.3      
Honda/Brawn 2006 2009 4 
 
Team Performance 12.25 26.73 14.48 3.62 
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Team Performance 3.56 
 
3.56 3.56      
     
Giancarlo Fisichella 








     
Benetton 1998 2001 4 -1.4175 
Team Performance 7.93 2.26 -5.67 
 
     
Renault 2005 2007 3 -4.806 
Team Performance 25.88 11.46 -14.42 
 
     
Force India 2008 
   
Team Performance 0 
   
     
Ferrari 2009 2010 2 5.33 
Team Performance 9.97 20.63 10.66 
 
     
     
Jarno Trulli 









     
Prost 1998 1999 2 0.95 
Team Performance 0.2 2.1 1.9 
 
     
Jordan 2000 2001 2 0.18 
Team Performance 3.94 4.3 0.36 
 
     
Renault 2002 2004 3 3.253333 
Team Performance 5.2 14.96 9.76 
 
     
Toyota 2005 2009 6 -0.445 
Team Performance 11.92 9.25 -2.67 
 









     
     
David Coulthard 
    
Williams  1994 1995 2 -1.035 
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Team Performance 28.36 26.29 -2.07 
 
     
McLaren 1996 2004 9 -0.21667 
Team Performance 11.78 9.83 -1.95 
 
     
Red Bull 2005 2008 4 -0.12 
Team Performance 4.61 4.13 -0.48 
 
     
     
Fernando Alonso 









     
Renault  2003 2006 4 3.8 
Team Performance 14.1 29.3 15.2 
 






    
     
Renault 2008 2009 2 -3.7 
Team Performance 11.4 4 -7.4 
 
     
Ferrari 
 
2010 1 10.66 
Team Performance 9.97 20.63 10.66 
 
     
     
Mark Webber 
    
Minardi 
 





     
Jaguar 2003 2004 2 -0.73 
Team Performance 2.88 1.42 -1.46 
 
     
Williams 2005 2006 2 -3.685 
Team Performance 8.94 1.57 -7.37 
 
     
Red Bull  2007 2010 4 5.14 
Team Performance 5.39 25.95 20.56 
 
     
     
Jenson Button 
    
Williams 
 
2000 1 -0.08 
Team Performance  8.41 8.33 -0.08 
 





2001 1 -2.36 
Team Performance 4.62 2.26 -2.36 
 
     
Renault  
 





     
BAR 2003 2005 3 0.326667 
Team Performance 4.17 5.15 0.98 
 
     
Honda/Brawn GP 2006 2009 4 3.62 
Team Performance 12.25 26.73 14.48 
 
     
McLaren 
 
2010 1 12.63 
Team Performance 11.03 23.66 12.63 
 
     
     
Olivier Panis 
    
Ligier  1994 1996 3 0.166667 
Team Performance 3.1 3.6 0.5 
 
     
Prost 1997 1999 3 0.066667 
Team Performance 0 0.2 0.2 
 
     
BAR 2001 2002 2 -1.135 
Team Performance 3.85 1.58 -2.27 
 
     
Toyota 2003 2005 3 3.12 
Team Performance 2.56 11.92 9.36 
 
     
     
Pedro De La Rosa 
    
Arrows 1999 2000 2 
 
Team Performance 0 0 0 
 
     
Jaguar 2001 2002 2 -0.115 
Team Performance 2.04 1.81 -0.23 
 
     
McLaren 2003 2009 7 -1.67571 
Team Performance 22.76 11.03 -11.73 
 
     
Sauber 
 
2010 1 -3.3 
Team Performance 5.59 2.29 -3.3 
 
     




    
Sauber 
 
2002 1 -2.6 
Team Performance 5 2.4 -2.6 
 
     
Sauber  2004 2005 2 -1.15 
Team Performance 5 2.7 -2.3 
 
     
Ferrari 2006 2010 5 -1.6 
Team Performance 28.63 20.63 -8 
 
     
     
Nick Heidfeld 
    
Prost  
 
2000 1 -2.1 
Team Performance 2.1 0 -2.1 
 
     
Sauber 2001 2003 3 -0.66667 
Team Performance 5 3 -2 
 
     
Jordan 
 
2004 1 -1.38 
Team Performance 2.08 0.7 -1.38 
 
     
Williams 
 
2005 1 -3.59 
Team Performance 12.53 8.94 -3.59 
 
     
Sauber/BMW 2006 2010 5 -0.574 
Team Performance 5.1 2.23 -2.87 
 
     
     
Kimi Raikkonen 
    
Sauber 
 
2001 1 3.7 
Team Performance 1.3 5 3.7 
 
     
McLaren  2002 2006 5 0.194 
Team Performance 14.7 15.67 0.97 
 
     
Ferrari 2007 2009 3 -11.9567 
Team Performance 45.84 9.97 -35.87 
 
     
     
Anthony Davidson 
    
BAR 
 
2002 1 -2.27 
Team Performance 3.85 1.58 -2.27 
 
     
BAR 
 
2005 1 -11.79 
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Team Performance 16.94 5.15 -11.79 
 
     
Super Aguri 2007 2008 2 -0.445 
Team Performance 0.89 0 -0.89 
 
     
     
Christian Klien 
    
Jaguar 
 
2004 1 -1.46 
Team Performance 2.88 1.42 -1.46 
 
     
Red Bull 2005 2006 2 -1.165 
Team Performance 4.61 2.28 -2.33 
 
     
Honda 
 
2007 1 -10.9 
Team Performance 12.25 1.35 -10.9 
 
     
     
Mika Hakkinen 
    
Team Lotus 
 
1992 2 1.2 
Team Performance 0.7 3.1 2.4 
 
     
McLaren 1993 2001 8 0.36125 
Team Performance 20.19 23.08 2.89 
 
     
     
Jacques Villeneuve 
    
Williams 1996 1998 3 -10.98 
Team Performance 42.07 9.13 -32.94 
 
     
BAR 1999 2003 5 0.834 
Team Performance 0 4.17 4.17 
 
     
Renault  
 
2004 1 0.86 
Team Performance 14.1 14.96 0.86 
 
     
Sauber 2005 2006 2 1.2 
Team Performance 2.7 5.1 2.4 
 
     
     
Adrian Sutil 









     
Spyker 
 







     
Force India 2008 2010 3 1.166667 
Team Performance 0 3.5 3.5 
 
     
     
Ralf Schumacher 
    
Jordan 1997 1998 2 0.355 
Team Performance 7.47 8.18 0.71 
 
     
Williams 1999 2004 6 0.686667 
Team Performance 8.41 12.53 4.12 
 
     
Toyota 2005 2007 3 -3 
Team Performance 11.92 2.92 -9 
 
     
     
Takuma Sato 
    
Jordan 
 
2002 1 -2.3 
Team Performance 4.3 2 -2.3 
 
     
BAR 2003 2005 3 0.326667 
Team Performance 4.17 5.15 0.98 
 
     
Super Aguri 2006 2008 3 
 






















Appendix 6 Interview Questionnaire 
 
1. In your experience, is knowledge transfer a motivation behind strategic alliance in 
Formula 1?  
1.1 (If yes) what are the processes that facilitate this transfer of knowledge? 
1.2 (If no) what motivates firms to get into alliances? 
2. What factors affect this process? 
2.1. Do you this industry variables of competition, evolution, and technology 
adequately cover the effect of industry on the knowledge transfer process? 
2.2. What other variables effect this process? 
3. What role does the nature of knowledge (tacit or explicit) play in this process? 
3.1. Does the nature of knowledge affect the choices of Formula 1 team in alliances? 
4. Do you think prior alliance have a bearing on this process of knowledge transfer? 
5. Does the closeness of knowledge to core competencies of the source the source firm 
affect the process? 
6. What role does a firm’s absorptive capacity play in this process? 
7. Are there any other dimensions that afffect the knowledge transfer process?  
8. Do these factors and dimensions affect the success of knowledge transfer process? 
9. Does directionality play any role in the success of knowledge transfer process? 




















Interviewee 1 is Professor of Business Strategy at an internationally renowned British 
university and has been involved in Formula 1 research for two decades. His research focuses 
on the areas of competitive strategy and innovation. He has published extensively on 




Interviewee 1: Hi Danish.  
 
Author:  Hello Professor. How are you? 
 
Interviewee 1: Very good?  
 
Interviewee 1: How are you?  
 
Author: Good as well thank you though do I do have...I am suffering from a cold so my voice 
might sound funny. Sorry about that.  
 
Interviewee 1: No problem.  
 
Author: Yes, so I wouldn't waste your time and I'd straight away get to the question. So starting 
with the first question. So, in your experience what would you say that is the main motivation 
behind the formation of strategic alliances in Formula 1?  
 
Interviewee 1: Well I guess on one level to win races. That's what they're doing, a Formula 1 
car is in alliance. And that's Or they will make whatever partnerships are going to allow them, 
help them to perform on the track. I mean we've, we're seeing a very good example of this 
playing out at the moment with Red Bull. Yes you know were what actually they're trying to 
do is to find a new alliance having found themselves in a situation where the partner isn't 
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sufficiently competitive. So fundamentally that that's what it's all about. It's trying to access 
capability, resources that they otherwise wouldn't be able to have.  
Author: Okay. And do you think that all this ties into a knowledge transfer.  
 
Interviewee 1: Yeah. Whether its knowledge transfer in the sense of knowhow going from one 
to the other, not necessarily because essentially what they're getting is knowledge that they 
don't have. So thats why you know otherwise they'd build their own power units so they need 
someone to do the power unit but knowledge transfer tends to go on more in the way of how 
you apply these different technologies so. So clearly there has to be some shared understanding 
of the challenges of aero dynamics for example in designing a power unit.  
 
Author: Absolutely.  
 
Interviewee 1: You need to be cognizant and sharing ideas. So knowledge is moving between 
the partners in that sense but not in the sense of a technology moving sort of all in a job from 
one area to another and move on.  
 
Author: Okay. Yeah that makes sense. And as you've already pointed out the main motivation 
for this is to win races that's all that Formula 1 is about. When these collaborations happen, 
how do think that you know what are the processes through which you know the engine 
designer understands, the engine manufacturer understands the aerodynamics in more linear 
construction of cars.  
 
Interviewee 1: So yeah I think the way it works is once a partnership is agreed at a senior level 
then these myriad of connections people within the organization and worked together to make 
things happen. So you know for example. You know every team will have a Pirelli Engineer 
working closely with them around the tyres, the temperatures, how much tyres are working and 
that person works for Pirelli but also they are dedicated on the relationship with Mercedes, 
Williams or whoever to make that work so it operates at all those different levels. Once it's 
agreed that we work together on this, they're very good, I think then getting that right the way 
through the organization. Even someone like Mercedes Benz H P P who provide the power 
units. They clearly will work with the Mercedes Benz chassis team, the main team if you like 




Interviewee 1: It's all happens next year you know so they have their customers and they will 
treat those customers you know perhaps not quite at the level of the works team but they will 
treat them very well and are just as enthusiastic about helping them with their performance as 
they may be with Works team.  
 
AuthorOkay. And what factors do you see affecting this process where personal are moving 
around. You know they have shared goals in terms of winning races.  
 
Interviewee 1: What do you mean in terms of...  
 
Author: This process of exchanging information. So if Mercedes Benz is working with say 
Manor next year they have the contract down, so what factors would affect that process of 
collaboration.  
 
Interviewee 1: Well the paradox is motorsport valley as a cluster. The paradox of the cost is 
because people move around the knowledge groups around the cluster even as people around 
different organizations. So people know other people and they know the people work. That's 
part of the cost. Those networks that you develop and build up so. So you know the fact that 
someone who moves from one team to another what it often means is generally although there 
have been one or two high profile examples as this. Generally it's not IP that is being taken in 
the form designs or whatever. But it's knowhow because it's people that have the knowhow so. 
So knowhow does get moved around does get you know when I was at Mercedes we did this 
and when I was at Red Bull we did this because part of people's value in the labour market is 
clearly if they're in a world championship team then people often look to recruit those people 
in the assumption that they will get some of that that competitive potential, competitive 
capability that they have.  
 
Author: Yes. Yeah that makes complete sense. So as as part of my research. I've been mainly 
focusing on in terms of what you know what industry variables are affecting this process, this 
process of alliances. By industry variables I mean competition, how competition affect, how 
the technology involved affect. So potentially Williams, for Williams it'll be be very expensive 
and probably technologically speaking improbable to make their own engine. So they go to 
Mercedes and in the process of evolution, so Williams have been following a curve in terms of 
revolution of their technological capabilities so they are very good at making their; you know 
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electronic management system engine management system. So I'm asking that that apart from 
these three variables that I am looking at do you think you know they adequately cover these 
three variables between them among them. 
 
Interviewee 1: No I think there's another one which is regulation. 
 
Author: Okay okay.  
 
Interviewee 1: And regulation as you've seen with the shift to the one point six litre energy 
recovery system units could change the balance of competition, can change the direction of the 
evolution of technology. So the direct regulatory intervention is often what creates the 
disruption, not always you know. So for example we saw back in the 80s Renault in using the 
existing regulations we've said that you could have a three litre normally aspirated or one point 
five litre turbo, and they create a disruption by doing that in other cases the disruption was 
created by the rate changes in regulation.  
 
Author: Okay.  
 
Interviewee 1: So I think I think to me from what you you just described the regulation will 
change the need for alliances, different relationships. The most obvious one is with the KERS 
with the energy recovery systems.  
 
Author: Yeah. Yeah. That makes sense. So regulation is something which I should have a look 
at them. Moving on. As you were mentioning you know people move around and they carry 
their know how with them. So that's really tacit knowledge that's what we are talking about 
here. So I'm just wondering how important a role, do you think does tacit knowledge plays in 
these alliances in this process of transferring your expertise from one team to another.  
 
Interviewee 1: Well I guess there's two different things. When you say transferring from one 
team to another, what do you mean? Is it the knowledge going from Mercedes to Williams or 
do you mean the knowledge going from Williams to Mercedes high performance power trains.  
 




Interviewee 1: Yeah. Because it's an interesting one because essentially when someone takes 
a partner, so for example take Xtract as an example. Yes. They do a lot of gears.  
 
Author: Yeah yeah.  
 
Interviewee 1: I mean technology. Then Xtract absorbs tacit knowledge by working with some 
teams. Yeah. And then are able to apply it and working with others so. So in that sense it gets 
moved from the alliance partner working with a number of different teams even though as we 
said you know there's no IP, there's no there's no laws being breached. No confidentiality is 
being breached but essentially what they're doing. So like a lot of consultants, is selling know 
how. Industry is part of what you're buying when you buy their products.  
 
Author: So it's very interesting that you've pointed out Xract because I've been in touch with 
them. I'm also doing a survey as part of my research. I've sent them the survey/ So do you think 
the knowledge that they have gained from working with these Formula 1 constructors and 
engine manufacturers and what not and they've tried to apply it in to the gearboxes they are 
trying to manufacture for road cars, production cars.  
 
Interviewee 1: Well yes. Yeah. Because Xtract's model, business model was to take exactly 
that. To move the technology because the technology started off in Rally cross that's where the 
original sort of gearbox which is more like a motorcycle gearbox in terms of how how it how 
it works. And they took that into Formula 1. They took it into touring cars. It took in two other 
four wheeler. And that's exactly their business model. To take a concept and developing one 
area then introduce it in other forms of motorsports.  
 
Author: Okay. And I would imagine that and this kind of association with you know and with 
Formula 1 teams in past if you have past alliances if you have a history of working with 
Formula 1 organization it plays into your favour when you go looking for business.  
 
Interviewee 1: Yes it can do. It can do it but its technology that can deliver. Yeah. It's 
appropriate. 
 




Interviewee 1: So it goes you know for example you know it may be its all aerodynamics. It 
may be far less important in other race series than something like a gearbox. Yes which is a lot 
more transferable as a technology.  
 
Author: Absolutely. Yeah. The same can be said about turbos as well. So building up on this. 
Let's say, I mean this, this case of McLaren and Mercedes, they had a very long partnership 
before they parted their ways in 2014. Some would say not a very wise decision. But Honda, 
on part of McLaren because Honda has not been doing very well this season.  
 
Interviewee 1: Yeah of course it's an interesting history to the whole thing. Yes. Going back 
to the Brawn… 
 
Author: Yeah. So going back to that association between Mercedes and McLaren. How much 
do you think McLaren has benefited in terms of their production car plans because they are 
manufacturing their own engine. As far as I am aware the three point six or eight litre turbo 
that they got in their road cars.  
 
Interviewee 1: I don't know the answer to that. Generally they transfer far less than we might 
suppose, between Formula 1 and automotive because the economics of it are totally different. 
So I don't know the answer to that. And you know. I'm not sure because you know the 
Briksworth operation clearly which was an acquisition as well like Mercedes. McLaren would 
know a lot of that in terms of Formula 1. How that would transfer it to roads, I'm not sure. 
Because the economics are totally different.  
 
Author: Okay. Yeah. Yeah that makes sense because I was thinking in terms of when firms 
get into alliances within Formula 1. Suppose Williams is you know offering their i.t. services 
or engine management services the electronics expertise to another team in Formula 1. How 
much would they be thinking in terms of protecting their core competencies? Because this is 
what sort of distinguishes, makes them stand out.  
 
Interviewee 1: Oh well yeah. I think they're very clear about that. The technology they're 
offering they would see is pretty much obsolete. Well not obsolete necessarily but because they 
know what they're working on in the future which is the source of advantage, the other 
innovative ideas so they will look to capitalize, make generate value out of technology but they 
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will be very sure that they're not you know giving any of the crown jewels away in doing that. 
So for example Williams provided gearbox or was it formula three at one time and it also done 
deal with Manor to provide the gearbox and again for them it's a cost saving exercise for both 
of them. Right now it's giving Williams a bit of revenue stream, and in Manor they don't have 
the cost of doing it themselves. So that works. But they they wouldn't do it if they felt there 
was anything giving any competitive advantage away because nowadays you see gearboxes 
are fairly well regulated and they're like engines used to be. So they're fairly standardized, they 
have a fixed number. They've got set dimensions the gears have got to be made to. And so there 
isn't a lot of competitive advantage that can be gained in that particular area.  
 
Author: So moving on from this topic to next related topic that is of absorptive capacity. So 
for a team like Manor Marussia, they're getting into alliance with Williams as you said they're 
going to supply a gearbox, Mercedes is planning to supply the engine. Because technologically 
Mercedes engine that they will get next year is quite well ahead of the Ferrari engine they're 
using from last year. How much do you think that that would affect their ability to absorb this 
new technology and make it work?  
 
Interviewee 1: Yeah I think. It's always a problem which is why Red Bull are getting in to a 
bit of a very difficult situation because of course the design of the car has got to optimize the 
power unit and all the [power units are different. So generally work will start on the new car as 
soon as the existing one is launched. Yeah that really gets underway towards the middle of the 
season. So July August time was when they really sort of get going with it and of course the 
further down the line you go without knowing what how you're actually going to be designing 
around. It totally compromises your ability to progress the development of the car. So I think 
there will be different challenges in every way both in building up relationships clearly with 
understanding how the different organizations work that they've now got to interface with and 
understanding you know some of the technological characteristics that might be distinctive that 
they need to recognize the way they develop their car to match the power unit.  
 
Author: That's very interesting. And what other dimensions, I mean we have already talked 
about absorptive capacity and closeness to their core competencies, prior alliances and tacit 
knowledge. Do you think this process of alliance and the process of knowledge transfer, does 




Interviewee 1: Well it's all as you say about knowledge. There is also an external facing aspect 
here from the one about the compatibility. The complementarities in terms of brand and market. 
So I think that's one of Renault's problems with Red Bull of course because Red Bull’s 
sponsorship is from Infinity. Nissan's luxury car brand. And which basically overshadowed 
sort of Renault relationship so I think there is something about this sort of market pricing in 
formula 1 because it is also a shop window for these organizations there is something about 
alignment and complementarity. I mean even if you think about Ferrari you've got this sort of 
colour coding of organizations you know. Ferrari and Shell, colour coding a line because of 
the colours of the brands. So there is there is also this external facing element to it. I think it's 
in there as well.  
 
Author: Yeah. And now the rumour mill is churning out that Aston Martin you know might 
take over Force India and they will get the name. Aston Martin F1 team because owners cannot 
pay back the loan they got from Diagio. So this is really interesting and very helpful professor. 
Moving on the last part of the interview which is about the success of you know getting 
knowledge and transferring knowledge in these alliances. So any other factors I mean other 
than the variables and the dimensions that we have talked about any other factors that you think 
in your opinion affect this process.  
 
Interviewee 1: And what is the process?  
 
Author: By process I mean the alliance growing together, working together, getting 
technology, getting engine manufacturers, building their chasis, sticking them together, and 
doing the system integration and making it all work.  
 
Interviewee 1Yeah I think if you think of it multileveled ie there is knowledge these 
relationships as people coming, all those teams coming together that those organizations come 
together. So I think I think as long as you're looking at those different levels then are these 
internal capabilities aligning. And what I'm sort of also like there is there is also an external 
base element to it I think. Yeah I think that that that sort of high level pretty much covers it.  
 
Author: Okay. And what do you think is easier for Formula 1 to collaborate with automotive 
manufacturer and take some of the innovative stuff that they are working and implement it 
within the realm of F1 rather than automotive manufactures, I mean we were talking about 
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Xtract. Is it difficult for Xtract, is it difficult, more difficult for Xtract to take technology from 
F1 gear boxes and implement for production.  
 
Interviewee 1: Yeah I think the interesting thing, the interesting anomaly about Formula 1 and 
more motorsport more general is generally in the prototype business. So they're in what I guess 
you you sometimes hear referred to as the Valley of Death. Yes. Was tween this sort of early 
discovery concept and manufacturing, you got this sort of concept prototype development and 
all that. So they are they are different very different capabilities. They have different business 
models and that means that actually for example if you look to motorsport often that the 
connections are not in automotive movement because of the scale and the costs that many 
needed they are actually more often in areas like aerospace, defense solution where you go 
looking at faster rates you're looking for more innovation you're looking for less mass 
production you're looking at constant development, more in those kind of industries than you 
often are in the automotive industry. So yes there are sort of overlaps in connections but 
actually in terms of compatibility of those capabilities Well actually it's more in say aerospace 
and defense perhaps than it is in automotive.  
 
Interviewee 1: Now there is this interesting example of Honda who in their previous forays 
into Formula 1 famously rotate engineers all through the years. And therefore. But therefore 
what they're looking at is a kind of capability development. In other words they're not looking 
into an idea they put on the road cars and they want those engineers to be more adaptive more 
innovative faster be more time sensitive with how they think about here. And that's the benefit 
they get from sort of dipping them into the F1 process. Generally these days because it's so 
specialist you do see less of that. So Mercedes rather than you know building how units 
themselves they acquire the specialist provider and there is a little bit of you know people can 
get seconded and so on this looks a bit like go on but not to the same level as perhaps it was in 
the 80s and 90s.  
 
Author: That is very helpful. So you would say tech in flow in Formula 1 so to speak, I mean 
there's that famous example of McLaren and Hercules aerospace working on carbon fibre 
chassis together. So you would think tech inflow is more from these aerospace and defense 




Interviewee 1: Well possibly but I think it's the interesting thing inflow implies that these 
aerospace people is promoting and seeing these opportunities. Absolutely not. F1 people are 
trying to solve problems to make the car go faster. Therefore they're looking wherever they can 
find a technology an idea that would help make the car go faster. So they're looking across the 
piece of software technology video gaming you know in terms of all the simulations they're 
looking in all these places to get ideas to help them improve their performance so it's their drive 
to innovate and improve this. It's making them try and find these ideas and give them an 
advantage so they're looking everywhere way.  
 
Author: So to speak they are industry agnostic and they do not care as long as they can solve 
the problem.  
 
Interviewee 1: Exactly. Yeah. And so they but they're going to typically look at those 
industries that are a more leading edge more pushing technology. And generally in automotive 
that's not a lot of what they're doing. So they've got to look in the software in the high tech 
industries they're going to look as I was saying in these sort of aerospace industries where 
they're sort of at the leading edge where innovation is really finding new ways of doing things.  
 
Interviewee 1: I guess probably more closely in a way that people like you know like Tesla 
and like you know Apple and Google. Well more work should be focused and looking at some 
new firms. I think I think what they often do is they make use of some of their capability in 
areas like materials. So the automotive manufacturer and I know this what Ross said about the 
relationship between Fiat and Ferrari was that actually they made an effort in Ferrari to find 
out what capability they had in Fiat and how they could use that. One of the areas was some 
work they were doing on materials or new materials testing and all that kind of thing. So and 
so they will always look for those opportunities where they which can help them take the car 
that us.  
 
Author: And would this go on to explain the sort of relationship for example where McLaren 
was in relationship with GSK for a while.  
 
Interviewee 1: Yeah. Yeah exactly. Well that is GSK looking for ways to benefit because one 
time I think its GSK  had some consumer brands. Lucas a head and shoulders which in which 
they sold off. Now as I understand it the relationship is that people from the McLaren applied 
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technologies which of course is their technology transfer business. So not a Formula 1 team. 
McLaren spend time are allocated so many days to help GSK deal with some of the issues and 
problems they try to do with it. 
 
Author: Which is not necessarily linked to their F1 business.  
 
Interviewee 1: No no. I mean both McLaren and William have businesses that are focused on 
generating revenue from F1 which are based around transfer, McLaren’s is more sort of data 
driven. Williams’ a bit more sort of general engineering. But that's the role of those business 
units. So people feel they're working in Formula 1 but they're not really because the Formula 
1 team focused on Formula 1 cars and the idea of the current applied technologies Williams 
advanced engineering us they have a business unit that can support these other activities.  
 
Author: That's very helpful. The last question is what do you think is the critical factor in this 
process of getting the technology or knowledge and implementing it and succeeding..  
 
Interviewee 1: They are systems integrators you know they're not an expert in a particular 
technology. They're good at pooling and bringing in whatever technologies they need and 
integrating them into a race car. That's absolutely right. So so therefore they identify well with 
the use of this technology or we need a bit do this or let's try this out so 3D printing for example 
F1 teams had 3D printing in the 90s you know and now is everyone's discovering it. Yeah. it 
wasn't as fast or whatever it is now. But they're just searching for ways in which they can go 
from a design on a screen to create that model to put it in the wind tunnel to manufacturing a 
component. And so yeah they're always looking. And then they will always find ways. I think 
the biggest challenge is often cultural alignment. Because for example in defense industry is 
almost the cultural opposite to Formula 1. So I think that then becomes a key about how you 
can get this knowledge sharing working is finding that culture alignment so that these two 
organizations can work together. And typically you know as we've seen with someone like 
Mercedes you know they've done it in a more intelligent way. We saw when Ford bought Jaguar 
Racing or. Stewart for example you know that that they treat it as a separate business. They 
don't interfere with it. They don't over corporatise it. And that helps it align with its partners. 




Author: Yes. Yeah. I think that as you pointed out is very crucial. Thank you very much 
































Interviewee 2 is Associate Professor of Strategy based at a highly ranked British university. 
His research is focused on investigating the interplay of innovation, business models, and 
alliances on firm performance. He is considered one of the leading academic experts in the 
motorsport industry and his empirical fields of research are often based on Formula 1. 
 
Transcript: 
Author: Okay I guess this is recording.  
 
Interviewee 2: Okay. So number one strategic alliances knowledge transfer from no one. First 
question. In your experience is knowledge transfer and motivation behind strategic alliances 
imprinted on it. Yes it is for sure. And one of the processes that facilitates this transfers is 
knowledge. Well the process the processes are the fact that the companies are for example have 
been working for a long time so they know how each other work. I think for example long term 
alliances between manufacturers and engine producers. That is usually motivated by the fact 
that the companies are rigging each other and have some kind of routines in place. In this regard 
also on geographical co-location helps. So the fact that they are in the same area helps. This is 
for example the case why certain companies like Mercedes or Hass they still decided to move 
in the area where Formula one is, rather than working for example from US or why certain 
other cases companies like HRC SPANIA Racing did very poorly by keeping their facilities 
back in Spain. So these are definitely also the possibility of having people that formerly worked 
for the supplier and now works for example for a main team. That's a good way of creating 
knowledge transfer. Because they're the CEO and maybe that was not working out with Renault 
engine; and is now in the board of the team and so they know how to work.  
 
Author: So moving on, the three factors from industry's point of view that I am looking at are 
competition, technology involved and then pace of evolution of technology. Interviewee 1 
suggested that I should include regulation into that process because it plays a role...so what do 
you think about these variables and do you think they adequately cover what I'm trying to find 




Interviewee 2: Yeah they definitely. Very interesting very interesting aspect. I think they all 
play. They are all in these variables for sure competition for sure. Evolution, technological 
sophistication. Sure. Meaning when people enter into alliances because they think that 
somebody can do their job better than they do and because let's say you have a specialized 
brake producer like AP Racing and Brembo and they can come up with something which is 
more effective in a shorter time frame. Economies of scale can also help them produce more 
parts and so dig down the costs. The problem is that you know Formula One cars are prototypes 
or prototypical products. So they do very few common components. Very few parts very few 
models per year which means that in the end there are no economies of scale. So if another 
company makes millions of breaks has machinery to manufacture the right breaks. That's an 
advantage. 
 
Author: So you think that that plays an important role in when companies like Ferrari and 
McLaren think about sourcing their brakes from Brembo. 
 
Interviewee 2: I think there's an aspect that is related to innovation.  
 
Interviewee 2: So you can access valuable innovation many times you can also access valuable 
innovation that has been developed by your competitors. So let’s say a producer, an engine 
producer has developed a very good engine who is supplying this engine to your competitors. 
You want to enter in relationship with them because you want to have the same engine. I mean 
let's look at what happened last year. Red Bull ended up with a Renault engine 
underperforming. So the first thing they saw is that team like Williams said an excellent engine 
thanks to Mercedes. So they tried to break their relationship with Renault and move to 
Mercedes and Mercedes of course decided not to give the engine because otherwise there with 
their capabilities in aerodynamics of Red Bull and engine of Mercedes, they would have been 
a much tougher competitor. So yes this is one of the reasons I think the main reason why 
companies decide to create alliances.  
 
Author: So moving on the second part is about the dimensions of knowledge transfer. 
Basically I'm looking at tacitness, and you know tacit knowledge plays a huge role in 
performance, prior alliances, proximity to core competencies, and absorptive capacity. I want 
to take them one by one starting with tacit knowledge. In your opinion because I postulated the 
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movement of people which really affects the performance. Because they bring tacit knowledge 
with them.  
 
Interviewee 2: Yeah the knowledge is very important and I think it's important for two reasons. 
First of all because it's difficult to imitate because it is tacit so it's not codified. And also it 
copes very well with the need for secrecy that all Formula 1 teams have. So the fact that 
Formula One teams seldom patent anything for a fact that they don't have time to patent 
anything and they don't even have them you know it also doesn't make and also if they patented 
their solutions everybody will know. So they have to work with secrecy and tacit knowledge 
in how to do things is basically what drives innovation. Most of the time. This is why the 
quickest way to get...some type of innovation, some type of knowledge and put processes into 
one Formula 1 team; is to hire the people that in the companies you are trying to imitate was 
actually developing that specific process. So this is what creates that kind of you know inter-
firm mobility across highly skilled technicians or managers who then bring a set of knowledge 
that is not codified and that can be extremely useful.  
 
Author: So the next bit is prior alliances. You have already mentioned that you know 
companies tend to form alliance if they already have a history of working together. Can you 
explain things like breakdown of the relationship between Red Bull and Renault in that regard 
because they did win four world championships with Renault?  
 
Interviewee 2: I think they simply in fact I think things don't explain very well I think the Red 
Bull did something quite unreasonable to you know put the blame on Renault that quickly. I 
mean for sure. Renault engine was not delivering what they were expecting but after winning 
4 championship I think you can be a little more patient. I think they rushed quickly to the 
conclusion and ultimately they ruin th relationship there for some... for sack of availability, 
they will have to keep for another year. So I in fact I don't think there was a very smart move 
overall. But you know red bull has high ambitions. And last year it was not he was not even 
competing for a world championship. I'm not talking about winning the world championship 
but at least competing. So this is the thing, the reason why I did say actually to drop them the 
bomb and decide to move or at least tried to move to some other producer.  
 
Author: And moving on, the next two aspects are proximity to core competence and absorptive 
capacity. So Mercedes and Williams are in a alliance and all of a sudden Mercedes realizes that 
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the only contribution they had last year during the first half of the season was Williams which 
was using their own engine. Does that affect the knowledge sharing process in an alliance like 
that.  
 
Interviewee 2: Well usually what happens is that manufacturers, engine manufacturers that are 
also keen competitors. They don't share their ups, their most updated engine, and some 
technology with their competitors when they realize that it's a better competitor. I mean 
Mercedes had an advantage there went way beyond what we Williams have, they have more 
resources, done an incredible job in their hybrid system. So in the end the official or unofficial 
voice is that they don't believe they don't deliver the same engine that they have. Or maybe 
they did unbelievably update as quickly as they would do they're onto you. So that's how you 
create a slag. But still there are situations in which this mechanism don't play out well or work 
because for example you have it happened in the past that when Renault was competing with 
its team and in turn Red Bull win the championship again and again. So it can happen that a 
customer car wins or among factory happened before it can happen again.  
 
Author: And probably that was the reason why Mercedes and Ferrari were unsure about 
sharing their engine.  
 
Interviewee 2: That's a reason I mean Mercedes said a straight no. Ferrari said we happy to 
sell as long as they agree not to get the engine that we have, the very last season's engine. I 
mean Ferrari doesn't even sell that engine to a Toro Rosso or a Hass which technically speaking 
not have the same skills, the same you know technological advancements, as Red Bull. So to 
be cautious so I think that's the reason.  
 
Author: And building on that how much you think your alliance partner's absorptive capacity 
plays into it. i mean Williams compared to Mercedes is a small team; when you compare the 
size and budget; so a Mercedes can, I mean one assumes here that they have a lot more 
technological know how then compared to Williams; especially in the area of hybrid engine 
which is not an area of expertise for Williams and Williams have always collaborated with 
engine manufacturers. So what role does absorptive play in such a scenario?  
 
Interviewee 2: Well OK. If absorptive capacity... I mean I go back to the original paper of 
Cohen Levinthal in 1990 on absorptive capacity. For me absorptive capacity is that capacity to 
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absorb knowledge or external knowledge and is created by the prior investments that 
companies having specific knowledge domain. So say because I invested a lot into 
understanding how hybrid system works is supposedly I will be better off learning new things 
about hybrid systems. There's a kind of you know I indulge in edhi effect a little bit but on the 
other hand it's also what drives understanding and learning.  
 
Interviewee 2: So my idea is if there are certain teams that are traditionally much better at 
developing in certain aspects so Red Bull has always been very good in aerodynamics, Ferrari 
has always been very good in engines, Mercedes recedes is very good in engines and 
aerodynamics. So I think there's a there's a kind of you know expectation. So what you know, 
you know is that you know..well on the one hand you know absorptive capacity allows you to 
put people...rather than absorptive capacity, we'll talk about learning. So companies try to 
collaborate to learn something from their partners or at least to obtain the knowledge that they 
lack to close the gap with competitors. On the other hand absorptive capacity shows that if a 
company has a long track record on one specific domain it will be better learning in the same 
domain. So let's say, if, we know that Red Bull Racing has an extraordinary understanding of 
aerodynamics than what they miss is the engine production. So they will try to pair up with the 
teams that are very, that can provide them understanding or knowledge or technology on engine 
mechanics. And I think this is pretty much the reason why certain complimentary synergic 
alliances are born and why other don't come up, don't get established.  
 
Author: Yes that is very interesting you say that the reasons are...so what really decides 
whether an alliance for knowledge transfer is successful or not. Where you know, For example 
what is, what is making the Mercedes and William alliance work and why the Renault and Red 
Bull alliance fault? What is the reason behind the successful knowledge transfer alliance.  
 
Interviewee 2: Well I'm not sure there is a knowledge transfer there. I think there was more 
like an integrative capability. So it’s not that...I mean knowledge transfer means that you know 
it would mean that let's assume that Mercedes works with Williams So Mercedes transferred 
the knowledge on engine to Williams and then I would expect next year Williams to build its 
own engine because they learnt how to build engines. But this doesn't happen. What happens 
is they simply put together two components they built together and these two components seem 
to work very well together. Although they're not being designed to work together, they have 
kind of modular fitting. So I think rather than looking at knowledge transfer here which is I 
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think something that happens more and between perhaps other type of suppliers and not engine 
suppliers, here it’s more like integrative capability. So how comes the same components work 
very well in some cars and in others they work less well. So in Williams, the engine works 
extremely well, in Force India, a little less. Main reason is also money and expertise. Williams 
is one of the most successful teams in Formula One and been there for many years despite 
being a relatively smaller teams. Let's say they are bigger of the small teams of what we call 
the garigestas. They normally only do cars for racing, they don't sell other products besides 
consulting and stuff like that. So I think they are quite good at knowing what you're doing. 
Force India is a lower limit, lower budget company and lower budget team and they are less 
experienced, have less talented engineers. Overall they come up with the package that is less 
profitable, less performative than what Williams can come up with. So I think it's a matter of 
skills and experience.  
 
Author: I'm sorry to interrupt, but it's very interesting you said that knowledge transfer 
happens in case of other suppliers. So for example let’s say Xtract the gearbox supplier. In 
what sense would they benefit from their alliance with of a Formula 1 constructor?  
 
Interviewee 2: Well the alliance with Formula 1 constructor allows them to understand how 
highly technologically advanced organization works in a highly competitive environment, 
learns to overcome its challenges. Right so it's a way of learning for example processes, 
application of components. You basically open a box of one of the most technologically 
advanced organizations and you are able to read inside this kind of; you know the box and see 
what's there. And so you learn on the other hand the team can learn something about a specific 
application of a component. And this will allow them in the future either to vertically integrate 
or eventually in that specific time to access type of knowledge that is in the field. So to say if 
a company works with a supplier. The only way you'll have to absorb what your competitor 
does is either you manage to copy them or you work with a supplier, this company work with 
in trying to access to the same level of knowledge same level of quality of components that 
your competitor is using.  
 
Author: That’s very interesting because when I look at the company of size of Magneti Marelli 
one of the biggest, you know electronic component manufacturer in the world. They get into 
alliance with a lot of Formula 1 teams, especially the longstanding alliance with Ferrari. And I 
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am thinking about direction of knowledge flow there. Is flow from Ferrari to Magneti Marelli 
or the other way around and what role does that directionality play?  
 
Interviewee 2: My feeling is that probably Ferrari learns from Magneti Marelli I mean Magneti 
Marelli are part of the same group, they are part of the Fiat group. So anyway Magneti Marelli 
learns from Formula One more in terms of you know practices, in terms of and it has an 
opportunity to invest in a highly competitive environment some type of products. So basically 
good thing about working with Formula 1 is that you basically can push your technological 
boundary to the limit and therefore come up with new solutions. Then other industries would 
be maybe even too much. It's a testing ground for new ideas while at the same time Formula 1 
learns something in terms of the specific technology application. You also have to consider a 
certain components these days have become commodities. So for example the central ECU of 
Formula 1 car, I think is supplied by McLaren to everybody. And so it's a commodity, so you 
do not really learn anything because everyone has the same component. It is like tyres, you 
don't learn anything from tyres because everybody got tyres. That you have because Pirelli 
supplies for everybody. At best what you learn is you learn how to fit the tyres when you're, in 
your architecture or you learn you know how which tyre works best. In depending on what 
setup you have or what kind of environment in the race there is but it's just a commodity, you 
get it because you know because everybody does. And then there are certain components you 
like or core components which are the ones where actually you have a massive impact on 
performance. In other cases you only have an impact on performance on negative cases.  
 
Interviewee 2: So to say when basically the component breaks down so car doesn't work but 
you don't have an advantage if it works. Or the advantage is minimal so in those cases the logic 
of convenience is what drives the relationship.  
 
Author: Very interesting. So when you think about Formula 1 and knowledge transfer, which 
industry do you think Formula 1 can contribute to , which industry do you think, in your opinion 
can learn from Formula 1 or is already in the process of profiting from the technical expertise 
that Formula 1 has to offer.  
 
Interviewee 2: Well Formula 1 has a clear connection to automotive which has always been 
because the owners of majority of the teams are the automotive companies or their...like I 
always say it's, Formula 1 is like the Big Brother of a Big Brother show of an R&D lab. So 
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basically you take an R&D lab and you create a show around this. You basically make some 
money out of the efforts that your army of engineers are doing. So majority of formula 1 teams 
have the imperative duty to passs or to develop valuable knowledge for the automotive 
industry. However there have been application to many other fields like hospitals or health 
care. Defense, transportation, sports industries, aerospace, satellite communication, big data 
communication, boat design. So there's plenty of application technology wise. I think we're just 
scraping the surface of the things that formula one can do in terms of developing technology. 
In terms of developing practices, I think its application is almost universal because the kind of 
pressure that the go through with the kind of dynamics they go through they are second to 
nobody. And this is why you know people, colleagues of mine, like Professor Mark Jenkins or 
others have been able to develop such compelling lessons for a manager from any type of 
industry. So especially fast paced industry, you can find a lot of similarities or at least you 
know there are broader managerial lessons you can learn. So I think that applicability is very 
very broad with a let's say un primary role of automotive  
 
Author: So the final question is what factor or dimension of knowledge would you classify as 
being a very critical role in the success of these alliances.  
 
Interviewee 2: So depends what you mean success of alliances. So you mean success for the 
Formula One team or success for the component producer. Because I think there are at least 
two type of alliances here; the alliances that Formula 1 team creates with their suppliers and 
their partners in that contributed to racing. So the customer in this case is the Formula 1 team 
and a provider of knowledge is most of the time and other is component producer or another 
Formula 1 team that provides the engine or other parts of the car. In that case the measure of 
performance is how well the formula 1 team is performing in the races. There is another 
measure of knowledge transfer, what in my paper on industrial corporate change I call the 
external knowledge transfer which means the fact that you bring knowledge from Formula One 
domain, may this be technical knowledge, may this be simple knowledge, simply process 
knowledge or you know practices best practices to other domains. In this case the measure of 
performance is how fruitful this knowledge transfer, these new insights that you are suggesting 
that a formula 1 teams to the external partner are for a business of the external partner. Often 




Interviewee 2: This is totally idiosyncratic to the task and you know I'm today at the company 
and how they work together. I think it depends of course it depends on you. But I think there 
are certain domains where Formula 1 has an expertise that is stronger. Like simulations or any 
kind, from CFD to Monte Carlo simulations for the races. Improvement of design engineering 
so how to improve the design of an object to for a specific purpose. And the third is 
management of complexity. So in terms of management practices how do you take decisions 
in situations where you have multiple stimuli and multiple sources of information? And you 
perhaps have a limited amount of time element amount of cognitive resources to provide a 
response. I think Formula 1 teams are very good at making the decision, making extremely 
linear and synthetic and effective. This is another field in which they, they can give a major 
contribution. But this is not it, Of course they can do much better than that.  
 
Author: You have to make a distinction between the knowledge transfer that is focused on 
racing success and knowledge transfer which you classified as external knowledge transfer.  
 
Interviewee 2: Exactly. 
 
Author: Thank you, those are all the questions that I had in mind. 
 



















Interviewee 3 is Professor of Engines and Energy System and based at a highly regarded British 
university. He has an extensive experience of working in industry, including Formula 1 
constructors and engine manufacturers and other motorsports, such as Indy Car in the US. 
Much of the interviewee’s research has been collaborative with universities and industry and 
gives him a unique vantage point on the subject of (tacit) knowledge transfer in Formula 1.  
 
The interview involved discussion of the interviewee’s work experience at various firms, in 
Formula 1 and automotive industry and as such included mention of information sensitive for 
these firms. The interviewee wished for the discussion to remain confidential. Therefore, author 






























Appendix 8 Journal Publication Based on the Thesis 
Tutors and gatekeepers in sustainability MOOCS 
D Mishra, S Cayzer, and T Madden 
On the Horizon 25 (1): 45-59 
Introduction 
The call for papers for this special issue challenges us to consider whether digital pedagogies are “supportive of 
sustainability or perpetuators of unsustainability”. Since Foster (2008) defines sustainable development as “a 
social learning process to improve the human condition” it would therefore seem appropriate to consider whether 
digital pedagogies can enable social learning. Our focus here is the use of online platforms, specifically MOOCs.  
MOOCs (Massive Open Online Courses) are sometimes credited with the potential to revolutionize distributed 
learning. Practices such as learner generated resources, system thinking and citizenship education, are 
characteristic of so-called connectivist MOOCs, or ‘cMOOCs’. In such MOOCs, it might be that the educator could 
take the role of facilitator or even absent themselves entirely from the learning process. At the other end of this 
continuum in MOOC categorisation is the ‘xMOOC’ where pedagogy is not dependent on learner contact and is 
driven by tutors via lectures and automated assessment (Bayne & Ross, 2014). Larger ‘traditional’ distance 
learning courses could potentially be included in such a definition. Increasingly, however these distinctions are 
becoming irrelevant. Most MOOCs cannot be neatly arranged into these two categories and often show 
contradictory participation patterns (Kop, 2011).  
In this paper we examine the extent to which MOOCs enable social learning. We use Social Network Analysis 
(SNA) to explore the nature of interaction between participants in two different MOOCs, particularly the role of 
tutors in mediating such interactions. We find that tutors, playing the role of facilitator and educator in the MOOC, 
can and do take a central role in some cases. However, in other cases the removal of tutors has little effect, 
suggesting that different modes of learning are possible in a MOOC community. We see participants playing 
central role in the network as ‘gatekeepers’; influencing network learning, learning driven by the participants via 
conversations among themselves and information flow. The implication is that digital pedagogies, when structured 
correctly, can enable social learning and thus support education for sustainability.  
Related Work 
McAuley et al. (2010) define MOOCs as “…a significant departure from the cliché “ivory towers” of traditional brick 
and mortar universities, the “walled gardens” of conventional learning management systems…” Some authors 
(Jacobs,  2013;  Hew  & Cheung, 2014) argue that MOOCs offer a model of democratisation in higher education: 
courses available to the  greatest  number  of  people  possible  with  the  lowest  barrier  to  participation. MOOCs 
differ from traditional classroom learning in their scale, pedagogy, and reach (Yuan & Powell, 2013). This has 
potential repercussions for higher education and its traditional practices (Gillani & Eynon, 2014; Gašević et al, 
2014). Sinha (2014) highlights how MOOCs are prompting participants to rethink learning and it has also been 
suggested that the real potential is in the new knowledge created through student interaction within MOOCs 
(Gillani & Eynon, 2014).  Thus, the traditional roles of student and teacher are challenged (Koutropoulos et al, 
2012; Rodriguez, 2013); for instance, in connectivist-type MOOCs, the educator could take the role of facilitator 
or even absent themselves entirely from the learning process (Kop, 2011). This approach is not, of course, unique 
to MOOCs, but it is possible that the scale and reach of MOOCs allow these learning networks to be qualitatively 
different to those found in classroom environments. 
Social Network Analysis (SNA) is a key tool to understand patterns of interaction in education (de Laat et al 2007). 
SNA has been used to perform quantitative comparisons between different communities and courses (Shen et al 
2008). The structure of the network can be pedagogically important: Reuven et al 2003 (quoted by de Laat et al 
2007) have found that critical thinking was enhanced in a structured network (rather than an unstructured forum).  
In the context of digital pedagogy, there are a number of relevant mathematical measures, or metrics. Simple 
metrics include the number of participants (nodes) and interactions (links, though also known as edges in the 
literature) in a network. These metrics give a sense of scale, which is usually of a different order of magnitude in 
a MOOC compared with a traditional classroom environment, or, indeed many online courses. MOOCs tend to 
have low participation as a percentage of total enrolments, with completion rates around 15% (Jordan, 2015). In 
addition, the vast majority of MOOC participants tend to ‘lurk’, that is, operate in read-only mode; Breslow et al 
(2013) found over 90% of participants were lurkers. Thus, the density (the percentage of all possible links present) 
is expected to be low. This gives an initial picture of participation. However, as Lipponen et al (2003) point out, 
high density may be due to one dominant individual. In this way, a highly-active teacher’s presence may affect 
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the density of a network disproportionately (Martinez et al 2003).  
Toikkanen & Lipponen (2011) assert that density is “unrelated to quality or meaningfulness” of online learning. If 
this is the case then perhaps we need a node-centric metric such as degree (Rabbany et al 2014; Russo & 
Koesten 2005) which refers to the number (or relative proportion) of links to a node. The degree can be weighted 
(e.g. by the number of times these nodes have interacted). High degree denotes a node that is highly connected 
in the network and potentially highly influential; low degree denotes a node that is on the periphery (Wasserman 
& Faust, 1994), thus SNA can be used to identify isolated participants (Reffay & Chanier 2003). It is common to 
measure average degree over a network 
Betweenness centrality is a measure which incorporates the importance of nodes as interconnectors. It is 
measured by counting the number of shortest paths which pass through this node. This number is divided by the 
total number of shortest paths in the network to give the betweenness metric. A node with high betweenness 
has a large influence on the transfer of items through the network. However this metric is not necessarily 
correlated with the participants’ subjective experience of learning (Toikkanen & Lipponen 2011) nor to course 
grades (Cho et al 2007).   
Average path length shows how closely connected nodes are; however this metric can only consider finite path 
lengths i.e. connected nodes. Diameter is the longest of these shortest paths. A large diameter implies a 
potentially loosely connected community; a small diameter may be a very densely connected community, or one 
in which few connections are present (most nodes unconnected or in small clusters).  
These possibilities can be teased apart by looking at the clustering of the graph.  Connected nodes tend to form 
in clusters, which may be weakly or strongly connected. Weakly connected clusters are those in which every 
node is connected to every other, directly or indirectly through other nodes in the cluster.  It is common for the 
entire graph, with the exception of isolated nodes, to form a single weakly connected cluster. However, 
participants can be originators (in-degree) and/or recipients (out-degree) of connections: for example, posting 
or receiving replies on a discussion. When this link direction is taken into account, strongly connected clusters 
are those where every node has at least one in-link and at least one out-link to some other node in the cluster 
(not necessarily the same node). A strongly connected cluster suggests a more conversational nature of 
interaction. 
Modularity is the tendency to form sub-communities. More precisely, modularity compares links within clusters 
against links between clusters. The result is calculated as a scalar with +1 representing perfect modularity (ie all 
links within and no links between clusters). The algorithm proposed by Blondel et al (2008) starts with individual 
nodes (i.e. clusters of size 1) and then performs a hill climbing search, clustering nodes one by one until modularity 
can no longer be increased by the addition of one more node. The algorithm repeats on the clusters produced by 
the first pass, and so the process repeats until a local maximum is reached. A modular structure might result in 
deeper, or perhaps just more fragmented, community discussion. Toikkanen & Lipponen (2011) find that 
communities with low modularity and few clusters are conducive to learning, at least according to the learner’s 
subjective experience.  
These SNA metrics will be used to build up a rich picture of network structure with and without tutors, and to relate 
this structure to pedagogic outcomes.  
Methods 
We focus on the ‘Sustainability for Professionals’ MOOC delivered by the University of Bath on the FutureLearn 
platform which hosts the ‘Inside Cancer’ MOOC, also from Bath. ‘Sustainability for Professionals’ tends towards 
being pedagogically connectivist, with ‘Inside Cancer’ being more traditional and instructor led. To be more 
precise, ‘Sustainability for Professionals” was designed1 along the following principles: 
• The course is designed to encourage conversation and connection between participants 
• The course makes use of FutureLearn facilities to encourage and maintain connections (e.g. like, follow).  
• There are discussions of the form “Share your experience of [X]”; thus, sustainability decision-making is 
framed as a learning process.  
• The course uses the diversity of perspectives to bring context to the topic under discussion. As Siemens 
(2005) notes: “While there is a right answer now [here], it may be wrong tomorrow [elsewhere] due to 
alterations in the information climate affecting the decision” (alternatives in square brackets our 
                                                     




These MOOCs were chosen because they differ in staffing, pedagogy, and subject matter. This helps us to 
juxtapose how different approaches can lead to different learning patterns. 
The FutureLearn platform provides a dataset containing comments posted by the participants and tutors during 
the course. These comments are time stamped, with each commentator and comment being assigned a unique 
identification number. Comments may be either directly associated with course content, or may be a response to 
another user’s comment.  
For our analysis we used Gephi, a popular industry standard open source network analysis and visualization 
toolkit (Jacomy et al., 2014; Burns, 2012).  
The definition of nodes and links are as follows: 
• A node represents a participant who has posted at least one comment (we also use the term ‘active 
participant’). This is not the same as FutureLearn’s definition of an ‘active learner’ – a participant who 
has completed at least one section of the course. In general, only a proportion of active learners post a 
comment and become active participants. This proportion is around 60% for the Sustainability MOOC 
and 40% for the Inside Cancer MOOC.  
• A link represents a response to a comment. The FutureLearn dataset does not support hierarchical 
responses, so the recipient node is taken to be the owner of the original comment and not any intervening 
response. 
• Link weight is the number of interactions between 2 nodes (participants). Directed links are permitted 
and recorded; the results reported here use directed links.  
 
We coded a data transformation (Appendix I), to create nodes and links for Gephi from the FutureLearn dataset 
Table 1 shows number of nodes and links for each run of the courses. 













Nodes 962 1109 1177 1512 1099 1069 
Links 2312 2279 1822 1215 1255 1141 
 
These files were imported into Gephi, and those metrics held to be most useful to investigate the networks (see 
Table 2) were calculated to create the final dataset containing values for each node and the graph as a whole 
Table 2: Metrics used for SNA analysis of the MOOCs 
Metric How Calculated 
Nodes (Participants) Simple count  
Links (Interaction among 
participants) 
Simple count 
Network  Diameter  Longest finite optimal path between nodes using undirected links 
Graph Density Fraction of all possible undirected links present 
Modularity  Calculated using Gephi algorithm, based on Blondel et al (2008) 
Weakly Connected  Minimum number of clusters in which each node is reachable from every other node 
along undirected links 
Strongly Connected  Minimum number of clusters in which each node is reachable from every other node 
along directed links 
Average Degree Average number of undirected, unweighted links per node 
Average Weighted Degree  Average sum of weights on undirected links per node 
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Average Path Length Average path length (along undirected links) between all connected nodes 
Number of Shortest Paths Number of optimal routes found between nodes 
 
Interviews with Tutors 
In addition to SNA, structured interviews were carried out with the lead tutors on the two MOOCs to contextualise 
the network analysis and discuss the metrics. The interview questionnaire is in Appendix II. The interviews 
highlight the approach of tutors to the online learning environment and their expectations (or lack of) concerning 
network learning. The tutors also remark on differences between a traditional pedagogic environment, such as 
university classroom, and a MOOC.  
The interviews highlighted the tutors’ approach to the MOOC and helped contextualise the SNA findings within 




(a)               (b) 
 
Figure 1 Sustainability March 14 Network Graph with (a) and without (b) Tutors. One of the tutor nodes is circled 
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on the left hand picture. Node size and colour is based on Betweenness Centrality 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the effect of removing tutors from a network. A number of well-connected nodes (including the 
one circled in the picture) have been removed; and yet the network still appears richly connected. Of course, this 
is only a visual impression and a deeper inspection can be achieved through the examination of SNA metrics as 
shown in table 3.  
Table 3: Metric Table. Figures in brackets are metric value of the network without tutors. Where no figure is given, 



























10 12 12 14 (12)  11 11 
Graph Density 0.003 (0.002)  0.002 0.001 0.001 (0) 0.001 0.001 
Modularity  0.305 (0.338)  0.373 (0.367)  0.401 (0.42)  0.501 
(0.542) 




356 (423)  470 (480)  586 (589)  972 (1008) 664 (669) 669 (673) 
Strongly 
Connected  
764 (786)  887 (891) 987 (985)  1435 (1450) 1011 (1008) 976 (973) 
Average Degree 2.403 (2.051) 2.055 (1.963) 1.548 (1.463) 0.804 
(0.679) 
1.142 (1.03) 1.067 
(1.011) 
Average 
Weighted Degree  
3 (2.53) 2.705 (2.596) 2.038 (1.933) 0.997 
(0.844) 





0.048 (0.031) 0.029 (0.028) 0.024 (0.023) 0.01 (0.008) 0.024 0.023 
Average Path 
Length 
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Fig 2: Comparison of SNA metrics for Sustainability (first three columns in each group) and Cancer (final 3 
columns in each group) MOOCs. The metrics are normalized against the maximum for that particular metric.  
Table 3 presents the summary results for the SNA metrics considered. Figure 2 presents the data in a relative 
form (normalised against the maximum value for that metric across all six MOOC runs). The number of active 
participants (nodes) increases for subsequent runs of the Sustainability MOOC but with the number of connections 
(links) decreasing. A contrasting effect occurs for the Cancer MOOC, with the number of nodes decreasing and 
the link numbers holding steady.  Another contrast is shown for network diameter, with the value for the 
Sustainability MOOC increasing and that for the Cancer MOOC decreasing. The average path length shows a 
similar pattern.   
The density for these MOOCs tends to be low with Sustainability having a higher density then Cancer. In case of 
degree, we observed that the Sustainability MOOCs had higher average and weighted out-degree than Cancer 
MOOCs. Again, subsequent runs appeared to have opposite effects, with degree increasing in Cancer MOOC 
but decreasing in the Sustainability MOOC.  
Looking at connected components we found two distinct trends. First, in both courses, there are almost twice as 
many strongly connected components as weakly connected components. Second, runs of the Cancer MOOC 
have higher number of connected components, both weakly and strongly. This difference reduces with 
subsequent runs to the extent that it is barely noticeable on the third run. Modularity also displays the same trend. 
The first run of the Cancer MOOC has a much higher modularity compared to its Sustainability counterpart, but 
this difference disappears by the third run of the MOOC. The clustering coefficient exhibits the same trend as 
modularity but in reverse (with values increasing rather than decreasing and vice versa). 
Overall, the metrics appear to be converging over repeated runs with two exceptions: number of edges and 
number of shortest paths. In both cases Sustainability is consistently and appreciably higher than the Cancer 
metric; the latter showing no sign of increasing. This is evidence of some persistent difference between the 
MOOCs. Further evidence is given by a higher proportion of nodes with high betweenness centrality in the 





Figure 3. Cumulative distribution of betweenness centrality for three runs of the Sustainability and Cancer MOOCs. 
Betweenness centrality is plotted on a log scale (unitless), and the graph is expanded to show the top 25% 
participants ranked by betweenness centrality. 
 
 
Figure 4. Effect of removal of tutors (% increase or decrease). The bars are arranged as for figure 2. The bar for the 
density in the first run of the Cancer MOOC has been cropped from -100%.   
As one would expect, the removal of tutor nodes (fig 4) has a negligible effect on the number of nodes (less than 
1%), but the effect on links is more marked, particularly on the first run. The removal of tutors also appears to 
have little effect on overall density; we observed an appreciable effect only in the first run of each MOOC where 
removal of tutors from the network resulted in more than 33% drop in density. Removal of tutors increases 
modularity and number of connected components, but decreases all other metrics.  
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In general, removal of tutors appears to have the most effect on network metrics in the first run of each course.  
Interviews with Lead Tutors 
The lead tutor for the Cancer MOOC remarked on the nature of interaction among learners and how the level of 
engagement was “surprising”. They also commented on the role of tutor in clarifying and verifying information 
posted by learners. The Cancer MOOC is part of a content-driven discipline and needs tutor intervention on 
matters of technical knowledge and veracity of information within the network. The tutor felt that the MOOC offers 
more robust engagement for students in terms of involvement of patients, experts, and consultants when 
compared to the traditional classroom environment. The tutor also highlighted a different approach to aid student 
learning in the MOOC with focus on end of the week wrap-ups to assist student learning. 
The lead tutor for the Sustainability MOOC pointed to the design of the course as a critical factor for an online 
learning environment and how it leads to greater participation. In case of Sustainability MOOC, the lead tutor 
already had experience of distance learning programmes and found that helpful in delivery of the MOOC. Though 
they thought that the MOOC is similar to online distance learning programmes, the MOOC generated more 
positive feedback and they thought it to be more engaging and enjoyable for the tutors. The lead tutor also felt 
that MOOCs appeared to have more potential for network learning compared to traditional distance learning as 
students involvement appeared to be increased. MOOC learners displayed a distinct set of motivations compared 
to traditional pedagogic environment learners, such as university students. The lead tutor added that students in 
university may be more driven by “value for money” aspect of the course whereas MOOC participants with their 
different backgrounds and professions are more interested in learning for the sake of it. The lead tutor also pointed 
out how conversations in MOOCs are initiated by highly confident people before spreading through the network. 
 
Discussion 
Social Network Analysis (SNA) is a key tool to understand interactions in an online environment (de Laat et al 
2007) and allows quantitative comparison between different networks and thus between courses (Shen et al 
2008). The  structure  of  the  network  can  be  pedagogically  important: Reuven et al 2003 (quoted by de Laat 
et al 2007) have found that critical thinking was enhanced in a structured network (rather than  an  unstructured  
forum). Table 5 shows a comparison between sustainability MOOC and a traditional pedagogic environment 
course. 
 
Table 4: Comparison between a traditional pedagogic environment course (left hand column: data taken from 
Palazuelos et al 2013) and the Sustainability and Cancer MOOCs (all three runs) 
Characteristic Introduction to 
Multimedia 
Methods 




Size ~70 962 - 1177 1069-1512 
Density 0.05 - 0.07 0.001 – 0.003 0.001 
Average degree 1 - 2 0.5 – 1.5 0.8 – 1.1 
Diameter 11-19 10-12 11-14 
Components 1-3 356 - 586 664-972 







350 – 550 nodes 
Although the number of participants did vary between the MOOCs, and between the individual runs, the number 
of active nodes was between 962 and 1512, thus allowing comparison between the datasets.  
Density for these MOOCs tend to be low, perhaps because a majority of MOOC participants are predominantly 
in a ‘read only’ mode. Density can be problematic as the presence of even one dominant node can greatly skew 
its value. We observed that trend only in the first runs of the Sustainability and Cancer MOOCs (this aligns with 
the conclusions of Martinez et al 2003.).  
Average degree and diameter are somewhat reduced in MOOCs; however this difference is small in comparison 
to the explosive growth of clusters, many of which are in fact isolated nodes. This suggests that the connectivity 
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in MOOCs is worth exploring further.  
One common finding is that the Sustainability MOOC is better connected that the Cancer MOOC, with higher 
values for links, cluster size and number of shortest paths. Toikkanen & Lipponen (2011) have shown in their 
paper that students with better network connectivity have a more meaningful learning experience, at least 
according to their subjective judgement.  
Betweenness centrality presents an interesting picture.  Frequency distribution (figure 4) curves suggest that the 
Sustainability MOOC nodes usually have a wider distribution and higher values for the betweenness centrality 
metric. For example, almost 10% of the Sustainability nodes have betweenness of 0.001 or higher, whereas in 
Cancer only the top 2% of nodes are this well connected. This suggests that the Sustainability MOOC design has 
had a tangible effect on network learning, which we define as the learning driven by the participants via 
conversations among themselves. In network learning; participants acting as information brokers attract other 
participants based on their reputation and are hubs for flow of information flow (Kop, 2012). This phenomena is 
particularly relevant for sustainability. Sustainability, perhaps more than any other academic field, is most relevant 
to daily life of citizens. Citizens not only need to be aware of sustainability as a concept but also be taking active 
part in promoting sustainable practices to ensure sustainable development. For this to happen, sustainability 
conversations need to spread via mediums other than traditional pedagogical environments such as classrooms 
and university campuses, and to this end, network learning is conducive. Driven by participants, a network learning 
environment can facilitate wide penetration of sustainability awareness. 
The lead tutor interviews confirm these intuitions; the Cancer MOOC is more traditional in its structure and involves 
tutor involvement on technical subject matter. In the case of the Sustainability MOOC, the lead tutor remarked on 
how network learning was facilitated via the design of the course. This is also highlighted in literature: Bayne and 
Ross (2014) remark on how the discipline and related practices influence the pedagogical approach to MOOCs 
On subsequent runs of the MOOC, they become more similar in terms of modularity, connected components and 
degree. However, the number of shortest paths is still appreciably higher in the Sustainability MOOC. A common 
finding was that the effect of tutor node removal was ameliorated in subsequent runs. Particularly in the case of 
clustering, modularity and connected components, tutor node removal goes from having a very strong effect to 
an almost negligible effect. This suggests that both MOOCs are adapting to a network learning mode. This ability 
of a MOOC to adapt and encourage network learning even when the course is not specifically designed to do so 
stands out in our study.  
Studies done using SNA (Xie et al., 2011) have described the role of gatekeepers, who themselves resist external 
influence, are committed to spreading their point of view, and when they reach an inflection point, their ‘followers’ 
adapt their point of view. Boyd et al. (2010) describe how these gatekeepers filter the information and resources 
that reach other participants within the network. We suggest that this description is apt for our identified 
participants with high centrality. While of course all participants may access any comment or response, in practice 
gatekeepers are critical nodes in the network around which other nodes congregate. Removing these nodes from 
the network will not only eliminate certain information channels but also remove network connection for a vast 
number of nodes.  However, these gatekeepers would not have responsibility to validate the information that they 
feed into the network as a tutor or information gatherer might. This is where digital pedagogies adapt a contrasting 
approach to that of traditional learning environments.  
However, this does not mean that tutors are not essential to such a learning environment. Tutors play an 
indispensable role in delivery of the course and when approached by participants, they can validate the 
information that is being filtered via the gatekeepers. Tutors also play the role of ‘emotionally engaged enthusiast’ 
(Ferguson & Whitelock 2014) encouraging learners. Tutors’ limited role in initiating conversations within the 
network is due, in part, to the design and content of the courses and composition of the network participants. A 
MOOC designed for a discipline that focuses on professionals (Sustainability) will encourage network learning 
with minimum input from tutors, whereas a MOOC designed in a discipline with highly technical details with a 
focus on experts and students in the field (Cancer) will behave differently, and interactions within such a network 
will not be on a similar scale as can be seen in table 3. Participation, as shown by number of links, in the 
Sustainability MOOC is greater than in the Cancer MOOC. The importance of design is highlighted in the 
interviews with the tutors as well.  
The MOOC networks under study differ depending on the subject matter and yet show a tendency to converge 
somewhat. As shown in our analysis, most metrics tend to similar values with each subsequent run. MOOCs offer 
a network learning approach based on connection, communication, and collaboration. Participants build 
connections and communities leading to collaborations and information flows. The role of participants, as shown 
in our analysis, is critical and in contrast with traditional pedagogies, it is the participants, especially those who 
 198 
 
act as gatekeepers that direct the learning process and access to resources.  
This implies a different type of learning is possible in a MOOC community where the network of learners, instead 
of the tutor, facilitate learning. The role of the tutor in such a case is limited to the delivery of the ‘lecture’ and 
participants learn via network learning where gatekeepers act as hubs for information flow and greatly influence 
the network.  
Our analysis shows how pedagogically connectivist-type MOOCs can play a constructive role in sustainability. 
Sustainability courses that are designed and delivered in a MOOC environment can lead to network learning with 
knowledge sharing and conversations being driven by participations. Participations in such MOOCs tend to form 
communities with certain individuals playing the role of gatekeepers. As our analysis highlighted, these 
gatekeepers are distinct from tutors who play a limited role in driving the conversation. This type of ‘network 
learning’ where participants take a leading role has implications for sustainability pedagogies. 
 
Limitations and Future Implications 
 
Our study is based on analysis of two MOOCs, Sustainability for Professionals and Inside Cancer, run by the 
University of Bath. We analysed three runs of each course and thus limited in sample size. Our analysis was not 
carried out in a controlled environment, which may limit its generalizability. The findings therefore should not be 
taken to describe all MOOCs, but rather describe potential outcomes which can be facilitated by appropriate 
course design. The gatekeeper role described and demonstrated will not necessarily be the case for other 
MOOCs, even those designed in a pedagogically connectivist manner. Platforms for MOOCs represent another 
limitation to our analysis. We made use of FutureLearn platform which is one of many platforms available for 
MOOCs and it is possible that different platforms will have different effects on network learning.  
On limitation of our study is that we did not track other connections between learners, such as ‘like’ or ‘follow’, 
preferring to focus on the connections formed by responses, which we assume involve more cognitive effort. 
FutureLearn does provide some of this data so it would be possible to augment our analysis in future work. 
Another limitation is that we did not interact with participants after they had finished the course. It would be useful 
to interview students on their experience of the MOOC and how it facilitates/obfuscates the learning process.  
There is much work to be done to elaborate on the role of gatekeepers and their motivations with a focus on how 
they affect social learning. A combination of mathematical analysis, observational studies, learning interventions 




Our study has implications for sustainability education. Our question was the extent to which MOOCs enable 
social learning. We used social network analysis to explore the nature of interaction between learners in a MOOC, 
particularly the role of the tutors in mediating such interactions. We found that tutors can and do take a central 
role in early runs of the MOOC – however, with the subsequent runs the removal of tutor nodes has little effect, 
suggesting that different modes of learning driven by participants are possible in a MOOC community. We 
postulate that in such a network ‘gatekeepers’ are critical for information flow. In such a network, the tutors can 
focus on course delivery and verification rather than acting as connectivity hubs. We have shown that two different 
MOOCs adapt to this pattern to some extent. However differences persist, and we conclude that appropriate 
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parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description='Restructure MOOC CSV.') 
parser.add_argument('input_csv', type=open) 
args = parser.parse_args() 
  
data_in = {} 
with args.input_csv as csvin: 
    reader = csv.reader(csvin) 
    next(reader)  # skip titles 
    for cid, author_id, parent_cid in reader: 
        data_in[cid] = (author_id, parent_cid.strip()) 
  
data_out = collections.defaultdict(int) 
for source_author_id, parent_cid in data_in.values(): 
    if len(parent_cid) > 0: 
        data_out[(source_author_id, data_in[parent_cid][0])] += 1 
  
with open('output.csv', 'w') as csvout: 
    writer = csv.writer(csvout) 
    writer.writerow(['source', 'target', 'weight']) 
    for k, v in data_out.items(): 





• How would you describe your role in the MOOC? 
o (Follow up) Does your role in the MOOC differ from your role in the 
classroom? 
• How would you describe the extent of your involvement in the community of 
students? 
o (Follow up) Did you find your involvement levels changing with the 
progression of the course? 
o (2nd Follow up) How does it differ from the traditional classroom 
environment? 
• Did you take on the same role in each run of the course? 
o (Follow up) If yes, why? Does it differ from the classroom? 
o (Follow up) If no, why?  
• How would you describe the network learning and involvement of the participants? 
o (Follow up) Did you find the levels of participation changing with the course 
progression? 
o (2nd Follow up) Does this stand in contrast with the classroom setting? 
• What were your expectations regarding student participation and network learning 
before the course commenced? 
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o (Follow up) Did these expectations change with the subsequent runs of the 
course? 
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